WIN #25-01 dated 24 June 2001
Weekly Intelligence Notes (WINs) are produced by
Roy Jonkers for non-profit educational uses only.
Associate editor Don Harvey contributed to this WIN.
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SECTION I
- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
TROFIMOFF TRIAL TESTIMONY -- Former KGB CI
general Oleg Kalugin testified that he had spent several
hours with George Trofimoff, the former US Army civilian
chief of the Joint Interrogation Center, at an Austrian
resort some 20 years ago, discussing espionage
requirements. Kalugin said that the KGB considered
Trofimoff a most valuable agent. Kalugin told the jury
he had supervised hundreds of agents around the globe
but personally knew only the best. He met with less than
a dozen agents -- and one of them, he said, was
Trofimoff. He said he had advised Trofimoff that
"he could do better," and warned him about
divorcing his American wife to marry an 18-year old
German nurse. He thought it might cost him his security
clearance. (Trofimoff did it anyway). According to
Kalugin, Trofimoff's productivity improved dramatically
after their meeting -- and so did Trofimoff's stipend.
Looking at him court, Kalugin noted "He looks
almost the same. He's lost some weight. He's older. But
we all are." As a side comment, Kalugin was
reported not to be pleased to have to testify. He had to
be subpoenaed.
In previous testimony a British intelligence officer
(John Doe) connected Trofimoff to documents smuggled out
by Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB archivist who collected
notes on KGB spies from 1972 to 1984 (Ref:
The Sword
and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret
History of the KGB [1999]). The British officer, who
had translated Mitrokhin's notes after the latter
defected to Great Britain (in 1992), testified about the
spy known by the KGB aliases of "Markiz,"
"Konsul" and "Antey" - whose
documents were shown all the way up to the Russian prime
minister and Ministry of Defense. The officer said the
spy not only provided more than 80 volumes of top secret
documents but also had seven volumes on himself in the
KGB archives. One volume is made up of about 400 pages.
"The more volume an agent has, the busier he's
been," the British intelligence officer said.
Numerous notations indicated that "Markiz" was
an official member of the 66th group of American
military intelligence and recruited by a clergyman.
Trofimof, 74, was a (reservist) member of the Army's
66th Military Intelligence Brigade, while serving as the
civilian chief of the Army's operations at the Joint
Interrogation Center in Nuremberg, Germany.
Earlier in the trial the jury was shown six hours of
secretly videotaped conversations between Trofimof and
an undercover FBI agent in which Trofimof detailed 25
years of spying for the Russians with the help of Igor
Vladimirovich Susemihl, a childhood friend who served as
the equivalent of a cardinal in the Russian Orthodox
church. Trofimoff has denied all charges.(Jonkers) (Assoc.Press//Wash
Post 20Jun01, p. A28.-- The Tampa Tribune 20 June 2001
p.1 - courtesy Frank Durr)
TERRORIST PLOT FOILED IN INDIA -- An alleged plot
to blast the United States Embassy in New Delhi was
reportedly foiled by the Special Cell of the Delhi
Police in coordination with the Indian Intelligence
Bureau . Two suspected terrorists were arrested,
including a Sudanese national, and quantities of high-
intensity explosives were discovered. . Police sources
said the two men were sent by Osama bin Laden's
organization - which was behind the attacks on U.S.
missions in Somalia, Egypt and Sudan - to carry out a
devastating attack on the U.S. Embassy here. (
http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/2001/06/16/stories/0116000c.htm)
(courtesy T. Newcomb, MW-AFIO)
ALERT IN YEMEN -- A group of suspects have been
arrested in Yemen for plotting to kill FBI and US Navy
personnel investigating the bombing last year of the
destroyer USS Cole. The suspects were believed to be
planning a suicide bombing attack against the American
Embassy in Sana, the capital of Yemen, to kill the
investigators. The FBI announced that the agency was
reacting to concrete information about the plot, and the
investigators were withdrawn from Yemen. US forces in
the entire area are on alert.
The reported plot was the latest turn in an
investigation that has been characterized by early
breakthroughs but has since failed to provide American
and Yemeni officials with the hard evidence on core
responsibility. Osama bin Laden, the FBI's most wanted
terrorist, has been portrayed as a prime suspect from
the start.
At least a dozen suspects have been arrested in
connection with the Cole attack, and six had been
scheduled for trial in Yemen. But the FBI pressured the
Yemen government to defer the trial as it sought to get
to the heart of the operation. Among those facing trial
are a Yemeni man suspected of importing the fiberglass
skiff used in the attack and several others who
confessed to providing the two suicide bombers with
false identity documents, a truck and other logistical
help. (Jonkers) (New York Times June 19, 2001//C.
Marquis)
SECTION
II - CONTEXT AND PRECEDENT
CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT -- Just before his
departure in January of this year CIA Inspector General
L. Britt Snider wrote an internal report with critiques
of Agency procedures, now reported in the press,
presumably leaked. After noting that the agency was
generally in good shape and that morale was high, Snider
focused on three basic areas where improvement was
needed:
(1) Management -- He noted "the
relative lack of centralized management and control
over resources.... It is often impossible to know
where money is and how it is actually being
spent." This not only impedes efficiency and
accountability but also makes it more difficult to
justify the need for additional resources. The problem
with asking the White House and Congress for more
money is that the agency has failed to show "it
has done all it can on its own to manage and conserve
its resources.. . . And at this juncture I think it is
a long way from being able to do so."
(2) The Information Revolution --
"Unless the Agency can continue to add value to
what customers are increasingly able to do for
themselves, their reliance upon the Agency's output is
going to diminish...[and] our ability to influence the
decision-making process is apt to erode over
time." To maintain its edge, the CIA must harness
technology currently in use in the private sector, Mr.
Snider said, noting the recent creation of the CIA
technology center known as In-Q-Tel. He described the
semiprivate office as having an "uncertain"
probability of success.
(3) Security Policy -- In comments
that run against the grain of most conventional
thinking about security policy, Snider proposed a
selective relaxation of Agency security requirements.
"The numerous requirements placed upon employees
for security or suitability reasons, e.g., recurring
polygraph examinations, psychological testing, annual
financial disclosures,... ought to be
reconsidered," he wrote. "While these
requirements may still make sense for the clandestine
service or employees otherwise posted overseas,
continuing to apply them indiscriminately to the
Agency population as a whole (many of whom never leave
the Washington area) seems debatable to me."
(Jonkers) (WashTimes 20June01, p.4//Gertz) (Secrecy
News 20 June 01) (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/snider.html)
NSA HONORS FOUR CRYPTOLOGISTS --
For the third consecutive year, the National Security
Agency inducted into its Hall of Honor yesterday
cryptologists who played a significant role in the spy
agency's history. The four honorees joined 11
cryptographic giants celebrated on the wall at the
National Cryptologic Museum. For the first time, three
of the honorees -- Mahlon E. Doyle, Howard C. Barlow and
John E. Morrison -- are still alive, a break with the
agency's practice of honoring only those who are
deceased. The fourth honoree, the agency's foremost
linguist, Sydney Jaffe, died in 1972 after working for
more than three decades for the agency.
"It's hard for us to talk about what we do,"
NSA Director Lt Gen. Hayden noted after unveiling the
plaques. "This agency has a wonderful heritage that
we want to build on . . . It means an awful lot to be
able to honor these individuals." (Jonkers) (Balt.Sun
15 June01 //L. Sullivan)
FOREIGN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT CAPABILITIES SURVEY
-- The US has been, and must be, concerned about the
nuclear space (missile) threat. Current capabilities by
nations cited as "rogue" threats do not seem warrant
a limited space missile defense. But if the nuclear
space/missile threat to the US appears to be years away,
an effective space/ missile defense is years away too --
and requires heavy immediate investment of talent and
funding. Massive US reprisal is a useful rational
deterrent, but miscalculation. miscommunication and
emotional (suicidal) irresponsibility (that may well be
caused by our policies) are rife in this vale of tears,
and US defense planners must plan for all eventualities.
The current situation is reflected in this NBC (open
source "intelligence") report.
According to the report, only one missile system
currently being developed by a foreign nation has the
capability to reach US territory in the near future. Of
the five states usually mentioned in discussions
justifying limited missile defense programs, Iraq,
Libya, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea (three secular
Islamic states, one religious Islamic state and one
communist bad boy -- or three pip-squeaks and two small
states), only North Korea has what can be called by any
stretch of the imagination an "advanced"
missile development program. North Korea's Taepo-Dong 2
missile, still under development, would have the range
to strike the United States but only at Alaska's thinly
populated western edge, or under the most pessimistic
assessments, the city of Anchorage. While it would be
the first missile strike on U.S. soil, it would almost
certainly be met by a devastating U.S. counterstrike
that would destroy the attacker and do little damage to
U.S. strategic interests. In addition, only North Korea
and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. Of these two, only
Pakistan is believed to have successfully built nuclear
warheads. While U.S. intelligence believes North Korea
has built one or two nuclear weapons, there is no
evidence that it has built missile warheads.
The five countries' missile development programs are
hindered by other limitations, such as:
(1) None has fielded a missile with a solid rocket
engine or even tested such an engine in flight. Each
uses liquid fuel engines, which require hours and in
some cases days to load and fire. A solid rocket engine
can be lighted and fired within in minutes.
(2) None of the states have extensive missile-launch
facilities or even missile-development facilities. North
Korea's facility on the Sea of Japan is limited to a
single, unprotected launch pad and nearby assembly
building, connected by a dirt road.
(3) None have the industrial capability to build even
moderately large numbers of missiles.
BOTTOMLINE:
North Korea's Taepo Dong-2, the most
advanced missile in development by any of the five
states, has yet to be fired from the Koreans'
rudimentary missile-test facility. Under the most
extreme assessments, the missile would have a range of
3,600 miles when fielded, U.S. intelligence officials
say. At that 3,600-mile range, it could strike as far
east as Anchorage. If its range is at the low end of
estimates 2,400 miles it could strike only the
westernmost islands of Alaska's sparsely populated
Aleutian chain. The Taepo-Dong 2 would need a range of
more than 4,800 miles to strike the U.S. mainland, and
somewhat less to hit Hawaii.
No other nation on the list has fielded a missile with a
range greater than 900 miles, according to U.S.
officials. Pakistan has the Ghauri missile, which it
bought from North Korea to defend itself against its
primary local enemy, India. Iran has yet to test any
missile with a range greater than 600 miles, and is
primarily concerned with hostile neighbors Iraq and
Afghanistan. Libya has only old Scud-B missiles with
ranges of 180 miles, and is a non-entity. Iraq is
covered by a billion-dollar space, air and ground
intelligence coverage blanket, and is limited by U.N.
sanctions to missiles with ranges no greater than 90
miles. Although Baghdad is asserted to have hidden Scud
missiles from weapons inspectors, none would have ranges
greater than 540 miles.
MISSILE SUMMARY: Iran
(Scud C: 300 miles, Status -- deployed; Shehab-3: 600
miles, Status -- tested ; Shehab-4: 900 miles, Status --
in development.) Distance to US -- 5,400 miles (Alaska),
7,200 miles (Mainland)
Libya (Scud B: 180 miles, Status -- deployed)
Distance to US -- 7,200 miles (Alaska), 9,000 miles
(Mainland)
Iraq (Ababil-100: 60 miles, Status -- deployed;
al-Samoud: 90 miles, Status -- tested; al-Hussein: 360
miles, Status -- forbidden, possibly hidden; al-Abbas:
540 miles, Status -- forbidden, possibly hidden)
Distance to US -- 5,400 miles (Alaska), 7,800 miles
(Mainland)
North Korea (Scud B: 180 miles, Status --
deployed ; Scud C: 300 miles, Status -- deployed; No
Dong: 600 miles, Status -- tested ; Taepo Dong 1: 900+
miles, Status -- tested ; Taepo Dong2: 3,600 miles,
Status -- in development) Distance to US -- 2,400 miles
(Alaska), 4,800 miles (Mainland)
Pakistan (Shaheen: 180 miles, Status -- deployed;
Tarmuk: 180 miles, Status -- deployed ; Ghauri: 900
miles, Status -- deployed)
(Jonkers) (MSNBC.com// June 19, 2001 /// Robert Windrem,
NBC News)
"COVERT" ACTION -- THE SADDAM HUSSEIN
OVERTHROW -- Another lesson on how not to institute
a covert action aimed at overthrowing a despot was
played out in the press recently. It began with a page
one story in March in a leading West Coast paper
denouncing in not-subtle-at-all terms the
leader/spokesman of the Iraqi National Congress, the
US-chosen group to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Ahmad
Chalabi, the INC leader, and the INC in general, was
described as having "no meaningful support" in
the region and as being seen as the gang that couldn't
shoot straight. Next came a defense of Chalabi in a
Washington paper by a distinguished columnist calling
the March attack "character assassination" and
pointing out that Chalabi was the bete noire of
the CIA because he publicized the agency's gross
failures in Iraq. (NOTE: It is difficult to understand
why Chalabi is accused of publicizing the near
simultaneous Baghdad roll-up of two CIA counter-Hussein
operations since the disasters were widely reported in
the press at the time.) In June the Washington press
reported an audit of the expenditures of the INC to
date. The audit was expected to hold up plans to build a
satellite transmitter in northern Iraq (predominantly
Kurdish and protected by US aircraft from Turkey), to
send teams of INC operatives into Iraq to collect
information on Saddam's regime, and to distribute
humanitarian aid.
The latest press report on the possibly/ uniquely/
unbelievably/ presumably covert action cited the State
Department's notification to Congress [which began
this affair with a $97 million allocation to State to
support the Iraqi opposition] that it plans to release
an additional $6 million to the INC to cover continuing
administrative costs and to facilitate the exile group's
efforts to start broadcasting television programs by
satellite into Iraq. The press is confusing on how much
money the INC has received thus far, but it has offices
in London, Washington, Damascus and Tehran with expenses
of about $2 million a month.
Reportedly, the group has so little credibility in the
Arab world and in Turkey that all but one of the states
bordering Iraq have made it clear to State that the
group will not be allowed to operate out of their
territories. In Iran's case, the INC spending of US
dollars in Tehran is probably unique as an instance of
US/Iranian cooperation. Of course, Iran has been backing
its own anti-Hussein force for years [and one that has
actually launched military operations, albeit not
terribly successfully, inside Iraq]. The one thing that
can be said about this current effort to unseat Hussein
is that it is simpler than its predecessors in the
overthrow campaign; Saddam's agents now only have to
read English language newspapers to remain current with
the state of play. ["state of play" is a
deliberate description since the US efforts make it look
like a game, only using real instead of play money.]
(Harvey) ( LA Times 19 Mar '01, p.1; Wash Post 8 Apr
'01, p. B7 by Jim Hoagland; Wash Times 11 Jun '01, p.11;
Wash Post 14 Jun '01, p. 44)
CHINA COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER LOOKS TO
FUTURE -- After 80 years, CCP leader Jiang
reportedly discussed alternative political leadership
solutions for China, allegedly saying -- "There are
also problems with presidential systems such as the
United States. The president may be elected by the
people. But he proceeds to appoint cronies to high
positions." Jiang said he favored the elitist
system model, as in Singapore and Malaysia. He added the
future of reform in China would develop in the form of
the popular selection -- under the criteria and
supervision of the CCP -- of well-educated, elitist
elements to fill senior posts. (Jonkers) (<http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2001/CNN-061301.htm>
/Willy Wo-Lap Lam)
SECTION
III - CYBER INTELLIGENCE
NIPC ADVISORY -- National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC) Advisory(01-013) "Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability In Microsoft's Internet
Information Services (IIS) 4.0 and 5.0. "The NIPC
and FedCIRC are jointly issuing this advisory to
highlight the vulnerability addressed in Microsoft
Security Bulletin MS01-033. Attackers can remotely gain
SYSTEM LEVEL ACCESS (root) on any computer running
Microsoft's IIS Web server software. System-level access
allows a user full access to the server, so as to
install malicious code, run programs, reconfigure, add,
change, or delete files. The NIPC and FedCIRC consider
this to be a significant threat due to the large
installed base of IIS users, the potential for remote
compromise, and the level of access granted by this
vulnerability. This FBI Awareness of National Security
Issues and Response (ANSIR) communication is intended
for corporate security professionals and others. The
Microsoft bulletin describing this vulnerability, and
its patch to fix the problem, may be found at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-033.asp
(FBI Special Agent Gary Harter, gharter@leo.gov)
HACKER VIGILANTES STRIKE BACK -- As security
breaches explode and law enforcement struggles to keep
up, some organizations are taking the law into their own
hands and punishing hackers themselves. Striking back at
hackers with, for example, denial of service attacks is
a sensitive subject, since doing so is illegal in most
countries. The process involves bombarding a server with
so much traffic that it crashes. However, security
experts say the U.S. Department of Defense has done it.
(courtesy T. Newcomb) (CNN) [http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/06/20/hacker.vigilantes.idg/index.html]
HACKER ATTACKS ON CALIFORNIA POWER SUPPLY FOILED
-- Several times over a period beginning April 25 and
lasting until May 11, hackers attempted to gain access
to the servers at California's Independent System
Operators (Cal-ISO), the agency that manages the state's
electrical supply and decides when rolling blackouts
will occur. According to the Los Angeles Times,
malicious users got close to disrupting the flow of
power in California during the rolling blackouts that
occurred on May 7 and 8z of this year. The attacks were
routed through China during a time when Chinese hackers
had announced a cyberwar against the United States in
retaliation for the death of Chinese pilot Wang Wei, who
was lost at sea when his plane collided with a US spy
plane April 1.(Levine)
(http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/comment/0,5859,2777037,00.html)
SECTION
IV -- BOOKS AND SOURCES
THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE: Attacks on
American Surveillance Flights, by Larry Tart and
Robert Keefe, Ballantine Books, NY, June 2001, ISBN
0-8041-1911-2., over 500 pages, including Appendices,
Notes and Index.. This is a work by an insiders, former
members of the "back-end" crews who have
played such a critical role in collecting intelligence
through by airborne electronic surveillance missions.
The majority of these reconnaissance missions are
routine, but the recent collision of the Navy's EP-3
and a Chinese fighter demonstrate the always-present
risk. The EP-3 crew survived, because of the skill of
the pilot, and because the Chinese did not want to shoot
it down -- only to harass. The Chinese pilot shadowed
the plane, flew directly beneath it to create
turbulence, and then suddenly started a climb
immediately in front of it -- and misjudged the
distance. He performed that dangerous maneuver precisely
because China does not officially consider the US its
enemy. In the Cold War, in too many cases, the approved
method was to kill it. And that what is covered by this
excellent book that fills a hole in the literature of
Cold War - and still ongoing- intelligence
reconnaissance missions. The Price of Vigilance brings
to life the risks and sacrifices, the diplomatic furor
that erupted after shootdowns, the grief and frustration
of the families. The centerpiece is the shootdown of the
USAF C130 over Armenia in 1958, with no survivors. This
is story of a part of the silent war the needed to be
told. Larry Tart and Robert Keefe have done another
service by writing this book. Recommended reading!
(Jonkers)
BIN LADEN ORGANIZATION VIDEO -- A
recruitment video created by the terrorist organization
al-Qa'ida and its leader, Osama Bin Laden, has recently
become available to several news agencies. The video
features terrorists in various stages of training and
includes direct references to the bombing of the
American destroyer USS Cole. The video appears to
be a promotional vehicle to increase membership in al-Qa'ida
and solicit financial contributions.
[http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/21/video.binladen/]
SECTION V
-
LETTERS
Ref: NRO OVERHANG -- (WIN 24 item).
Former HPSCI Staff Director Mark Lowenthal writes
:
A minor point of clarification re the
NRO: the "flap" in 1996 was about the fact
that the "carry forward account" was so
large, but not that funds had been diverted to build
the new NRO buildings. NRO always had carry forward
authority as some of its programs could not be fully
executed in a fiscal year. However, HPSCI was
amazed/shocked, etc. when we discovered just how large
this account had become and that it was not being
fully reported to Congress. However, there was never
any concern that some of these funds had been used for
other purposes, such as the new buildings.
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