Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
Boris Berezovsky Wins Litvinenko Poison Spy Libel Case. Businessman Boris Berezovsky has won a libel case over allegations he was behind the murder of former Russian agent Alexander Litvinenko.
He was awarded �150,000 ($224,000) at the High Court over a claim made by Russian TV channel RTR Planeta.
Mr. Berezovsky, 63, said he was a friend and supporter of Mr. Litvinenko and the comments were "outrageous".
The fierce critic of former Russian President Vladimir Putin was poisoned with polonium in London in 2006.
Mr. Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch who lives in Surrey, said outside the court he had tried to protect his reputation and was satisfied with the judgment.
He later said he had "no doubt" RTR and the Russian authorities tried to undermine his asylum status in the UK and put the murder investigation of Mr. Litvinenko on the "wrong track".
"I am pleased that the court, through its judgment, has unequivocally demolished RTR's claims," he said.
"I trust the conclusions of the British investigators that the trail leads to Russia and I hope that one day justice will prevail."
The state-owned channel RTR had boycotted the hearing claiming the court had robbed it of the opportunity to defend itself.
The allegations were made on its program Vesti Nedeli.
In his ruling, Mr. Justice Eady told the court in London: "I can say unequivocally that there is no evidence before me that Mr. Berezovsky had any part in the murder of Mr. Litvinenko.
The Russian, who was granted political asylum in the UK in September 2003, was suing over the broadcast in April 2007.
It suggested the motive was that Mr. Litvinenko had witnessed an attempt by Mr. Berezovsky to avoid extradition and obtain political asylum by obtaining false evidence.
He was alleged to have procured the false account - that there was a security service plot to kill him - from a Vladimir Terluk.
Mr. Terluk denied in court he was the person called Pyotr featured in silhouette in the program, but the judge said he had "no doubt".
The broadcast suggested Mr. Berezovsky was party to threats to Mr. Terluk's life, but Mr. Berezovsky insisted it was propaganda designed to threaten his asylum status and security.
Both RTR and Mr. Terluk are liable for the damages, but the judge said Mr. Terluk was not personally responsible for the claim Mr. Berezovsky was implicated in Mr. Litvinenko's murder.
Mr. Berezovsky had earlier told the court he first met Mr. Litvinenko, whom he knew as Sasha, in 1994 when Mr. Litvinenko was working for the Federal Counter-intelligence Service.
He said his friend had twice saved his life - in an explosion in Moscow which killed his driver and in a stand-off during a police raid.
Mr. Berezovsky said: "We shared a dramatic and dangerous history - he had helped me and I him, and, fundamentally, we shared the same enemy."
He said he visited Mr. Litvinenko several times when he fell ill and was shocked when he was told his friend had ingested polonium.
Mr. Litvinenko had met two Russian men, one a former KGB security officer, at a hotel in London before he fell ill.
In November 2007, Mr. Berezovsky was sentenced to six years in jail in his absence for stealing millions of pounds from the Russian airline carrier Aeroflot in the 1990s. He described the verdict by a Moscow court as "a farce".
Then, in June last year he was sentenced to 13 years in his absence for stealing thousands of cars from Avtovaz, also in the 1990s.
[BBC/9March2010]
Dubai Police Chief Asks Spies to Leave the Region. Dubai Police have warned spies operating in the Gulf to leave the region within one week or face consequences.
"Those spies that are currently present in the Gulf must leave the region within one week - if not, then we will cross that bridge when we come to it," Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan Tamim said.
The statement comes following the January 19 assassination of Hamas commander Mahmoud Al Mabhouh, which Dahi has blamed on Israel.
The ultimatum indicates that Dubai Police are aware of the identities of spies operating in the UAE and the Gulf region and appears to be a warning of exposure if they do not comply.
Asked if the alleged spies are holders of European passports, the police chief said: "Europeans and others", but he did not respond when asked if he was also referring to spies holding Arab passports.
It is unclear if Dahi was referring to spies working for European governments or those who use European passports to spy for others.
Dahi also accused Israel of "vast falsification" of Western passports. "We discover false passports on a daily basis," he said.
[Najami/GulfNews/9March2010]
Pakistan Spy Chief Gets One-Year Extension. Pakistan's prime minister has extended the term of the head of the country's main intelligence agency by a year in a move expected to reinforce efforts to fight Islamic militancy.
Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, director general of the military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, was due to retire this month but will remain in office for another year, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani's office said in a statement.
Pasha, a former head of military operations for Pakistan's Army, was appointed head of the ISI in September 2008, months after U.S. officials questioned the reliability of the spy agency in the campaign against militancy.
Such questions have largely ended under his leadership, however, since security forces mounted big offensives against militants in the northwest over the past year.
The powerful ISI has often taken the lead in combating militants, who have been attacking the agency as well as other security and government targets. It also plays a major role in foreign policy.
As such, India and Afghanistan view the spy agency with great suspicion, and it is often referred to as a "state within a state." Pakistan's civilian politicians also fear it for its role in previous coups.
[Reuters/9March2010]
The Eichmann Files: Classified Documents Could Be Released after 50 Years. Fifty years after Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann's arrest by the Israeli Mossad in Argentina, basic details about his 15 years as a fugitive remain a government secret. The files kept by Germany's foreign intelligence agency, the BND, remain classified today - allegedly for reasons of national security. A German journalist is now suing in a federal court for the release of the files.
Fifty years have passed since Adolf Eichmann's arrest, but the German foreign intelligence agency, the BND, is still hoping to prevent the release of files detailing his post-war movements. A Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig is currently examining almost 4,500 pages of secret documents on Eichmann, a leading architect of Hitler's plans to murder Europe's Jews. The court is soon expected to rule whether the BND's justifications for concealing the files are still applicable and in line with the country's freedom of information laws.
The court is using closed "in camera" proceedings in which the three judges considering the case are the only people with access to the files.
According to paperwork filed with the court, the BND maintains that secrecy is necessary because much of the information contained in the files was provided by an unnamed "foreign intelligence service." If the information were released, the BND argues, it would deter other nations from sharing intelligence with Germany in the future. "It would adversely affect future cooperation between foreign intelligence services and German security agencies," the agency's lawyers argue. The fact that the files are classified has prompted considerable speculation over the origins of the intelligence. The BND has clarified that the intelligence did not come from an American source, and it is widely assumed that it came from Israel's Mossad, whose agents captured Eichmann in Buenos Aires in 1960. He was subsequently brought to trial in Israel, where he was convicted and hanged.
Uki Go�i, a prominent Argentine journalist and expert on the post-war Nazi fugitives, has taken a special interest in the BND files and thinks that references to a foreign intelligence service are a smokescreen. "They could easily redact the name of the intelligence service and the name of the informants". "The files would not be embarrassing to any other secret service but to Germany itself." Go�i believes the files would reveal hitherto unknown levels of collusion between the German government and Nazis who fled overseas to escape prosecution.
In his book, "The Real Odessa," which describes how the Peron regime systematically aided Nazi war criminals, Go�i documents how Nazi war criminals lived free and easy in Buenos Aires. German Foreign Service members and Nazis visited the same establishments and drank in the same beer hall. The Nazis didn't hide their allegiances either: "The Nazis would come in, click their heels and throw up their traditional salute," Go�i told SPIEGEL ONLINE. Eichmann didn't feel the need to keep a low profile in that community. The German embassy in Buenos Aires gave his wife and children passports in their own name, just as they had given infamous Nazi doctor Josef Mengele a passport.
Attorney Reiner Geulen thinks that the most explosive information enclosed in the files pertains to Eichmann's flight from Germany. "He was very chatty in Jerusalem - he knew he was going to die anyway," Geulen said. According to Geulen, Eichmann explained in great detail who helped him flee Germany and then Europe - information the Israelis were very interested in. "There is good reason to believe that he received help from German, Italian and Vatican officials," he said.
One of the problems was West Germany's well-documented reluctance to hunt Nazi war criminals. "Why do you think the Auschwitz prosecutor, and Frankfurt public prosecutor, Fritz Bauer, traveled to Israel to the tell them about Eichmann's whereabouts instead of telling his own government?" asks Wilhelm Dietl, a former BND agent and author of a book about Eichmann's abduction from Argentina. "He didn't trust the Germans to want to find Eichmann."
Bauer's biographer, Irmtrud Wojak, agrees. She believes Bauer was reluctant to report Eichmann's whereabouts to his own government because of the number of former Nazis in office. "Last but not least, Werner Junkers, an ex-Nazi was the ambassador to Argentina," she wrote. Bauer feared someone in the government might tip Eichmann off.
For his part, journalist Go�i believes releasing the information will do more to boost Germany's reputation than besmirch it. "Whatever the German secret service did in the 1950s should not embarrass anyone today," he says. "The only thing that should be an embarrassment today is that they are trying to hide that information."
[Becker/Spiegel/11March2010]
"Jihad Jane" Suspect Dropped Out Before High School, Married at 16. The Pennsylvania woman who allegedly used the Internet alias JihadJane to recruit people for violent jihad had dropped out before reaching high school and was married at age 16, the start of a bumpy life that might have left her vulnerable to radical beliefs, according to federal sources and public records.
While caring for an ailing man in a suburban community where she had few friends, Colleen Renee LaRose, 46, turned to YouTube, MySpace and electronic message boards, where she found like-minded individuals bent on supporting international terrorism, according to an indictment unsealed this week. Her path to radicalization took years and included a series of online contacts with men who urged her to action, the sources said.
LaRose left her live-in boyfriend in Pennsburg, a quiet town outside Philadelphia, and traveled to Western Europe in August as part of an alleged plan to kill a Swedish artist. LaRose believed she could "blend in" to the community because of her blond hair, blue eyes and small frame, she wrote in e-mail messages to her alleged co-conspirators.
FBI analysts and national security experts have worried for years that Westerners with easy access to passports could be recruited for terrorist aims. Michael L. Levy, the U.S. attorney in Philadelphia, said the JihadJane case "shatters any lingering thought that we can spot a terrorist based on appearance."
Central to LaRose's case is the Internet, which is being used increasingly by al-Qaeda and other groups to penetrate U.S. borders with radical propaganda, National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael E. Leiter said in a talk last month to the Intelligence and National Security Alliance.
"LaRose's actions again reflect the fact that immersing oneself in the propaganda and culture of jihadists through the Internet can lead to an individual attempting to undertake a violent act, no matter that person's age, gender, or background," according to an analysis by the SITE Intelligence Group, a private firm that monitors jihadist Web sites.
LaRose is scheduled to appear in court March 18 for an arraignment on charges that she conspired to support terrorists and kill a Swedish artist and that she lied to FBI agents about her online activities and associations. Prosecutors say she could face life in prison if convicted. Mark Wilson, a public defender representing her, declined to comment.
LaRose was arrested in October in Pennsylvania, accused of attempting to transfer a passport stolen from her boyfriend, Kurt Gorman. She was appointed an attorney, appeared at a brief public court hearing, agreed to be detained and waived her right to a speedy trial. The grand jury indictment accusing LaRose of terrorist offenses did not emerge until last week and was unsealed by authorities Tuesday.
The charges came as a surprise to neighbors on Main Street in Pennsburg, a little less than 50 miles from Philadelphia, where LaRose had lived for years while taking care of Gorman's elderly father.
In an interview with CNN, Gorman said LaRose had vanished - with his stolen passport - in August, shortly after his father's death. Prosecutors say she traveled to Europe to find artist Lars Vilks as part of an alleged plot to kill him in revenge for his provocative drawing of the Prophet Mohammed on the body of a dog.
"Sounds crazy," Gorman told CNN. "It is hard to believe... She wasn't no rocket scientist. She was limited in her capacity, so I'm not sure how much she thought she could do on her own."
Four men and three women were arrested in Ireland by local police this week in connection with the case, according to European news accounts.
LaRose had brushes with the law in Pennsylvania, where in 2002 she faced charges of public drunkenness and disorderly conduct, according to public records. She also fought charges in South Texas, where she lived with Sheldon "Buddy" Barnum, the man she married at 16.
In a telephone interview, Barnum, who was 32 at the time of the 1980 wedding, said: "What do I remember about her? Nothing. Wasn't nothing to remember." [Johnson&Crites/WashingtonPost/10March2010]
Britain Spy Agency Lost Track of 35 Laptops. Britain's main signals intelligence agency lost track of 35 laptop computers in an unacceptable lapse that showed a "cavalier" attitude to tracking equipment, a parliamentary committee reported on Thursday.
An 2008 audit of laptops at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) showed 35 were unaccounted for, including three certified to hold Top Secret information; the intelligence and security committee said in an annual report on intelligence services. The rest of the laptops were unclassified.
GCHQ, a big eavesdropping operation similar to the National Security Agency in the United States, reports to the foreign minister, intercepts communications and translates them.
The committee said it appeared logging the allocation and subsequent location of laptops at GCHQ had been "haphazard."
"The Committee considers that this formerly cavalier attitude towards valuable and sensitive assets was unacceptable. GCHQ must ensure that it controls, tracks and monitors its equipment effectively. Now that proper processes have been introduced, we trust that this problem will not arise again."
In response, a government statement said it accepted the committee's criticism and conceded that GCHQ had been unable to account fully for all of its laptops at that time.
"However, GCHQ has no evidence of any loss of laptops or classified information," it said. "The most likely explanation in most cases is that the laptops were destroyed but without the destruction being fully recorded. GCHQ has now tightened up its controls."
The government has been repeatedly embarrassed by lapses over missing laptops and storage devices involving losses of information, such as when tax authorities lost data on 25 million people exposing them to the risk of identity theft and fraud.
GCHQ's predecessor, the Government Code and Cipher School, was responsible for Britain's greatest intelligence triumph, deciphering the codes of the Nazis' Enigma machine during World War Two.
[Maclean/11March2010]
Defense Official Ran Private Spy Operation. A Defense Department official is under investigation for hiring private contractors to gather intelligence on suspected insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
That information was then supplied to military units and intelligence officials, according to anonymous military and business sources in the United States and Afghanistan. The scheme violated U.S. policy against using contractors as spies.
Michael D. Furlong was reported to have hired contractors from a private company run by retired Special Forces officers for what some sources described as an off-the-books spy operation. Some sources said the information gathered by the contractors was used by the military to track down and attack militants providing effective "force protection.".
Officials said they were not sure who condoned Furlong's operation, and it may have been funded by diverting money from a program intended to merely gather information about the area.
They also said the operation appears to have been shut down while Furlong is under criminal investigation by the Defense Department.
A Pentagon spokesman had no comment. [AP/15March2010]
Iran's Cyber Police Hack US Spy Sites. Iranian security forces have arrested 30 people accused of waging cyber-war against the country with the backing of the United States.
A few hours after announcing the arrests the Islamic Revolutionary Guards said they had hacked 29 websites they allege are funded by US spooks. The sites use a cover of human rights activity to disguise an espionage network.
Tehran's Public and Revolutionary Court said on Saturday that the network of sites was designed to collect information about Iran's nuclear program.
The sites were also accused of: "provoking sedition and illegal demonstrations and rallies through releasing unreal and unfounded news and reports after the June presidential elections ... providing media and news support for the Jundollah terrorist group and the monarchist opposition groups."
The network was accused of distributing 70 million copies of US-made anti-filtering software.
Iranian authorities said the sites were funded by the US via opposition groups like the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization and monarchist groups.
In other news, Venezulan news websites have hit back at attacks from Hugo Chavez, the country's president. Chavez last week called for internet regulation and singled out one site - Noticierio Digital for criticism.
The site responded angrily to Chavez's attack, accusing him of threatening freedom of expression in all forms of media - the internet being just the most recent example. The site said the comments singled out by Chavez were posted without moderation, and were removed from the site as soon as it was made aware of them.
[Oates/TheRegister/15March2010]
Al-Qaeda Suspect From NJ Worked At 6 Nuke Plants. An American seized in Yemen in a sweep of suspected al-Qaida members had been a laborer at six U.S. nuclear power plants, and authorities are investigating whether he had access to sensitive information or materials that would be useful to terrorists.
Sharif Mobley, 26, worked for contractors at plants in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland from 2002 to 2008, mostly hauling materials and setting up scaffolding, plant officials said.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan said Friday that investigations are under way into which areas Mobley entered. But he noted that areas containing nuclear fuel are tightly controlled, and that a laborer typically would not have access to security information or other sensitive matters.
The plants are also checking areas where Mobley worked to ensure everything is in order, said NRC spokeswoman Diane Screnci.
Mobley, a U.S. citizen of Somali descent, has not been linked to any wrongdoing at any of the plants. And officials said nothing he did when he worked there aroused any suspicion.
Officials said Mobley passed the necessary screenings, which include criminal background checks, drug testing, psychological assessments and identity verification.
Nevertheless, Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, an industry watchdog, said the case raises questions about security at the nation's nuclear plants.
"The real question is: Was there information that the NRC or utilities could have seen that would have led to his disqualification?" Lyman said.
Mobley, a Muslim who grew up in Buena, N.J., was among 11 al-Qaida suspects rounded up earlier this month in Yemen. He was taken to a hospital there over the weekend after he complained of feeling ill. Yemeni officials said he snatched a gun and shot a security guard to death in an attempt to escape from the hospital.
He has not been accused by authorities in the U.S. or Yemen of attempting to make a bomb or attack a nuclear plant.
His parents have said he is not a terrorist, though former friend Roman Castro said Mobley was becoming increasingly radical in his Muslim beliefs before he moved to Yemen about two years ago.
Mobley worked for contractors at the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear plants in New Jersey from 2002 to 2008; the Peach Bottom, Limerick and Three Mile Island plants in Pennsylvania from 2003 to 2007; and Calvert Cliffs in Maryland for two weeks in 2006, operators said.
Company officials said most of his work came during periodic refueling outages, when hundreds of contract employees descend on the plants. The workers do a variety of jobs, but "nothing technical," said Curt Jenkins, business manager at Mobley's union, Local 222 of the New Jersey Laborers Council.
Mobley had "vital access" that allowed him into any area of the plants where he worked in New Jersey, Jenkins said. But guards were posted in the most sensitive places, and "anywhere that you might be able to do anything, they pretty well got that pretty secure."
Every worker entering a plant has to clear security, explosives and radiation checkpoints, and that information is recorded, the NRC's Sheehan said. The plants also teach employees to recognize and report suspicious behavior.
Jenkins said that he never saw any sign of trouble from Mobley and that he was a union member in good standing. "He always treated us with respect," he said. "Very well-mannered."
Mobley's work came during a period in which nuclear plant security was increased in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Steve Kerekes, a spokesman for the industry group the Nuclear Energy Institute, said that before regulations changed in 2003, workers could gain temporary access to plants before their screening was complete. It was not immediately clear whether Mobley had access before he was completely cleared.
"To the best of our knowledge, with the regard to this individual, there was nothing to suggest any kind of problem with him," Kerekes said. "We have a personnel database that's in place that lets all our companies across the industry know instantaneously if someone is for some reason denied access or flagged for some other kind of reason related to their behavior."
However, the information shared between nuclear power companies is sometimes incomplete, said Lyman, of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
A law enforcement official says Mobley traveled to Yemen with the goal of joining a terrorist group. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the investigation is still going on.
A second official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, says the U.S. government was aware of Mobley's potential extremist ties long before his arrest. The official did not say how long the government had been paying attention to him.
[CBS/14March2010]
Interpol's U.S. Arm is Clueless, Justice Department Says. Who can forget Victor Mature as Interpol secret agent Charles Sturgis?
Almost everybody, it turns out. The 1957 B-movie was almost immediately consigned to the crime noir dustbin.
But the popular image of the International Criminal Police Organization as a global network of brilliant sleuths has never dimmed - no matter that Interpol doesn't really do any policing itself.
It "facilitates the exchange of information to assist law enforcement agencies in the United States and throughout the world in detecting and deterring international crime and terrorism through a network of 187 member countries," in the words of the Justice Department's Inspector General.
Washington's node on the Interpol network is the U.S. National Central Bureau.
And it's apparently clueless, the IG said in a stinging audit report.
It doesn't play well with others, for starters - including U.S. domestic law enforcement agencies, the report said.
"The audit found that the USNCB has not made critical international criminal information such as information regarding some international fugitives and habitual criminals available to law enforcement agencies in the United States," it said.
Among the "critical" information? Lists of lost foreign passports, "increasing the potential that high-risk violent criminals can enter and move freely throughout United States."
And terrorists, one presumes.
Washington's link to Interpol fails to pass along its foreign members' criminal bulletins most of the time, the IG also said.
Isn't that criminal? It makes you wonder what the drones over at the U.S. National Central Bureau spend their time doing.
"Our audit found that 45 (87 percent) of 52 foreign-issued bulletins we reviewed were not made available to frontline U.S. law enforcement officers such as border patrol officers, visa application reviewers, or local police officers," the IG said.
"In addition, the audit disclosed errors and inconsistencies in the information provided by the USNCB to U.S. law enforcement agencies," the Justice report said.
"Consequently, their law enforcement data systems likely contain out-of-date or incomplete data and include information on individuals for whom no law enforcement agency has a current investigative interest."
And so on.
The USNCB sounded delighted by the IG's wake-up slap.
"I am pleased to inform you that, since the audit began in March 2008 [we have] taken a number of actions in response to your findings," said its director, Martin Renkiewicz.
"We are also evaluating how best to implement several of the recommendations in light of ongoing USNCB information sharing initiatives. I am confident that your report will serve to strengthen the effectiveness of our operations and enhance the value of our contribution to the Department's mission."
[Stein/CQPolitics/9March2010]
Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE
This Week in History: US Petitions de Valera to Expel Diplomats. One of the main challenges to Irish neutrality during the second World War came from the United States at the end of February 1944 as preparations were under way for the D-Day landings in France. In what became known as the "American Note" incident, the US secretary of state, Cordell Hull, demanded that the German and Japanese ambassadors be expelled from Dublin because of the risk of their spies acquiring details of the invasion plans. The demand was rejected by the government and led to short-term fears of an invasion by American and British troops from the North and a subsequent ban on all cross-channel travel by Britain. The text of the "Note'', from which this is an extract, was published in the censored Irish newspapers on 11 March 1944.
"It has become increasingly apparent that, in spite of the declared desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate in favor of either of the belligerents, it has, in fact, operated and continues to operate, in favor of the Axis Powers and against the United Nations, on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend.
"One of the gravest and most inequitable results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized espionage which the geographical position of Ireland affords to the Axis and denies to the United Nations.
"Situated, as you are, in close proximity to Britain and divided only by an intangible boundary from Northern Ireland, where are situated important American bases, with a continuous traffic to and from both countries, Axis agents enjoy an almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from Great Britain and Northern Ireland into Ireland and, from there, transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany.
"We do not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Whether, or to what extent it has succeeded in preventing acts of espionage against American shipping and American forces in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the German and Japanese Diplomatic and Consular representatives still continue to reside in Dublin and enjoy the special privileges and immunities customarily afforded such officials.
"That Axis representatives in neutral countries use those special privileges and immunities as a cloak for espionage activities against the United Nations has been demonstrated over and over again.
"It would be naive to assume that Axis agencies did not exploit the conditions to the full in Ireland, as they have in other countries. It is our understanding that the German Legation in Dublin, until recently, at least, has had in its possession a radio-sending set....
"Supporting evidence was furnished by two parachutists, equipped with radio-sending sets, dropped on your territory by German planes.
"Not only the success of the operations, but the lives of thousands of United Nations' soldiers are at stake.
"We request, therefore, that the Irish Government take appropriate steps for the recall of the German and Japanese representatives in Ireland. . .
"You will, of course, readily understand the compelling reasons why we ask as an absolute minimum the removal of these Axis representatives... It is hardly necessary to point out that time is of extreme importance, and that, we trust, Your Excellency will favor us with your reply at your early convenience.''
[Joyce/IrishTimes/11March2010]
The FBI's Ten Most Wanted List Turns 60. Mir Aimal Kasi had earned a spot on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list and Brad Garrett, a mild-mannered but dogged FBI agent out of Washington, wanted him badly. Kasi, a Pakistani, had stood outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., in 1993 and methodically opened fire, shooting into car windows, killing two CIA employees and wounding three others.
Like most fugitives on the list, Kasi was no easy find. Garrett and others spent four-and-a-half years continent-hopping, tracking endless leads before finding him in a seedy hotel in Pakistan at 4 a.m. Kasi was about to head off to prayer. He was brought back to the U.S., where he was eventually executed by lethal injection by the state of Virginia.
"It's probably every agent's dream to capture a top 10 most wanted fugitive," said Garrett, who retired from the FBI in 2006. "It wasn't my driving force, of course, but the idea of being able to arrest a top 10 fugitive is really something. If you're on the top 10 list, you must be a really bad person, a big deal."
The FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives List debuted on March 14, 1950, and has become a fixture of American culture.
On March 14, the bigger-than-life list, which has included some of the most notorious criminals of our time, from assassin James Earl Ray to serial killer Ted Bundy to terrorist Osama bin Laden, turns 60.
The list has become part of Americana. First seen in post offices and banks, now the Ten Most Wanted photos are more likely to show up on TV shows, billboards and the Internet through Web sites and trendy social networks like Facebook and Twitter.
"We recognize the unique ability of the media to cast a wider net within communities here and abroad," FBI Director Robert Mueller said in a statement marking the 60th anniversary. "The FBI can send agents to visit a thousand homes to find a witness, but the media can visit a million homes in an instant."
Authorities say the list came about after a reporter for the International News in 1949 told the FBI he was interested in writing a story about the "toughest guys" the FBI was after. The FBI provided the names and descriptions of 10 fugitives - four escaped prisoners, three con men, two murder suspects and a bank robber - and the reporter wrote a story that captured national attention and triggered hundreds of tips.
The FBI figured it was on to something. On March 14, 1950, Director J. Edgar Hoover launched the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives program. The first fugitive was Thomas J. Holden, a bank robber who murdered his wife and her two brothers. A little over a year later, he was spotted in Beaverton, Ore., by someone who recognized his photo in the newspaper.
Holden was one of 494 fugitives who have made the list in the past six decades. Of those, the FBI says, 463 have been captured or located, and 152 of those were "the direct result of citizen cooperation." More specifically, two fugitives were captured as a result of the Internet, 27 from television broadcasts, two from radio coverage, three from newspapers, three from magazines and 49 from FBI posters.
Cases that involved tips from a top 10 poster included fugitive Joseph Martin Luther Gardner, a Navy man who was wanted in the 1992 gang rape and murder of a 25-year-old woman in South Carolina. Authorities caught the other suspects, but not Gardner - at least not for a while.
Jeffrey L. Covington, an FBI agent from Philadelphia who retired in 2007 and worked on the Gardner case, recalled that a woman had gone into a convenience store in 1994 in Philadelphia. Later, she returned home to New York and was in a post office when she saw an FBI wanted poster of Gardner.
"She said, 'Oh my God, that's the guy in the store,'" Covington recalled. She called authorities, and Covington said he and members of the Philadelphia Fugitive Task Force moved in and made the arrest.
"He was absolutely startled," Covington said of Gardner. "And then he lied about his name. The usual stuff."
Over the years, as times changed, so did the composition of the list. At first in the 1950s it consisted of bank robbers, murderers and car thieves. In the 1960s, some fugitives included kidnappers and militants who had destroyed government property. By the 1970s, there were organized crime and terrorist figures and radicals like H. Rap Brown and Angela Davis. And in by the 1990s, sexual predators, drug traffickers and gang members had joined the list.
For the most part, the list has been dominated by males. Only eight fugitives have been woman, with '60s militant Davis among them.
A lot of thought goes into who makes the list, and who doesn't, according to Rex Tomb, who headed the FBI's chief fugitive publicity unit in Washington and helped decide who made the list. He retired in 2006.
"Many times a particularly aggressive agent would want us to put their fugitive on the list," Tomb said. "In looking at the submission, however, we realized that the case, though very serious, might be either too complicated or uninteresting to potential readers or viewers. Photographs might also be of such quality that we knew the public would be unable to notice key, distinguishing physical traits. The top 10 list is media driven. If certain elements are not present, reporters won't use it. We had to learn which cases would fly and which wouldn't.
"There are only 10 slots on the list," he said. If the media won't cover it, the list is of no help. If it can't help a case, why put it on the list?"
On nine occasions, the top 10 list has actually had 11 or more fugitives.
"This has occurred when there was not a vacancy on the list and the FBI determined that there was an overriding need that an individual be added to the list," said FBI spokeswoman Debbie Weierman.
She said some of the 11th fugitives have included Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was implicated in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassin, James Earl Ray. Ray was one of six people who twice appeared on the list: once when he shot King in 1968 and again in 1977 when he escaped from prison.
Fugitive Donald Eugene Webb holds the record for the longest time on the list - 25 years, 10 months and 27 days - for the murder of Police Chief Gregory Adams in Saxonburg, Pa., in 1980. In 2007, without any real explanation, he was removed from the list even though he remained at large. The FBI now says he no longer fits the criteria, but he remains a fugitive.
The shortest time on the list - two hours - was claimed by bank robber Billie Austin Bryant, who had killed two FBI agents in the late 1960s in Washington. The oldest person to be placed on the list - and who still remains on it - is Boston mobster James "Whitey" Bulger. He was 69 in August 1999 when he was put on the list.
Today he is 80.
Alive and well? Who knows. [AOLNews/13March2010]
Nazi's Planned to Infiltrate the Vatican with Spies Dressed as Monks. Officials in Germany thought the idea of agents posing as monks and priests in a cloister would be the perfect cover for them.
A Nazi sympathizer living in Rome came up with the idea and it was quickly seized upon by officials in Berlin who saw it as the ideal opportunity to keep up with Allied activity in the city.
The plan is revealed in MI5 reports held at the National Archives in Kew and which have now been declassified - and it comes just days after other files revealed how Germany had also tried to infiltrate the Boy Scouts.
Operation Georgian Convent as it was called involved the purchase of a building in Rome by Michael Kedia, a Russian anti communist Nazi sympathizer from Georgia (Russian Republic of) who was also known to British intelligence.
According to the documents at Kew the idea gathered pace in the autumn of 1943 as the Allies advanced up through Italy and the Germans were preparing to pull out of Rome.
MI5 was tipped off about the plan by Giuseppe Dosi, an Italian policeman who was acting as an informant to the British intelligence service and his report is in the file.
It reads how a "....plan was started whereby the immunity of the Vatican buildings in Rome was to be exploited to the advantage of the German Intelligence Service.
"The plan (involved the)...set up a Georgian cloister in Rome under Vatican protection and among the monks introduce agents who were to keep contact with German intelligence."
Dosi's report added how two rooms within the cloister were to "be set aside for the use of the agents for storage of transmitters, batteries and any other secret material."
Officials in Germany thought the idea of agents posing as monks and priests in a cloister would be the perfect cover for them and enable them to covertly carry out spying work as during the war the Vatican remained neutral.
Money was provided from Germany and a building to be used as the Georgian cloister was bought by Kedia in the Monteverde district of Rome, just to the north of St Peter's.
Six agents were sent to the cloister to pose as monks and seminarians but they aroused the suspicion of Vatican officials for their lack of knowledge on Catholic doctrine - and their interest in women.
However, the plan was thwarted after a tip off to the Vatican who wrote a letter to Germany's Ambassador for the Holy See saying it had been informed of the plot and "deplored" by it.
[Telegraph/14March2010]
How Should We Measure Intelligence Community Performance?, by Joseph
Mazzafro. As the Congress and the DC dignitary debate if health care is affordable given the nation's first trillion dollar annual debit incursion, I am wondering where the money would come from should the United States need to defend its national interests against another Al Qaeda attack or worse. The President has already frozen budgetary growth for all discretionary spending not related to national security, but can the Defense Department and Intelligence Community remain fenced for much longer given the increasing national debt - the size of which already is a national security concern in its own right?
There is another debate occurring between former DNI Mike McConnell and newly appointed White House Cybersecurity Coordinator (aka czar?) Howard Schwartz regarding whether the United States is an unwilling/unacknowledged participant in cyberwarfare. McConnell says we are close if not already so involved; Schwartz says we are not. I would have a better idea of who was more proximate to right if I actually knew what constituted cyberwarfare. I use to think as a naval officer that a physical attack on a U.S. Navy warship was an obvious act of war, but then the USS Cole was declared a "crime scene" so I am certain I have no idea what even loosely defines an act of cyberwarfare. To be effective the newly formed US Cyber Command is going to have to develop rules of engagement (ROE) based on what is "hostile intent" and an "act of war" in cyberspace that will strain the current boundaries of both military doctrine and law. Even more immediately if I where assigned as CYBERCOM's J2 I would be concerned with how to do collection management, targeting, and post action assessment in cyberspace. Other questions on my mind would be what constitutes "order of battle" in cyberspace; how do you do meaningful net assessment? My hair would begin to really hurt when the topics shifted to threat warning and dissemination to non-SCI cleared elements and foreign partner information sharing.
Sounds like there is lots of deep thinking for military and intelligence scholars to do regarding the metaphysics of cyberspace so lets move on - or back to our last discussion on "Systemic Failure or Irrelevance" of the IC, which drew several interesting and insightful comments.
First, I want to note that from their reaction it now seems clear that General McCrystal, General
Petraeus, Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates were all aware of MG Flynn's assessment of the changes needed in the Afghanistan intelligence domain to insure mission success of defeating a Taliban lead insurgency against the central Afghan government. Even more significantly they did not object to it being unclassified and published for wide distribution by a private sector think tank. Given the lessons learned from Desert Storm, the overthrow of the Taliban post 9/11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as the findings from the 9/11 and Weapons of Mass Destruction Commissions, Flynn's "FIXING INTELLIGENCE" thesis is distressing to me because it reveals that the military intelligence community continues to cling at least sublimely to its Cold War mindset with collection, analysis, and operations being remote and separate from each other. As with cyberwar, the intelligence needs associated with irregular warfare also appear to be not well articulated or understood yet.
Second, I hope most of you saw AFCEA Intelligence Committee Chairman Bill Nolte's commentary on the AFCEA Intelligence website: where Bill asks "How Good Should Intelligence Be" and by extension what are reasonable metrics for assessing how good it is? In the aftermath of the intelligence community's collective failure to "no fly" Abdulmutallab (a.k.a. Passenger 19A) on December 25th, Bill's central point is captured in a rhetorical question of "should the public expect intelligence to eliminate threats any more than they expect police services to eliminate crime?"" The answer is obviously NO, but this got me to thinking what should American people expect from their $75 billion intelligence enterprise? My immediate response was (and still is) military forces are not expected to eliminate wars, but they are expected to win them so is it not reasonable to expect the intelligence community to undermine the threat of terrorism (or cyber events, irregular warfare, etc.) over time? Some will properly argue that intelligence does not have the bandwidth to deal with all the threats confronting national security, if that is the case then the leadership of the intelligence community must advise the political leadership of the nation (probably in a classified setting) where the nation can best take more risks because of insufficient intelligent resources.
Another way of thinking about what metrics might be meaningful for the intelligence community is to suppose that the DNI was an elected position. This is a bad idea of course, because the campaigning would lead immediately to meaningless counter claims about who could provide the best intelligence for the least cost by reducing waste and still protect the civil liberties of all Americans. Remember the old adage about which two of the three do you want? Nonetheless, an elected DNI position would be an interesting way for the American people to express what they want their intelligence community to do for them. In a popular contest to become DNI, I wonder how long it would be before at least one of the candidates began to run ads after focus group testing promising to use the unequaled technical and human resources to insure that government understands the future threats it has to protect the republic from vice extrapolating threats from the recent past into the present?
That's what I think; what do you think? [Mr. Mazzafro brings over three decades of intelligence community experience to Oracle's National Security Group where he is responsible for tailoring Oracle's industry leading information products, solutions, and services to meet the unique needs of the Intelligence Community. Prior to joining Oracle he led EMC's business development efforts with the Intelligence Community. Before entering the private sector he served for 27 years rising to the rank of Captain while being posted to a variety of significant positions ashore and afloat as a Naval Intelligence Officer.]
[Mazzafro/AFCEA/9March2010]
Intelligence Community Must Build Greater Trust, by Pete
Contostavlos. Recently the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Dennis Blair, testified before the Senate Homeland Security Committee about the suspect accused of trying to detonate explosives on a Christmas Day flight. What was widely reported and roundly criticized was that Blair suggested a special interrogation group be used despite the fact that such a group does not yet exist. What received less attention was that according to the Washington Post, Blair and the heads of the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, and Department of Homeland Security were not consulted about the decision to charge the suspect in a civilian criminal court. This incident has reopened debate about the role of the DNI and the intent of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. While this debate plays out, there are three actions that should be taken to build the Intelligence Community (IC) into a stronger and more cohesive unit and improve oversight of it.
First, leaders from both parties of the House and Senate intelligence committees should team with the administration to formally review and assess the effectiveness of the Intelligence Reform Act in order to implement midcourse corrections. Only five years since it became law, a thorough review would ensure it is fulfilling congressional intent and is properly implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. An undeniable fact is that at least one key recommendation of that Report has not been acted upon - a call for a unity of effort in Congress that would be the "most difficult and important recommendation" to implement.
Secondly, it is time now for Congress to come together with the Administration to complete the intelligence reform dealing with Congressional oversight and create House and Senate Committees that have both authorization and appropriation power. The existing bifurcated congressional oversight impedes the American people from having an experienced, singular watchdog and the IC from being most effective. Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduced legislation that has bipartisan support with cosponsors Sens. Burr (R), Bayh (D), Snowe (R), and McCain (R) that would give the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence appropriations power. This would allow the same members to delve more deeply into intelligence programs and operations without dividing priorities among "authorizers" and "appropriators." The Administration should immediately support the Feingold measure, prod the House leadership to follow suit and encourage leaders to attach it to next appropriate vehicle heading for signature - all while leveraging the Republican cosponsors of the bill. This would go a long way toward rebuilding confidence that our nation's security is a bipartisan issue, some of which was lost following the Christmas Day incident.
Third, bridges must be built to have effective oversight. Like any effective team, there must be mutual trust between the DNI, the CIA and IC elements at all levels. The DNI already has in place a community-wide directive requiring rotational assignments in other intelligence community organizations, which is a great start. Intelligence leaders must expand the number of these jobs available and make the most attractive jobs open for competition outside their own organizations to make this more effective. The DNI staff should go further and ensure that all IC elements are better integrated in a more inclusive and measured decision-making and policy processes. Although the Justice Department is not entirely part of the IC, the Attorney General and FBI Director must collaborate to the fullest extent that law allows and work to build trust with IC personnel right down to staff officers working these cases. All leaders and their staffs must direct their organizations to do more than just collaborate, but work together to build professional bonds and respect which will effectively improve the DNI's oversight. We'll never know for sure but is seems as if better working relationships among IC and Justice senior officials may have led to a much different handling of the Christmas Day case.
Within the IC, we are constantly reminded how dangerous the world is that we live in. We must take these steps in order to keep the trust of those intelligence professionals and war fighters on the front lines in order to provide timely, accurate and relevant information to policymakers and those who need it. [Pete Contostavlos served as the chief of the geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) community policy branch at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Prior to joining NGA, he served as the Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy and Strategic National Security Affairs for U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson (FL). Previously, Mr. Contostavlos was the Legislative Assistant to U.S. Rep. Owen B. Pickett (VA), serving as his advisor on national security-related legislative matters. Pete also served in the US Navy, assigned to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations at the Pentagon, dealing with the Navy's key programming and budget matters. Before his assignment in the Pentagon, he was stationed aboard the guided missile cruiser USS Cape St. George as the navigator, and gunnery officer prior to that. Pete holds a bachelor's degree in history from the US Naval Academy and a master's degree in history and public policy from The George Washington University. He is currently a fellow in the National Security Program at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government.]
[Contostavlos/HuffingtonPost/11March2010]
Iran's Spies Show How it's Done, by Mahan
Abedin. The dramatic arrest of Abdulmalik Rigi, Iran's most wanted man, on February 23 continues to be shrouded in mystery. But with information and insights gleaned from security sources in Tehran, Asia Times Online can reveal some of the most intricate background details leading to this stunning arrest.
The imagery - and the concomitant political message - was compelling. The image of a young man being surrounded by balaclava-clad security officers by the side of a small commercial plane was designed to send the strongest possible message to Western intelligence services, their political masters and the Western public in general. If the West led by the mighty United States has failed in its nearly nine-year pursuit of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, embattled Iran managed to get its man with minimal political and economic cost.
Aside from frustrating American subversion efforts in Iran's southeast, the capture of the Jundallah leader sends an unmistakable message that in the intelligence wars of the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran has once again seized the initiative. The repercussions of this will be felt across all spheres and at all levels, boosting Iran's diplomatic and political posture in the region, and thus making the country less vulnerable to American and Israeli bullying.
How a young man of 31 years with little formal education became the most serious and proximate security threat to the Islamic Republic is undoubtedly the most interesting dimension of ethnic politics in post-revolutionary Iran. The story of Rigi is still littered with unanswered questions. Security sources in Tehran contend that he has been cooperative in custody and surely enough there was no obvious hint of duress or coercion in his hastily-arranged "confession" that was aired on Iran's Press TV two days after his arrest.
From an ideological point of view, the emergence of the Sunni militant Jundallah group is undoubtedly tied to the geopolitical and ideological concussions that have engulfed the region since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent American-led military intervention in Afghanistan.
Iranian authorities believed their country to be immune from the kind of Sunni militant terrorism that had plagued neighboring countries, in particular Pakistan and Iraq. The idea that Shi'ite-majority Iran with its deep-rooted culture and civilization and strong sense of national identity and cohesion could fall victim to indigenous practitioners of this retrograde and savage form of terrorism hadn't even crossed the minds of many Iranian security officials. This is not so much a failure at the intelligence and security levels, but an indication of profound cultural arrogance and misplaced self-assuredness.
Jundallah is believed to have emerged in a coherent form in 2003, its organizational origins rooted in the twin security threats unique to the Sistan and Balochistan province, namely organized crime and a small but vocal secessionist movement. Balochi separatism, in different forms and guises, has been an irritant to the modern Iranian nation-state since the 19th century.
In recent decades what started out as a tribal revolt against the perceived intrusions of the central government developed distinctly ethnic and religious overtones, with self-declared champions of the Baloch people bemoaning the so-called Persian and Shi'ite character of the Iranian state.
On the surface, the victory of the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the country's transition from an absolute monarchy to a semi-democratic Islamic Republic was a body-blow to the small numbers of militant secessionists in Balochistan, as well as elsewhere, in particular Iran's Kurdish regions in the northwest, insofar as the Islamic Republic promoted more inclusive notions of nationality and citizenship.
But beneath the surface old grievances continued to fester - reinforced by years of central government neglect of local infrastructure - and accentuated by perceived sectarian policies. This is the backdrop to the emergence of Jundallah, which unlike previous generations of Baloch nationalists, openly embraced a religious and at times sectarian rhetoric, projecting itself as a Sunni Islamic movement at war with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Jundallah's strong religious and sectarian rhetoric, coupled with its tactics of suicide bombings and beheadings (painfully reminiscent of the atrocities perpetrated by Sunni jihadi groups in neighboring Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan), was a major shock to Iranian security officials, who by 2004 had begun to realize the extent of the problem, and quickly took remedial action.
The Islamic Republic prides itself on having efficient and adaptive security and intelligence services. Iranian officials often cite the successful experience of these agencies in countering a broad range of security and intelligence threats, including terrorism by left-wing and secessionist groups and intense espionage and subversion activities by Western intelligence services, over the past 30 years to underscore their skills and capabilities. It seems that the full gamut of these capabilities was deployed against Jundallah and its local allies in Iran and Pakistan to great effect, to the extent that the group is now for all intents and purposes decapitated and probably a spent force.
Using old tribal espionage networks established decades ago, the Ministry of Intelligence successfully penetrated Jundallah, recruiting many of its members, including top commanders. Although security sources in Tehran decline to comment on the matter, sources close to Jundallah-centered investigations in Tehran and Zahedan (capital of Sistan and Balochistan province) claim that the Ministry of Intelligence had recruited Rigi's younger brother, Abdulhamid.
Certainly, the behavior of Abdulhamid Rigi and the leniency afforded him by Iranian security and judicial authorities has raised many questions and lends credence to the suspicion that Abdulhamid was recruited as an agent, probably in late 2007.
Despite having been tried and sentenced to death for several murders, Abdulhamid has regularly given interviews to Iranian media since his ostensible "arrest" in 2008. In these interviews he has claimed to have met American diplomats and secret agents in Karachi and Islamabad in Pakistan, thus buttressing the unflinching belief of Iranian intelligence chiefs that Jundallah has had a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tail all along.
Skillfully using former senior leaders of terrorist and insurgent groups as a means of putting pressure on these groups and sabotaging their morale is a tried and tested trademark of the Iranian intelligence services. The same tactics have been used extensively and highly effectively against a number of other terrorist organizations, most notably the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization, which ranked as the country's number one security threat during the 1980s and much of the 1990s.
But there is something distinctly unusual about Abdulhamid Rigi's media appearances insofar as he seems more like an enthusiastic and skillful prop for his new masters rather than a captured and broken terrorist leader.
While security sources in Tehran decline to be drawn on Abdulhamid's precise relationship with the Ministry of Intelligence, they admit that his help was invaluable in tracking his brother's movements and unearthing his extensive ties to the CIA. According to these sources, Iranian intelligence had been monitoring Abdulmalik Rigi round the clock since August 2009, but moving against him was difficult due to strong American backing and the fear of exposing invaluable methods and agents.
But the major suicide bombing on October 18, 2009, which targeted a conference hall in the Pishin area of Sistan and Balochistan where senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders were hosting a reconciliation meeting with local tribal elders, killing dozens of IRGC officers, including the deputy commander of the Guards' land forces, forced a decisive move against Rigi.
While the Ministry of Intelligence was not overly enthusiastic about ensnaring Rigi prematurely - for fear of compromising intelligence operations targeting Rigi's American masters in Pakistan and Afghanistan - the IRGC (which is now the dominant power in Sistan and Balochistan) brought sufficient pressure to bear, finally resulting in Rigi's capture in late February.
Security sources in Tehran are keen to highlight Abdulmalik Rigi's jet-set lifestyle, describing constant travel between Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Islamabad, Kabul and Central Asian capitals since early 2006. On the day of Rigi's arrest, Minister of Intelligence Heidar Moslehi appeared at a carefully arranged press conference giving details on Rigi's contacts and movements.
According to the intelligence minister, Rigi had even traveled to the British overseas territory of Gibraltar, from where he was allegedly moved to a European country, presumably to meet top Western intelligence chiefs. While independent verification of these claims is next to impossible, these carefully managed leaks are best understood as a means of inflicting sufficient public relations damage to Western intelligence without revealing anything solid by way of methods and knowledge.
In any event, security sources in Tehran tell Asia Times Online that they have "massive" amounts of information and documents in their possession that link Jundallah to the CIA and specialized branches of the United States military operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They also claim that the CIA had prior knowledge of the suicide bombing in Pishin in October (which was a massive blow against the IRGC) but there is an ongoing debate within security circles in Tehran as to whether the Americans had actively instigated the terrorist attack.
The outcome of this debate may well have serious repercussions, possibly prompting IRGC Qods force retaliation against American secret agents operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The IRGC Qods force is believed to have identified every noteworthy component of American intelligence activity in the region and the Qods force has the capability to strike a deadly blow against American intelligence assets in the region and beyond.
The precise details surrounding Abdulmalik Rigi's arrest are the subject of considerable debate. The Iranian government is content for confusion to prevail, especially since it feels it has succeeded in achieving two immediate post-arrest public relations objectives; to depict the operation as an all-Iranian affair (with no assistance rendered by any foreign intelligence service) and to paint Rigi as an American agent.
Notwithstanding the existence of several plausible theories surrounding Rigi's arrest, the bulk of the speculation has centered on Kyrgyzstan Airways flight QH454 en route to Bishkek from Dubai. According to most Iranian media reports, Iranian jets forced the plane to land before arresting Rigi with at least one accomplice. Kyrgyz authorities initially confirmed the arrests but then protested to Iran for forcing the plane to land and denied that any passengers were missing once the plane had landed at its destination.
Security sources in Tehran depict Abdulmalik Rigi as quiet and withdrawn. They describe a resourceful operative who despite lack of any formal education was able to develop a sophisticated relationship with the CIA and the US military, as well as the intelligence services of Pakistan, the UAE and "several" Central Asian states.
But they are also keen to downplay his physical daring and maintain that Rigi lacks physical courage and that his reluctance to place himself in "dangerous scenarios" had caused friction in Jundallah. This information ties in with accounts from journalist sources in Tehran who claim that Rigi's brother, Abdulhamid, fell out with him because of his increasing penchant for the "good" life and his reluctance to take part in operations.
By any standard, Abdulmalik Rigi's arrest is a major success for the Islamic Republic's intelligence services. This dramatic operation has boosted the morale of Islamic Republic loyalists throughout the Middle East and caused considerable dismay and embarrassment to Iran's Western enemies.
The arrest came in the wake of the assassinations of Iranian physicist Massoud Ali Mohammadi in Tehran in early January and legendary Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai later that month. While investigations into Mohammadi's assassination (by a remote-controlled bomb) are ongoing, Iranian authorities have already pointed an accusing finger at America and Israel, without providing much by way of evidence.
In the case of Mabhouh, although the Dubai police moved quickly to identify the assassins (who are widely believed to belong to the Israeli intelligence service Mossad), Iranian security chiefs believe the assassination could not have occurred without some complicity by UAE political and security chiefs.
The Iranians believe that at the very least high UAE officials had enabled the Mossad operation by creating a permissive operational environment for the Israeli spy service in Dubai. Although Mabhouh was not scheduled to meet Iranians in Dubai, he is believed to have had strong ties to the Iranian security establishment and this same establishment believes that the assassination was designed to send a strong signal to Iran and its allies.
Despite the amateurish way the assassination was carried out, it was nonetheless a morale boost for the Israelis and the Americans and was interpreted as such in Tehran. However, Rigi's arrest once again tipped the balance of confidence in favor of the Iranians, especially since, unlike Mabhouh's assassination, the operation was carried out with flawless precision and efficiency and moreover it was neither immoral nor did it violate any international laws.
Whether the Islamic Republic will be able to reap the full political and diplomatic dividends of this major intelligence success will depend on large measure to what extent Iranian policymakers can think imaginatively about all the conflict points between Iran and the United States, especially in regards to policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan and the nuclear standoff. It will also depend on to what extent Iran can keep up the momentum of this success in the intelligence and security sphere with a view to continuing to deter Israeli military aggression, either against Lebanon or Syria, or far less likely against Iran itself. [Mahan Abedin is a senior researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant to independent media in Iran.]
[Abedin/AsiaTimes/11March2010]
Section IV - BOOKS, OBITUARIES JOBS AND COMING EVENTS
Ex-CIA Spy Recounts Torture, Tension Hunting Al Qaeda Terrorists. One of the most useful tools that the CIA used to track al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah was a large sheet of butcher paper taped to an office wall, on which agents charted out his known associates. Imagine their frustration when, right after they'd captured Zubaydah in 2002, FBI agents sealed his cellphone in an evidence bag. Tempers flared when the phone rang and the FBI wouldn't let the CIA see who was calling. That's just one of the startling anecdotes in John Kiriakou's The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA's War on Terror, which chronicles his 14 years working for the nation's spy service.
What stopped you from answering that call when the phone started ringing?
When the phone started ringing, I went head-to-head with the FBI agent. She said if I tore open the bag that it would compromise the chain of evidence and that the case would be compromised. The CIA was there to bust down the door, capture the bad guy, and take their computers to get the next guy. The FBI doesn't think like that; the agent thought that she was doing the right thing. Meanwhile, we thought that if Zubaydah's an al Qaeda leader, then the people calling him must also be al Qaeda. I should have opened the bag, snatched the phone, and taken the call. But I should add that that incident was one of the only problems I ever had in the field working with the bureau. They are very smart and professional.
How did you end up in Pakistan on the trail of Abu Zubaydah?
When they offered me the chance to learn Arabic, I jumped at it. It was the early 1990s, and there were only five or six of us from CIA in the Arabic language school. After 9/11, I was one of the few dozen people in the building who spoke Arabic. Even now, after all these years and all these terrorist attacks, CIA still doesn't have an appropriate language capability. You can count on one hand or so the number of agency people who speak Pashto. How can you expect a CIA officer to recruit a tribal chieftain in Waziristan when they cannot even speak to each other?
There's lots of detail in the book, like the fact that you positively identified Zubaydah with a picture of his ear. Did the CIA demand many redactions?
The first time I submitted the book to the CIA review panel, they redacted every single word. The CIA requires that former employees not mention relationships with foreign governments or expose sources, methods, or locations. This book doesn't. But it turns out that I still had some enemies at CIA. After Obama won the election and there were changes in the top level of CIA, I resubmitted the book, and a week later, it was cleared.
The blogs chatter that you are not a former employee but part of an agency disinformation campaign, particularly on waterboarding.
Yes, let's clear that up. I stopped working for CIA in 2004. I don't currently have any top-secret clearances. And despite what they saw in the blogosphere, I'm not part of some CIA disinformation campaign or anything. Not everyone is involved in a conspiracy.
You defended the use of waterboarding in the case of Zubaydah, yet your original description of his treatment on ABC News in 2007 was far different from what we now know happened.
I specifically said to ABC News that I never tortured anyone, that I was opposed to torture, and that I was opposed to the use of enhanced techniques. I never witnessed waterboarding, and I said so to ABC News. I only learned about the waterboarding from colleagues at CIA who were receiving the cables from the field. My friend in the CIA told me that Zubaydah had been legally waterboarded and that he'd broken after 30 seconds. I said, "Awesome." Now we know that Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times in a single month, raising questions about how much useful information he actually supplied. In retrospect, it was a valuable lesson in how the CIA uses the arts of deception even among its own.
Is waterboarding torture?
Of course it is. I think it's wrong to have done waterboarding multiple times and wrong to have done it on multiple prisoners. By the time KSM [al Qaeda operative Khalid Shaikh� Mohammed] was captured, the CIA should have had sources in place so that we didn't need to collect the information through torture. But in the case of Abu Zubaydah, it worked. True, it didn't work in the case of KSM and [9/11 suspect] Ramzi Bin�alshibh. Those guys told their interrogators what they wanted to hear. But in the case of Abu Zubaydah, it worked.
How can we believe your contention that waterboarding worked?
I don't understand why the Bush administration and the Obama administration won't release the information that was gained from Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. It gives me heartburn to be on the same side as Dick Cheney, but the information that was received from the water�boarding of Abu Zubaydah stopped an attack and saved lives. I believe it saved American lives. You'll have to trust me.
Can you understand why many people won't?
I'm sure that I won't convince people. But it is not my job to convince people. At CIA, successes often go unheralded, while failures go on to win Pulitzer prizes.
Are the American people capable of having a rational debate about waterboarding?
No. People have already made up their minds, right or wrong. And there is too much bad information out there for people to have a rational debate about it.
How much did your family know about your work?
I never told them who I worked for. With my kids, it only really came up once. I had seven cellphones plugged into the wall in my office, and my son, 6 years old at the time, asked me why I had so many. A few weeks later, he saw me taking off my gun and locking it up in my office safe. He came over and whispered, "Are you a detective?" I said, "Yeah, something like that."
What prompted you to write this book?
I'm an overweight, middle-aged guy with a moderate educational background, and I don't always come out looking great even in my own book. I punched out a Greek pastry chef after a traffic accident; I had problems with my personal life; I had problems with my bosses. But in the end, I happened to be at the center of some very interesting and exciting situations. The book is intended as an honest account of the CIA through the eyes of a former analyst and operative whose experiences suggest that America's spy service often does a better job than the critics think.
[USNews/12March2010]
Andr�e Peel. Andr�e Peel, who died on March 5 aged 105, was a much-decorated heroine of the French Resistance; known as Agent Rose, she helped dozens of British and American pilots escape from occupied Europe and only escaped death at the hands of the Nazis by the skin of her teeth.
When the Germans invaded France, Andr�e Virot, as she then was, was in her mid 30s and running her own beauty salon in the Breton port of Brest. Her first act of defiance took place as German troops entered the town, when she gave shelter to a group of fleeing French soldiers and begged her neighbors for civilian clothes for them so they would not be captured. She was subsequently amazed - and disconcerted - to find that German soldiers of all ranks had been taught fluent French and that some even spoke Breton.
When General de Gaulle declared in his famous broadcast of June 18 1940 that "France has lost a battle, but she has not lost the war," Andr�e and some friends got together to type out the message and slip copies through people's letterboxes. She soon became involved in the Resistance, circulating the organization's clandestine newspaper. Within weeks she was made head of an under-section of the organization, responsible for sending information to the Allies.
Brest was an important naval base, and information about shipping movements was vital to the Allied war effort. By establishing contacts in the dockyard, Andr�e was able to pass on information about naval installations, as well as about troop movements and the results of Allied aerial attacks.
These were mainly directed at the harbor area, but many bombs missed their target and fell on the town. No one blamed the Allies. She recalled one man whose house had been destroyed leaping with joy when he found that his precious radio, on which he listened to the BBC, had survived intact. On another occasion she came across a group of teenage boys singing "What joy, Tommy, now that we are united at last" to a well known tune, as British bombs rained all around.
During her three years with the Resistance - during which she was known first as Agent X and then as Agent Rose - Andr�e helped save the lives of more than 100 Allied pilots. Her team used torches to guide Allied planes to improvised landing strips and smuggled fugitive airmen aboard submarines and gunboats on remote parts of the coast, often feeling their way in the dark past German coastal shelters.
The work was extremely dangerous. Any family found harboring an Allied airman risked being shot and in 1943 Andr�e herself was forced to leave Brest after a comrade (who had been forced to watch his family being tortured by the Gestapo) informed on her.
She fled to Paris and assumed another identity, but a week after D-Day she was again betrayed by a comrade, who confessed under torture. She was arrested and taken to Gestapo headquarters where she was stripped naked, interrogated and subjected to a series of tortures, including simulated drowning and being savagely beaten around the throat. As a result her gullet was displaced and her tonsils crushed. She continued to suffer pain for the rest of her life.
Eventually she and other prisoners were transported to the women's concentration camp at Ravensbr�ck where, on arrival, they were forced to strip and frog marched into what she later realized was a gas chamber. She never discovered why they were released since many others lost their lives. She noticed later that the camp did a brisk trade with local farmers who bought the ash from the camp crematorium to spread on their fields.
Andr�e narrowly escaped death on several more occasions. She fell ill with what a doctor told her was meningitis, but recovered. Then, during the daily roll call, she was selected for the gas chamber but was saved by a Polish fellow inmate who crept up to a table and snatched up the piece of paper with Andr�e's number on it without being seen by the SS.
Eventually she was transferred to Buchenwald concentration camp where life seemed easier, initially at least, and she was able to send messages to her family in Brest via French prisoners-of-war working in the fields outside.
But, as the Allies closed in towards the end of April 1945, it became obvious that the Nazis were determined to obliterate evidence of their crimes. By the time she and a group of fellow prisoners were lined up against a wall, they had heard that some prisoners had been shot and others killed with flame throwers, so they had little doubt what was in store.
As a firing squad drew near, she wrote later, the terrified prisoners heard a telephone ringing in the camp commandant's office. It was a message from the Americans to the effect that the firing squad had been seen entering the camp and that if they wanted to live, they would spare the lives of the prisoners. The soldiers fled.
Andr�e Peel was awarded the Croix de Guerre (with palm), the Croix de Guerre (silver star), the Cross of the Voluntary Fighter, the Medal of the Resistance, the Liberation Cross - all French awards - as well as the American Medal of Freedom, awarded by President Eisenhower, and the King's Commendation for Brave Conduct, given by George VI.
After the war she received a personal letter from Winston Churchill congratulating her on her work. Much later, at age of 99, she was made a Chevalier de la L�gion d'honneur, France's highest honor, receiving the award from her own brother, General Maurice Virot, a retired four-star general.
After her release from Buchenwald, Andr�e returned to Paris where she was welcomed by crowds singing the Marseillaise, and fulfilled a promise made in 1944 to make a pilgrimage to the Sacr� Coeur church in Montmartre to thank God for her deliverance.
Andr�e Marthe Virot was born on February 3 1905 into a religious and deeply patriotic French family. Her father was a civil engineer who specialized in building bridges. When she returned to a devastated Brest after the war, she learned that he had been killed after walking too close to a German soldier who was fishing using hand grenades. A brother had also lost his life in Germany while fighting in the ranks of the Free French.
She returned to Paris where she became the manager of La Caravelle, a restaurant near the Luxembourg Gardens specializing in "first class cuisine at acceptable prices". News that she was a former Resistance worker attracted many clients including leading politicians and former Allied servicemen.
One day a young English student called John Peel came into the restaurant. He was supposed to be learning French, but his accent was so comical that Andr�e offered to give him lessons. Though he was 20 years her junior, a relationship developed, and they ended up getting married. Her husband made his career as a neuropsychologist at Barrow Gurney mental hospital in Bristol and they settled in a village nearby.
Andr�e always felt she had been born with a special gift: "Very often I could feel a kind of electric current at my fingertips, sometimes extremely hot, and this current passed out of my hands into the air. When I wanted to concentrate it and intensify it, my wish was granted". In Bristol she laid her "electric" hands on a woman who had been injured after stumbling on the stairs and discovered she had the gift of healing. "My future path had opened in front of me as if I had been guided thereto by some divine order," she recalled. She established herself as a healer and dietitian, building up a faithful list of clients.
Though Andr�e Peel always kept the striped blue-and-grey tunic she had been forced to wear in the concentration camps, she never intended to write a book about her experiences until it was suggested that by doing so she would be telling the stories of those who had not survived. Her autobiography, Miracles do Happen, appeared in 1999.
When she celebrated her centenary, Andr�e Peel said: "I still feel like a woman of 50. I think that time has forgotten me." The secret to a happy life, she observed, was a good companion - and eating the main meal of the day at lunchtime.
Her husband predeceased her. [Telegraph/10March2010]
Betty Villemarette, Helped Win Benefits for Ex-CIA Spouses. For almost two decades, Mrs. Villemarette served the agency in what she called "the traditional partnership role of 'two employees for the price of one,' " accompanying her husband, a CIA officer, on his secret and dangerous assignments around the world. One night in Ethiopia, when a trigger-happy guard who was supposed to be protecting the Villemarettes shot out the windows of their house, she marched outside in her robe and took away his gun.
When the marriage fell apart in the early 1970s under the stresses of CIA life, Mrs. Villemarette learned that she was not entitled to a share of her ex-husband's pension and that many other women, as well as some men, were in the same financial straits. On their behalf, Mrs. Villemarette waged and won a quiet decade-long battle to secure benefits for former CIA spouses. And from inside the CIA, where the former Potomac resident pursued her own career after her divorce, she built the first real family-support system, transforming the culture of the clandestine agency.
"Betty Villemarette was, for half a century, a tireless advocate for Agency employees and families," CIA Director Leon Panetta said in a statement. "Her hard work and dedication did much to improve the quality of life for our officers and their loved ones."
Once a supporting character in her husband's career, Mrs. Villemarette had become a celebrity within the CIA by the time of her death, at age 88, on Feb. 23 in Los Angeles after a stroke. When she received the agency's prestigious Trailblazer Award in 2007, CIA women waited in line to thank the white-haired woman in a wheelchair.
"The former spouse who was left without a means of support . . . wouldn't have made it if it were not for Betty," said Ann Doyle, a Bethesda resident who was married to a CIA officer and after her divorce worked for the agency.
Stephanie Glakas-Tenet, the wife of former CIA director George J. Tenet, wrote to Mrs. Villemarette in 2007 that without her, "thousands upon thousands of agency families would not have been protected." Glakas-Tenet is one of several directors' wives who served on the Family Advisory Board, a committee that was created through Mrs. Villemarette's efforts and which conveys families' concerns to top CIA officials.
Mrs. Villemarette led CIA divorcees in a campaign similar to one that won pension rights in 1980 for former spouses of State Department employees. Some were destitute, a situation made more maddening to them when their former husbands remarried and women who had not endured the hardships of overseas CIA postings began collecting benefits for life. But they never went public.
"None of them ever spilled any secrets," Doyle said. "They were very loyal to the agency and the country, in spite of being badly treated by the system."
Mrs. Villemarette was one of several women who testified before congressional intelligence committees in closed hearings on the matter. Those efforts resulted in the passage of a series of laws in the 1980s that entitled former agency spouses to shares of lifetime benefits, survivor benefits and health insurance.
"Everyone who worked on those things was very brave because the CIA is such a tight club," said former congresswoman Pat Schroeder (D-Colo.), who was a key player in the effort to rewrite pension laws. "If you were working internally on the side of what I thought was justice and equity, you got incredible heat."
No one got more heat than Mrs. Villemarette, said Barbara Colby, who was married to William E. Colby when he was CIA director in the 1970s and testified at the hearings. (The Colbys, both of whom supported the legislation, later divorced.)
"Betty was our flagship person," she said.
Mrs. Villemarette was born Betty Jane Crawford on July 28, 1921, in Hibbing, Minn. She attended the University of Wisconsin at Madison on money that had been set aside for a football scholarship; she liked to say that the school had been unable to find a male student more deserving of the academic honor. She graduated in 1943, majoring in journalism, and found a reporting job in El Paso.
There she met a handsome B-17 bombardier, Raymond Villemarette, whom she married shortly before the end of World War II. A few years into their marriage, Mrs. Villemarette's husband was recruited by the fledgling CIA.
"Some people think of it as a glamorous life," said John Villemarette, one of their four children. "They realize too late the strain and the cost."
When Mrs. Villemarette and her husband separated, she received no alimony and limited child support, her children said. At their residence in Australia, their last overseas posting, Mrs. Villemarette wore pearls and managed servants while her husband drank Johnny Walker with visiting President Lyndon B. Johnson; after her divorce, she lived in a one-room apartment, wore thrift-store clothes and chopped her own wood for heat.
Mrs. Villemarette's brimming r�sum� neatly displays the problem that new divorcees encountered when they tried to find work: From 1951 to 1970, she lists nothing under "professional experience." But in 1976, she landed a job with the CIA, the professional world that she knew best. Her assignments during her 23-year career with the agency included editing the classified President's Daily Brief, her family said.
Mrs. Villemarette lobbied for the creation of the Family Liaison Office, now known as the Employee and Family Services Division, which assists families with problems they encounter moving overseas or returning home. The Family Advisory Board also continues to play an important role.
"I certainly appreciated it as a spouse of an agency employee," said Karen L. Chiao, who co-wrote the book "Spies' Wives" and served on the board. "It was something that we had needed for a long time."
In her 70s, while still working at the agency, Mrs. Villemarette completed a doctorate in counseling and human development at American University.
Her former husband died in 1994.
In addition to their son John, of Kensington, survivors include two other sons, Raymond Villemarette of Vienna and Thomas Villemarette of Los Angeles; a daughter, Suzanne Villemarette of Shelbyville, Tenn.; a sister; and five grandchildren.
The group of early CIA wives that decades ago began gathering in Mrs. Villemarette's home, which was decorated with African war masks, Australian boomerangs and other souvenirs from her postings around the world, continues to meet in the Washington area. Mrs. Villemarette once reflected on the sacrifices expected of the women because they were married to officers: She was happy to make them, she wrote in some personal papers, because she was proud to serve her country.
[Langer/WashingtonPost/13March2010]
University of Maryland University College - Academic Director,
Cybersecurity, School of Undergraduate Studies. The Academic Director, Cyber Security is responsible for the design, development, maintenance, and the review of the entire Cyber Security curriculum to assure quality, academic rigor, and currency. The academic director will provide leadership and focus to the emerging discipline; will develop and maintain a strategic vision; and will ultimately establish a national reputation for the program. In addition, the academic director will be responsible for hiring, training, evaluating, staffing and mentoring CSIA faculty. Finally, this person is responsible for managing issues related to students and other duties as assigned by the Dean and Assistant Dean for Computer Information & Technology.
A Masters degree in Information Technology or related field is required; a terminal degree in an IT-related field is preferred. A security-related certification (e.g. CISSP) is highly desirable. Five years of experience in Cyber Security issues are required. Academic experience preferably with adult students is preferred.
This position is available immediately. Salary will commensurate with experience and faculty rank. If interested, please submit a cover letter, curriculum vitae, salary history, and list of three professional references within your application. Cover letters and information should be addressed to:
Candidate Search - Academic Director, Cyber Security
University of Maryland University College
UMUC offers an excellent benefits package to include tuition remission, a minimum of 28 days of leave, as well as a range of insurance options.
Students and employees of UMUC must apply for this position via PeopleSoft Self-Service.
For detailed information, please visit:
http://www.umuc.edu/personnel/exempt.shtml
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Military
University: Instructors for Intelligence Studies Program. Teach without leaving comfort of office or home. American Military University is seeking part-time instructors in our
Intelligence Studies Program. Many of our students are young working
adults and thousands of our students are active military and are
currently deployed around the world! The students value your real life
experience! A PhD is required for these positions.
The American Public University System (APUS) consists of two online
accredited universities: American Military University and American Public University.
The School of Security and Global Studies invites applications for
online part-time faculty positions in the Graduate Intelligence Studies
Program and the National Security Studies Program. In addition to
teaching, faculty will assist in curriculum and program development,
student mentoring, and engage in professional development activities.
Requirements:
- PhD in a discipline related to Intelligence or National Security
Studies (International Relations, Political Science, etc) is required.
- Special attention will be given to those with practitioner
experience in the Intelligence Community (e.g., collections, analysis,
operations) or in a national security field.
- Teaching experience is preferred.
- Access to high speed internet
Location
- These positions are held remotely
Benefits
- Work From Home Office
- Retirement Savings Plan (401K)
- Employee Stock Purchase Plan
- Professional Development Opportunities
- 50% Discount on Tuition
To Apply:
Visit http://www.apus.edu/hiring/
and complete the "Faculty Employment Application"
Please note:
our application allows only one attachment per application. Please
make your cover letter the first page of your CV.
Thank you for your interest in APUS! We look forward to receiving your
application.
Want to learn more about our Intelligence Programs? Please click here.
Questions? please contact aclayton@apus.edu
Annette Clayton| Faculty Recruiter
American Public University System
American Military University | American Public University
P.O. Box 947, Charles Town, WV 25414
T 304-724-2855 |F 703-334-4713| aclayton@apus.edu | www.apus.edu
--------------------------------------------
EVENTS IN COMING TWO MONTHS....
MANY Spy Museum Events in March, April and May with full details are listed on the AFIO Website at www.afio.com. The titles for some of these are as follows:
17-18
March 2010 - Fairfax, VA - The National Military Intelligence
Association hosts Spring 2010 Symposium at the SECRET/NOFORN Level.
Topic: Transformation of Military Department Intelligence and Their
Service Intelligence Centers
The intelligence
agencies of the Military Departments - Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, including the Coast Guard are making dramatic and significant
changes to their capabilities, missions, organizational structure and
future vision. Along with these Service intelligence agencies, their
Service Intelligence Centers - NGIC, NMIC, NASIC, and the NCMIA are
playing an increasing role in supporting not only their own services
but the national intelligence community. Hear as the senior officers
of
those organizations highlight new developments and changes to the
organizations as they undergo transformation.
Further event details and registration can be found: https://www.123signup.com/event?id=mqxhn
Location: Northrop Grumman Mission Systems.
Wednesday, 17 March 2010, 6:15 pm - Scottsdale, AZ -
AFIO AZ Members at Keith Thomson Book Signing for "Once A Spy" novel
Keith is the author of the new novel, Once a Spy. He writes
on intelligence matters for the Huffington Post in Alabama. A former
semi-pro baseball player in France, he won an award for his short film
at Sundance, is a cartoon artist for Newsday, and is a screenwriter.
The event is free of charge.
Poisoned Pen Press bookstore is located one block south of Indian
School Road on the corner of Goldwater Boulevard and East 1st Avenue,
Old Town Scottsdale. The address is 4014 N Goldwater Blvd. Suite 101,
Scottsdale, AZ.
We would very much like to give Barbara Peters an idea of how many
AFIO members intend to come, so please advise as soon as possible if you
plan to attend. Send your RSVP to simone@afioaz.org.
18 March 2010, 11:30 am - Colorado Springs, CO - AFIO Rocky Mountain Chapter hears Bryan Cunningham on "National At Risk." Talk to occur at the Air Force Academy, Falcon Club. Markle Foundation's Bryan Cunningham speaks on "Nation at Risk." Cunningham is with the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. RSVP to Tom Van Wormer at robsmom@pcisys.net
Thursday,
18 March 2010, 12 noon – 1 pm - Washington, DC - Author John Kiriakou
speaks on his new book: The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA’s
War on Terror
The CIA has come under sharp criticism
for its handling of 9/11 and the enhanced interrogation techniques
used
in Afghanistan and the Iraq War. Former CIA operative John Kiriakou,
who was involved in the capture of one of Osama Bin Laden’s closest
aides, Abu Zubaydah, wrote The Reluctant Spy to set the record
straight. Hear his often brutally honest account of firsthand
experience with the controversy over waterboarding, the pressures from
both inside and outside the agency, and the planning for the Iraq War.
Now a senior investigator on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
focusing on the Middle East, South Asia, and international terrorism,
Kiriakou will share his insider’s view of the weaknesses and the
unsung
strengths of the CIA. Free! No registration required! Join the author
for an informal chat and book signing at the Spy Museum. Further
information at www.spymuseum.org.
20 March 2010, 2:00 p.m. - Kennebunk, Maine - The AFIO Maine Chapter hosts Dr. Terence Roehrig speaking on ASIA-PACIFIC CHALLENGES AND THE U.S. Dr. Roehrig, Associate Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI, will address economic, political, and security issues in the region and how they will affect the U.S. He will discuss the direction of China's rise, and the roles played by India, Japan, and the two Koreas. Dr. Roehrig travels frequently to the region doing research and will travel to Japan later this spring in connection with work on a new book. The meeting will be held at the Kennebunk Free Library, 112 Main Street, Kennebunk. The public is invited. For information call 207-985-2392
Friday, 24 - 26 March 2010 - Tampa, FL - Symposium on Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Challenges and Opportunities of Governance and the Role of Regional Actors. Co-Chairs: Dr. Mohsen M. Milani and Dr. Thomas Mason Event includes an hour-long conversation with U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. David H. Petraeus at 2:30 p.m. on Friday, March 26, in the Oval Theater of the Marshall Student Center. The general's talk, as well as other conference discussions, are free and open to the public, but seating is limited. Those interested in attending are asked to RSVP at
RSVP-GenP@usf.edu.
In three days of intense discussions, invited experts, who come from a truly diverse academic and career backgrounds, will analyze the challenges faced by these two countries and their ramifications for the U.S. national security and interests. USF is organizing the conference as a means of advancing discussion on the development of future regional policy. Attending the event will be contingents from U.S. Central Command, the U.S. diplomatic corps, scholars, students and concerned citizens. Experts also will explore the connection between security interests and the dire healthcare situation in both nations.
Five panel discussions will feature scholars from diverse backgrounds. Experts from the U.S. Army War College, the Rand Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment, Boston University, the Ministry of Health in Kabul and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will be among the panelists.
Kevin McGurgan, British Consul-General in Miami, will make a presentation at Wednesday's opening session. Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann will deliver Wednesday's keynote address: "What We Can Achieve in Afghanistan: A Realistic Appraisal."
On Wednesday, panel discussions will be held from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the Gibbons Alumni Center and will explore governance in Afghanistan and present regional perspectives from Islamic movements, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Thursday's discussions will be held from 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the Marshall Student Center's Oval Theater and will concentrate on Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, Russia and Iran; the role of tribes in Afghanistan and the status of women in Afghanistan.
Friday, the focus moves to public health at 9 a.m. in the Marshall Student Center's Oval Theater with a wide-ranging discussion on maternal and child health; water security and the future direction of U.S. health services in Afghanistan.
The conversation with General Petraeus will conclude the event.
AFIO Members planning on attending the general's talk should be advised that no purses, bags or backpacks will be allowed in the theater and seating is limited. The general's talk also will be broadcast live at on USF.edu.
A complete schedule of events can be found here.
Thursday, 25 March 2010, 6 p.m. - New York,
NY - AFIO Metro NY Chapter hosts U.S. Secret Agent who specialized in
Explosives and Codes. The AFIO New York Metro Chapter
Thursday evening meeting will feature Dr. John Behling, one of the last
surviving members of the forerunner agency of CIA [the Office of
Strategic Services], who will tell of his training in explosives and
codes, his being dropped behind enemy lines, his work with the
Resistance, and the post-war years in the Occupied Zones. Of special
interest is his eyewitness account of his visit to the Mauthausen
Extermination Camp, and his subsequent search for escaping Nazis,
hidden assets and war criminals.
Many of these experiences will be in a yet-to-be-published memoir on
his distinguished wartime service. He also spent many years
working for the U.S. Department of State.
This is a first-hand account with remarkable -- and chilling --
details that no film or printed work can convey in the same manner. Do
not miss it.
Location: University Club, 9th Floor. $40 pp; $20 students/military
No reservations required.
For further information contact Jerry Goodwin, Chapter President, at
347-334-1503 or afiometro@yahoo.com
Wednesday, 31 March 2010, 8 p.m. - Coral Gables, FL - AFIO Miami Chapter hosts Keith Thomson in special reading "Once A Spy" and a special presentation on Microdrones -- or did you think it was an ordinary insect on your ceiling? Thomson will read from his spy novel: Once A Spy, at Books & Books in Coral Gables. The Microdrones [professional unmanned aerial vehicles] have offered to debut their 2.5LB drones beforehand for AFIO members, as well. Microdrones have been used to extraordinary success by police in the UK (FAA regulations are thwarting their use in the U.S.; meanwhile radio-controlled helicopters and airplanes up to 55LBs have essentially no restraints). Clearly an event not to miss. For further information contact chapter President Tom Spencer at trsmiami@aol.com
THURSDAY, 1 April 2010 - Tysons Corner, VA - National AFIO Luncheon featuring Seymour Hersh and Marc Thiessen.
Full details are here.
Wednesday, 7 April 2010, 6 p.m. - Las Vegas, NV - AFIO Las Vegas Chapter Meeting features Matthew Zucker, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Topic: “Mexican Drug Cartels” Employed with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) for 12 years, Officer Matthew Zucker is currently serving as a TAC Officer assigned to the Detention Services Training Division. While assigned to the LVMPD Detention Services Division Intelligence Section, Officer Zucker worked issues involving Hispanic Gangs, Black Gangs, White Gangs, Prison Gangs, and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. He compiled a certified training class entitled “Introduction to Surenos” which has been taught to approximately 10,000 police and corrections officers nationwide. He has been a featured speaker at three consecutive LMPD Gang Conferences, the Virginia Gang Conference, American Jails Conference, Southern Nevada Gang Symposium, the National Latino Peace Officers Conference, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATF) Hispanic Agent Association Conference, Federal Law Enforcement Analysis Training, and the LVMPD Sheriff’s Recruitment Council.
Location: Nellis Air Force Base Officers' Club. Guest names must be submitted to me by 4:00 p.m., Monday, March 29th. Join us at 5 p.m. in the "Check Six" bar area for liaison and beverages.
If you plan to attend, RSVP with names by 4 pm, Monday, March 29th. Entrance to the Base for your guest(s) cannot be guaranteed if I don't have their names
(unless they already have military ID to enter the base). (The deadline to submit names of guests is by 4:00 p.m March 29, 2010) All guests must use the MAIN GATE located at the intersection on Craig Road and Las Vegas Blvd. 5871 Fitzgerald Blvd.
Bring your spouse and/or guest(s) to dinner as well as our meeting, but remember to submit your guest(s) names to me be the stated deadline above.
You may email at BentleyM@nv.doe.gov or call me anytime at 702-295-1024 if you have any questions. We look forward to seeing you!
Tuesday, 13 April 2010, 5 p.m. - Hampton
Roads, VA - The AFIO Norm Forde Hampton Roads Chapter - to hear Carl
Finstrom on Stella Polaris. AFIO member Carl Finstrom will
present, "Stella Polaris: The Exfiltration of Finnish COMINT Material"-
The evacuation of the Finnish Intelligence Service from Finland to
Sweden in Sep 1944.
Finstrom is an AFIO Member and Past President, Christopher Wren
Association.
Stella Polaris was the code name for a secret plan developed by the
Finnish Intelligence Service for their evacuation to Sweden in the final
phase of World War Two. The plan was coordinated with the Swedish
counterpart intelligence organizations in June 1944 after the Soviets
resumed a massive offensive. By the end of June there was a real danger
of a Soviet breakthrough and Soviet occupation of Finland. The Finns
sought to relocate their intelligence assets to neutral Sweden so that
they could continue the fight working with a significant Finnish
stay-behind force. Finns stored weapons and ammunition at hundreds of
locations to support a stay-behind force of at least 50,000 resistance
personnel. The Stella Polaris story is of great interest to cryptologic
historians. The story of the evacuation of the Finnish Military
Intelligence Branch from Finland to Sweden after the signing of the
ceasefire with the USSR in Sept 1944 is perhaps the most extraordinary
event in the history of communications intelligence
Free and open to the public. Light refreshments will be served.
RSVP: Melissa Saunders at mwsaunders@cox.net
Location: Main meeting room at Tabb Library, York County. Directions:
From Norfolk take I-64 West. Merge onto US-17 North via Exit 258B
toward Yorktown. Follow US-17 North approximately 2.2 miles to Victory
Blvd/VA-171 East. Turn right onto Victory Blvd/VA-171 East. Turn right
at the next traffic light onto Hampton Hwy/VA-134 South. Turn right at
the next traffic light onto Long Green Blvd. Tabb Library is on the
immediate right. It is across the street from the Victory YMCA.
From Williamsburg take I-64 East. Merge onto Victory Blvd/VA-171 East
via Exit 256B. Follow Victory Blvd/VA-171 East approximately 2 miles.
Turn right onto Hampton Hwy/VA-134 South. Turn right at the next traffic
light onto Long Green Blvd. Tabb Library is on the immediate right. It
is across the street from the Victory YMCA.
Tuesday, 13 April 2010, 1130 hrs - Tampa, FL - The AFIO Suncoast Chapter will hold its Spring meeting and luncheon on "Current Challenges to America's Historical Strengths in the Intelligence Community" featuring Walter Andrusyszyn.
CCheck-in registration will commence at 1130 hours, opening ceremonies and lunch& Business Meeting at noon, followed by our speaker, Walter Andrusyszyn who will be discussing the consequences of global/U.S. debt; Middle East; Russia and Eastern Europe; NATO/EU; China and the proliferation of nuclear weapons with a favor of the White House and State Department. A full Luncheon with normal salad, rolls, dressing of choice, coffee and tea, and desert, will be served for the usual $15, all inclusive. We will have the wine and soda bar open at 1100 for those that wish to come early for our social time. We recommend you not miss this luncheon and presentation.
Reply ASAP, with your name and any guests accompanying you, to: Bill Brown at billbrown1@tampabay.rr.com
Your check payable to 'Suncoast Chapter, AFIO' (or cash) should be presented at time of check-in for the luncheon. Should you not have 'bumper stickers' or ID card for access to MacDill AFB, please so state in your response. Be sure to include your license number, name on drivers license and state of issue for yourself and for any guests you are bringing on base. And don't forget, all of you needing special roster gate access should proceed to the Bayshore Gate entrance to MacDill AFB (need directions, let us know). The main gate will send you to the visitor‘s center and they will not be able to help you get past security, unless you are just asking for directions to the Bayshore Gate.
We look forward to your response -- hopefully also seeing you at the O'Club at the April 13th luncheon.
Walter Andrusyszyn has been an Adjunct Professor of International Business at the College of Business Administration of the University of South Florida, where he began teaching in spring 2007. From January to May 2009 he was temporarily assigned as Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.S. Mission to NATO. He joined the Plastipak Packaging Company in January 2004 following a career in the U.S. Government. He retired from public service at the end of 2003, after serving at the White House as the Director for Northern and Eastern European Affairs in the National Security Council (he became Director in November 2001). Having entered the Foreign Service in 1980, he served in Stockholm (1980-82) and in East Berlin (1982-84) before returning to Washington to be the Desk Officer for Grenada and the Windward and Leeward Islands of the Caribbean (1985-1987). In 1987-1988 he was Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. He then served in Bonn as the Bonn Group Representative, responsible for Berlin and Four Power rights during Germany's reunification. In 1990, he headed the Political-Military unit at the American Embassy in Bonn.
Andrusyszyn became the Desk Officer for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in 1992. In 1994, he returned to Bonn to head the unit reporting on domestic political events in Germany. In October 1995, he was assigned to the American Embassy in Sarajevo where he served during the Dayton Peace Talks and for the first months of IFOR deployment. For his efforts to gain the release of an imprisoned American journalist held by Bosnian Serb authorities, Mr. Andrusyszyn received the Secretary's Award for Heroism. In April 1996, he was assigned to Stockholm as Political Counselor. In August 1997 he was appointed Charge d’Affaires at the American Embassy in Tallinn, Estonia and in July 1999, be became director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs, responsible for NATO and the OSCE. In September 2001 he was named the Director of the Task Force on Terrorism in response to the September 11 attacks.
Born in Blackburn, England in 1951, Mr. Andrusyszyn emigrated to the U.S. in 1957 and was raised in New York City. A graduate of New York University (1973), he attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1973-1975). He continued his studies in Germany and also worked as a local employee for the Sri Lanka Embassy in Bonn (1977-78)..
Wednesday, 14 April 2010, 11:30 a.m. - Scottsdale, AZ - AFIO Arizona Luncheon on "Current Perspective on Pakistan-Afghanistan-India Issues." Where: McCORMICK RANCH GOLF COURSE,7505 McCormick Parkway, Scottsdale AZ 85258 ~ Phone 480.948.0260
Speaker: Prof Phil Jones, Director, Global Security/Intelligence Studies, Embrey-Riddle Aeronautical, Prescott, Arizona Campus, on “Current Perspective on Pakistan-Afghanistan, Pakistan-India Issues.” Phil Jones is a former national intelligence analyst and an international security expert with extensive field experience in political and security risk studies. He has also served as security manager for an international corporation and management services for corporate clients.
He has done extensive field work for World Bank clients in international development projects and is an expert on South Asia. Professor Jones will focus on timely Pakistan-Afghanistan, Pakistan-India issues.
RESERVATIONS: WE WILL NEED FOR EVERY MEETING an RSVP no later than 72 hours ahead of time; in the past, not reserving or cancelling without prior notice (72 hours prior to the meeting) created much grief for those of us organizing the meeting and dealing with the personnel!
WE ARE charged for the no-shows and please remember, we are a small organization with a humble coffer!
We would therefore APPRECIATE that you all respond to this email to confirm your presence (or not). Our meeting fees will be as follows: $20.00 for members, $22 for non-member guests.
Email Simone simone@4smartphone.net or simone@afioaz.org or call and leave a message on 602.570.6016
15 April 2010, 12:30 p.m. - Las Angeles, CA - The AFIO L.A. luncheon hosts Marthe Cohn - "Behind Enemy Lines: A French Spy Inside Nazi Germany."
Marthe Cohn was a member of the French First Army intelligence service during World War II and made many covert trips inside Nazi Germany. During her presentation, she will recount her missions as a French Jewish spy and how she disguised herself as a young nurse to find information about German troop movements and alert Allied commanders. Her book, Behind Enemy Lines, an outstanding memoir, is the story of an ordinary human being who, under extraordinary circumstances, became the hero her country needed her to be. Nine years ago she was awarded the Medaille Militaire, a relatively rare medal awarded for outstanding military service and given, in the past, to the likes of Winston Churchill.
She has appeared at the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. and on CSPAN2.
Lunch will be served at 12:30 PM at the LMU campus for a cost of $20. Please RSVP via email AFIO_LA@Yahoo.com by no later than April 9, 2010 if you would like to attend the meeting. If directions are needed please forward an email request.
Friday, 16 April 2010 - Austin, TX - CIA Invites AFIO Members to the CIA - LBJ Library Conference on STRATEGIC WARNING and The ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE - Lessons Learned from the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Full details at top right column of this issue of the Weekly Notes.
23 - 25 April 2010 - S. Portland, ME - The New England Chapter of the Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association (NCVA-NE) holds a spring Mini-Reunion at the Marriott at Sable Oaks. For additional event information, call (518) 664-8032 or visit website.
28 April 2010, 6:30 p.m. - Coral Gables, FL - The AFIO Miami Chapter hosts dinner with CIA Clandestine Services Officer. Save the date for a special dinner meeting with a member of the Clandestine Service, CIA. We will be discussing the mission and how we can help. This will be an opportunity to invite trusted members of the business community. Details to follow. Inquiries to trsmiami@aol.com
28 April 2010, 6:30 p.m. - Washington, DC - The Goethe Institute will host a presentation and discussion of the film "The Lives of Others" about the surveillance society of East Germany during the Cold War.
If interested in attending this free cinema presentation and discussion, send your RSVP to: rsvp@washington.goethe.org or by phone to: 202/289-1200 extension 170. Please note that the film discussion is scheduled to begin at 6:30 p.m
30 April 2010, 9 a.m. - 6 p.m. - Washington, DC - "The Stasi and its Foreign Intelligence Service" - Free Workshop by CWIHP and
GHI.
The German Historical Institute and The Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars hosts one day workshop on the STASI. This CWIHP-GHI workshop will be held at the Woodrow Wilson Center, One
Wilson Plaza/1300 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. in Washington. There will be four panels with leading
American, German, British and Canadian historians working on the Stasi
and HVA: Panel 1: The Stasi and East German Society; Panel 2: The Stasi
and the East German State and the SED (communist party); Panel 3: The
HVA and KGB; and Panel 4: The HVA and the West, which will deal mainly
with East German espionage in West Germany.
PROGRAM:
Friday, April 30 (Woodrow Wilson Center) The Stasi and East German Society, with Uwe Spiekermann, GHI; Jens Gieseke, Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, and Gary Bruce, Waterloo University, Canada. David Bathrick gives commentary.
The Stasi, the SED, and the GDR State - a panel with Christian Ostermann, Woodrow Wilson Ctr, Walter Süß, Birthler Agency, Berlin, and Jefferson Adams, Sarah Lawrence College.
Keynote Address: “The Stasi Legacy in Germany’s History” by Professor Konrad Jarausch, University of North Carolina
The HVA and KGB panel with Mircea Munteanu, Woodrow Wilson Ctr, Benjamin Fischer, formerly CIA History Staff, Washington, DC and Paul Maddrell, Aberystwyth University. Comment by Oleg Kalugin, KGB (ret)
The HVA and the West panel with R. Gerald Livingston, GHI, Georg Herbstritt, Birthler Agency, Berlin and Kristie Macrakis, Georgia Institute of Technology
Dirk Doerrenberg, formerly Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
A luncheon keynote address on the Legacy of the Stasi in German History will be delivered by Professor Konrad Jarausch of the University of North Carolina's History Department.
AFIO members are invited to participate in the discussion following panelists' presentation. but asked to register with the Wilson Center in advance, identifying themselves as AFIO members. No fee for participation is required. REGISTER by e-mail at the following address: coldwar@wilsoncenter.org.
Contact persons at the
Wilson Center: Mircea. Munteanu, CWIHP Deputy Director (Mircea.Munteanu@wilsoncenter.org) or Tel: 202/69-4267, or Timothy McDonnell (Timothy.McDonnell@wilsoncenter.org).
A full program outline can be
provided by the Wilson Center contact persons.
PLAN NOW FOR THIS UPCOMING SPYCRUISE®....
13 - 20 November 2010 - Ft. Lauderdale, FL - SPYCRUISE to Grand Turks, Turks & Caicos; San Juan, PR; St. Thomas, USVI; and Half Moon Cay, Bahamas - with National Security Speakers Discussing "Current & Future Threats: Policies, Problems and Prescriptions."
This National Security Educational Lecture/Seminar co-sponsored by the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies (CICENTRE) and Henley-Putnam University, being held aboard Holland America's M.S. Eurodam features some top intelligence experts, as follows:
Porter Goss, Former Director, CIA
Gen. Michael Hayden, Former Director of CIA and NSA
Peter Brookes, Heritage Foundation Fellow, Former CIA Operations Officer
Michael Braun, DEA Operations Chief, Retired, Managing Partner, Spectre Group Intl
Dr. Michael Corcoran, President, Henley-Putnam University
Major General Paul E. Vallely, U.S. Army Retired
Clare Lopez, Retired CIA Operations Officer, Ci Centre Professor; VP, Intelligence Summit
SPACE IS LIMITED - Reserve your stateroom now for this EIGHT DAY cruise/conference.
RESERVATIONS: www.DFunTravel.com or call 1-888-670-0008.
Fees are remarkably reasonable for an eight day cruise: $1,199 inside cabin; $1269 Ocean View Cabin; $1449 Verandahs; $1979 Suites. Price includes program, taxes, port charges and gratuities.
Colorful brochure here.
For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimers and Removal Instructions
Weekly Intelligence Notes (WINs) are commentaries on Intelligence and related national security matters, based on open media sources, selected, interpreted, edited and produced for non-profit educational uses by members and WIN subscribers.
REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS: We do not wish to add clutter to inboxes. To discontinue receiving the WINs:
a) IF YOU ARE A MEMBER -- click here: UNSUBSCRIBE and supply your full name and email address where you receive the WINs. Click SEND, you will be removed from list. If this link doesn't open a blank email, create one on your own and send to afio@afio.com with the words: REMOVE FROM WINs as the subject, and provide your full name and email address where you are currently receiving them.
b) IF YOU ARE NOT A MEMBER, and you received this message, someone forwarded this newsletter to you [contrary to AFIO policies]. Forward to afio@afio.com the entire WIN or message you received and we will remove the sender from our membership and distribution lists. The problem will be solved for both of us.
CONTENTS of this WIN [HTML version recipients - Click title to jump to story or section, Click Article Title to return to Contents. This feature does not work for Plaintext Edition or for some AOL recipients]. If you wish to change to HTML format, let us know at afio@afio.com. The HTML feature also does not work for those who access their e-mail using web mail...however NON-HTML recipients may view the latest edition each week in HTML at this link: https://www.afio.com/pages/currentwin.htm
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
WINs are protected by copyright laws and intellectual property laws, and may not be reproduced or re-sent without specific permission from the Producer. Opinions expressed in the WINs are solely those of the editor(s) or author(s) listed with each article. AFIO Members Support the AFIO Mission - sponsor new members! CHECK THE AFIO WEBSITE at www.afio.com for back issues of the WINs, information about AFIO, conference agenda and registrations materials, and membership applications and much more!
(c) 2010, AFIO, 6723 Whittier Ave Suite 200, McLean, VA 22101. Voice: (703) 790-0320; Fax: (703) 991-1278; Email: afio@afio.com
Click here to return to top.