WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE NOTES (WIN) #48-00 dtd 1 December
2000
WINs contain intelligence items and commentaries selected, written,
edited and produced by Roy Jonkers for AFIO members and WIN
subscribers. Associate Editor Don Harvey contributed to this
WIN.
WINs contain proprietary and copyright information, and may be
electronically re-disseminated only as approved by the Editor, except
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SECTION I
- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
PENTAGON INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON JOHN DEUTCH -- The DOD
Inspector General (IG) said in a final report made public
November 28th that John Deutch committed a "particularly
egregious" violation of security rules by using unsecured
computers at his home and in his office. While serving as an
Undersecretary of Defense in 1993 and then as Deputy Secretary of
Defense until 1995 (the second- and third-ranking civilian posts at
the Pentagon, respectively), Deutch "declined departmental
requests that he allow security systems to be installed at his
residence."
The Pentagon
investigation tracked down at least seven desktop and laptop computers
that Deutch had used, several of which were later sold or donated to
educational institutions. None was found to have classified materials
stored in their memories. But a former aide told investigators that
Deutch had used two portable computers to write a daily journal that
contained classified information. Because computers used for the
journal also were at times hooked up to Deutch's Internet account, the
inspector general called Deutch's actions "extremely risky."
"The evidence we obtained clearly establishes that Dr.
Deutch failed to follow even the most basic security
precautions," the report concluded. During that same period, it
added, Deutch signed a memorandum to all Pentagon employees warning
that only "properly reviewed and cleared" information should
"be placed on electronic systems accessible to the public."
Deutch declined
to be interviewed by investigators "based on the advice of
counsel." A special prosecutor appointed by Attorney General
Janet Reno has recommended Deutch be charged with violating security
laws, but the matter is still under review. (Wash.Post Nov29,2000,
pg 9 /// Walter Pincus) (Jonkers)
RUSSIAN AIR FORCE RECONNAISSANCE MAY RESUME ALASKA AIR PATROLS
-- The Russian Air Force has moved several of their ancient
prop-driven Tu-95 Bear bombers to Anadyr airbase in northeastern
Siberia, and another three to Tiksi airbase in north-central Siberia,
and may soon be planning to resume air surveillance patrols off
Alaska. The Russians last deployed bombers over the Bering Sea in
March of this year. Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said the
Russian actions fit a recent pattern of air training and surveillance.
"We would anticipate that in the next few days they might fly one
or several of these planes up through the Bering Straits and close to
Alaska." Twice this fall Russian Air Force planes also flew near
the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in the Sea of Japan off the coast of
Siberia, and afterward released photographs showing that they had
approached the carrier. These flights are both normal training and
surveillance operations, and a possible manifestation of Russian
internal policy struggles about defense roles and missions, pitting
the various Russian services against each other in the fight for
status and budget dollars. (NYT 1 Dec 2000, AP)
(Jonkers)
NATO REVERSES COURSE ON ALBANIAN TERRORISTS --
In a reversal of familiar Balkan roles, and shifting the
focus of US/NATO intelligence to yet another hotspot, NATO praised
Serbian restraint yesterday and pledged to cooperate with Belgrade in
a crackdown on ethnic Albanian terrorist activities. The statement by
NATO Secretary General George Robertson, using the
"terrorist" label for the Albanian guerillas for the first
time, exposed NATO's extreme
frustration with Albanian nationalist extremism and announced a
six-point program of action, including new priorities for intelligence
surveillance. "Albanian extremist activity in the
Presevo Valley (of Serbia proper) is in no one's interest and only
serves to heighten tensions," he added. Robertson left no
doubt that he blamed the "UCPMB" for the increased tension
in the area, posing a "direct threat" to the Kosovo
peacekeeping mission, KFOR.
UCPMB is the
Albanian acronym for a self-styled liberation army in the Presevo
Valley, a demilitarized zone between Kosovo and Serbia.. A guerilla
attack last week captured several strategic points in the Valley and
raised fears of more bloodshed in the region. Serbia moved tanks up to
the line. Serbian police backed by two armored vehicles entered a
"strategic village" in the area and searched for terrorists.
Measures in
NATO's six-point program include (1) an
information campaign on the politically damaging effects of extremist
activity in the Presevo Valley; (2) mobilization of Kosovo Albanian
politicians who may be able to lay a moderating hand on hard-line
guerrilla groups; (3) contacts between Presevo Albanians and Serb
authorities; (4) closer KFOR contacts with local Serb police; (5)
increased intelligence/surveillance operations on the boundary line
and (6) closer (intelligence) monitoring of any violence in the
demilitarized zone.
In context,
within Kosovo, the KLA and its extremist supporters lost
overwhelmingly in recent local elections, as Rugova�s moderate party
received 80% of the votes (as they also received before brutal Serb
counter-terrorist operations in Kosovo were opposed by the US and
resulted in US/NATO embrace of the KLA, properly cleansed by
propaganda). The KLA reacted, as in the past, with assassinations,
this time of Rugova's
subordinates, and by exporting violence to Serbia proper. It appears
as if a lesson has been learned, however, in that NATO is not about to
embrace the neo-Stalinist drug-dealing
KLA extremists for the second time, and that the Serbs have started
using their brains. US/NATO Intelligence will now be focusing on
another hotspot. (Baltimore Sun,30Nov2000) (Jonkers)
CHINA - U.S. MILITARY EXCHANGES -- China
and the United States tentatively agreed yesterday to more exchanges
between their militaries. Two days of talks between U.S.
Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe and a group of Chinese
generals exhibited the wavering dynamics that now characterize overall
relations. China's pledge last
week not to help Pakistan, Iran and others to build nuclear-capable
missiles apparently brightened the atmosphere. Mr. Slocombe
later told reporters: "There's
no question that the United States and China have real differences
about issues and that some of those are quite important differences.
There's a difference between
that and regarding each other as enemies." As the wise man once
said, "keep your friends close, and your enemies closer."
Military contacts are a sensible step in a process requiring
continuous prudence. Good intelligence is a prerequisite. (Wash
Times Dec1, 2000, p. 16)
SECTION II - CONTEXT &
PRECEDENCE
CHINA SLIPS PAST U.S. AWACS BAN -- Russian officials say
they are going to lend China two Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS)
radar surveillance aircraft for three years, and then sell them
advanced, $200-million versions of the AWACS airplane in a deal
similar to that offered previously by Israel -- which the U.S.
opposed and believes it has killed. Delivery of up to six
advanced A-50E AWACS airplanes to China is to be completed by 2005,
according to both U.S. and Russian officials.
Even a first-generation
Russian A-50 AWACS with a limited radar range up to 150 miles would be
a key element in increasing the coordination and striking power of
China's air forces. China
currently has very little capability for directing groups of aircraft
in a combat environment. This shortcoming has been one reason that
neither Taiwan or the U.S. have been overly concerned about Chinese
invasion threats, since air superiority would be necessary for any
successful thrust across the Taiwan Strait.
The standard Russian-built A-50 is a "far-less
capable AWACS than the Chinese would have had" if purchase of an
Israeli-developed Phalcon system had been completed. The current
Russian AWACS is "early 1980s technology at best," said a
U.S. radar company official. "It's
large and bulky," has established a reputation for low
reliability and involves old transmitter/receiver technology. However,
the Russians are offering the A-50E, a derivative of the standard A-50
mainstay that carries a radar developed by the Moscow-based "NII
Priborostroenie" scientific and research institute. The
performance attributed to the system by Russian sources includes the
ability to detect cruise missiles against ground or sea clutter at a
range of up to 250 mi. The radar is expected to take three years for
production, tests and integration into the aircraft.
U.S. Air Force
analysts are said to be skeptical of the Russian performance claims.
"The A-50E [will be] less capable than the Israeli-modified
A-50I," said a U.S. official. "The A-50E will have a search
range [for aircraft] of approximately 125 naut. mi. and the capability
to track up to 50 targets. The A-50I would have had a maximum
effective search range of approximately 205-215 naut. mi. and the
capability to track up to 100 targets simultaneously with the more
advanced EL/M-2075 [L-band] radar."
Israeli aerospace
industry officials, frustrated by last-minute U.S. opposition to their
China sale, have vowed to ask for a reassessment of the program once
the new U.S. administration is in office. (AW&ST July 17,
pp. 38, 45 /// Wash Post Nov 29. P.9, David Fulghum) (Jonkers)
WW II SECRET INSURANCE INTELLIGENCE UNIT - NOW
DECLASSIFIED -- Some WWII intelligence operations had nothing
to do with double cross operations or glamorous people, but produced
more valuable information for war missions like strategic bombing than
many of those so glorified during the last half-century. Probably no
more than one percent of our members have ever heard of the special
unit described in this report (except those who remember an earlier
WIN report,� but the story is
so good it bears reiterating).
Newly
declassified intelligence files now held at the National Archives are
among those declassified last year to speed the identification of Nazi
assets. They tell of an OSS unit composed of not just secret
agents, but secret insurance agents. This "Insurance
Intelligence Unit" (IIU) provided data on a global industry that
both bankrolled and ultimately, helped bring down
the Third Reich. Usually about a half dozen men,
the unit focused on the enemy's insurance industry, its leaders, its
records, and suspected Allied collaborators in the insurance business.
They mined standard insurance records for blueprints of bomb
plants, timetables of tide changes and thousands of other details
about targets, from a brewery in Bangkok to a candy company in
Bergedorf. They provided data on which factories to burn, which
bridges to blow up, and which cargo ships could be sunk in good
conscience. They uncovered head counts for city blocks marked
for incineration and pothole counts for roads to be used for invasion.
That insurance
information was vital to Allied strategists who were seeking to
cripple the enemy's industrial base and batter morale by burning
cities. In 1944, the unit chief wrote regarding data for an
Allied bombing target committee: "Within a few days, a conference
on the burning possibilities of some important cities will be held.
I have reproductions of approximately 150 plans covering
Japanese plants about ready to ride."
Germany had 45% of the worldwide wholesale
insurance industry before the war began and managed to actually expand
its business as it conquered continental Europe. As "reinsurers,"
these companies covered other insurers against catastrophic losses and
in the process learned everything about the lives and property they
were reinsuring. The IIU was composed of men who knew the
insurance business and who were able to extract volumes of useful data
from the files of American, British and other insurance companies as
well as spotting possible insurance contacts that tracked back to the
Nazis. Working in Europe, one member of the unit - which operated in
the field largely unknown to the State Department or the War
Department - gathered material ranging from Chinese railway inspection
reports to photos of the Mitsukoshi department store in downtown Tokyo
to blueprints of the German chemical company that made poison gas.
Interestingly, the article notes that the two
largest insurance wholesalers before the war, Munich Re and Swiss Re,
are, once again, the two biggest wholesalers in the world. Presumably,
these firms again hold the sort of detailed but unglamorous data they
held decades ago; a cynical soul would wager the volume and mundane
nature of the data means it is not being mined even if its potential
value is known. (Los Angeles Times 22 Sep 00, p. A1 //Mark Fritz)
(Harvey)
SECTION III
- CYBER INTELLIGENCE
CIA COMPUTER GAMES - The CIA has completed its
investigation of "inappropriate use of Agency computer
systems" by a group of CIA employees and contractors, and
administrative action has been taken in a number of instances. It
involved the use of unauthorized "chat rooms" and databases
and a misuse of the Agency's
computer networks. The investigation uncovered no information
involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, but
the activities that were the subject of this inquiry were deemed to be
a clear and serious violation of the trust expected of all Agency
employees..
Four employees, including one Senior Intelligence
Service (SIS) officer, have had their security clearances revoked,
rendering them ineligible for continued CIA employment. Eighteen
employees, including two SIS officers, were issued letters of
reprimand and most of them will be suspended without pay for periods
ranging from 5 to 45 days. The SIS officers
were also downgraded one grade. In addition, the security clearances
of nine contractors were revoked.
The activities
under investigation began in the mid-1980s as an unofficial users
group on the CIA's mainframe system. Over the years, as the Agency
migrated to new information systems, the hidden databases were moved
to take advantage of these new systems. Concealed databases were
created outside of established management and security procedures.
Approximately 160 individuals at one time or another were involved.
Some had retired or otherwise left the Agency at the time of the
commencement of the security investigation. In addition to the
disciplinary actions noted above, 79 employees, with minimal
involvement, received letters of warning or security briefings. Eight
employees were exonerated and no action taken. (CIA Public Affairs 30
Nov/00)
(< www.cia.gov/public_affairs/press_release/pr11302000..html>
/// < www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/pas.html >)
(Jonkers)
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CENTER (NIPC) REPORT
-- The W32/ProLin@MM Internet worm (Shockwave) currently represents a
medium threat in the United States. Shockwave worm arrives as an
attachment to an email message with the subject "A great
Shockwave flash movie". The body of the message contains
the text "Check out this new flash movie that I downloaded just
now...It's Great, Bye".
The anti-virus software industry has created and released a Data file
that will detect and remove the malicious code from the infected
system. Full descriptions and removal instructions can be found
at:
http://www.symantec.com http://www.vil.nai.com
http://www.antivirus.com http://www.fsecure.com
http://www.sophos.com
Additional
information on NIPC and NIPC Advisories is available at: <
http://www.nipc.gov
>. This is an FBI Awareness of National Security Issues
and Response (ANSIR) report. Recipients are asked to report, actual or
suspected, criminal activity to the FBI or other law enforcement
agencies as appropriate. Incidents may be reported online at http://www.nipc.gov/incident/cirr.htm (Special
Agent G. Harter)
SECTION IV
-� BOOKS & OTHER SOURCES
SADDAM'S BOMBMAKER, by Khidir Hamza and J. Stein, Scribner,
NY 2000, (ISBN 0-684-87386-9) Although a previous WIN included a
mini-review by a media journalist of this book, the following
mini-review is by AFIO President Gene Poteat, based on his reading of
the book.
If you have
been incommunicado on a Pacific island for the last few decades, you
can catch up on the perpetual grindings in the Middle East by reading
this book. Hamza is one of the multitude of foreign scientists trained
in American Universities. He returned to his homeland to develop
weapons of mass destruction that would later challenge American
policies. Hamza, who was Saddam Hussein's
scientist charged with building an atomic bomb to counter those of
Israel, tells his story as a member of Saddam's
inner circle. He concludes that a crude Uranium bomb had been
designed, developed and would have been ready for testing except for
the interruption by DESERT STORM -- and hidden thereafter from UN
inspection teams. He learned from other scientists of similar chemical
and biological weapons programs. The book is written in layman's
terms and is a good read by virtue of his insight into the despotic
dictator's decadent and
paranoid behavior, his initial failed efforts for CIA help in
defecting, his eventual escape, the CIA's
later exfiltration of his family, and his life in America -- still
haunted by Saddam. (Poteat)
SECTION V � -
ODDS AND ENDS
ROYAL NAVY & MARINE FITNESS REPORTS� (FORM S206) EXCERPTS
-- Although fairly well and widely disseminated, here are a
few more snippets from British Navy and Marine efficiency reports:
* This Officer reminds me very much of a gyroscope
-- always spinning around at
a frantic pace, but not really going anywhere.
* When he joined my ship, this officer was something of a granny;
since then he has aged
considerably.
* This medical officer has used my ship to carry his genitals from
port to port, and my
officers to carry him from bar to bar.
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