AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #20-09 dated 2 June 2009

Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS

US Plans to Press FBI Into Counter-Terror Ops. The US plans to push the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Justice Department into global counter-terrorism operations in a shift away from the Bush administration's policy that relied largely on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Moreover, the CIA-dominated system of clandestine detentions and interrogations will be replaced with one built around transparent investigations and prosecutions, the Los Angeles Times reported.

Under the 'global justice' initiative, which has been in the works for several months, FBI agents will have a central role in overseas counter-terrorism cases. They will expand their questioning of suspects and evidence-gathering to try to ensure that criminal prosecutions are an option, officials familiar with the effort were quoted as saying.

While the initiative is a work in progress, some senior counter-terrorism officials and administration policymakers see it as key to the national security strategy President Obama laid out last week - one that presumes most accused terrorists have the right to contest the charges against them in a "legitimate" setting, the Times said.

The "global justice" plan aims to bring virtually all suspects to a court of law in the US or abroad. That will be the case whether a suspected terrorist is captured on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, in the Philippine jungle or in a mosque in Nigeria, said a senior US counter-terrorism official with knowledge of the initiative.

Asked about the initiative, FBI assistant director and chief spokesman John J. Miller said: "We have no comment on it at this time." [SamayLive/28May2009] 

Obama Orders Review of Government Classification. Expanding his drive to open government, President Barack Obama is ordering two studies of whether the government is classifying too much information and using too many different ways to keep it from public view.

He wants the answers in just 90 days, and it's no secret which way he's leaning.

In a memo Wednesday, Obama ordered national security adviser James L. Jones to consult relevant agencies and recommend revisions in the existing presidential order on national security classification that lays out the rules under which agencies can stamp documents "confidential," "secret" or "top secret."

That same memo also ordered Attorney General Eric Holder and Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to set up a government-wide task force on standardizing so-called controlled but unclassified information. This is data with stamps like "for official use only" or "limited official distribution" that are not authorized by the executive order but have grown up over the years to keep sensitive data from the public even if it doesn't meet standards for national security classification.

Obama noted that there are now 107 different stamps for such data, also known as "sensitive but unclassified" information, and 130 different procedures for applying those stamps. He said a 2008 order by former President George W. Bush had "a salutary effect" in establishing a framework to begin standardizing these designations for sensitive terrorism-related data, but he asked the task force to recommend whether that work should be expanded to cover all sensitive but unclassified information government-wide.

The tone of the memo suggested Obama thought a government-wide effort would be a good idea. Obama also directed this group to study the procedures for handling sensitive but unclassified data to be sure that "information is not restricted unless there is a compelling need."

While Obama didn't order any changes in government secrecy Wednesday, his memo contained language and set agendas for the two studies that hinted strongly at moves he might take. It was greeted with cheers from open government advocates who have long argued that government classifies too much information.

Meanwhile, the government spent more than $8.6 billion in the 12 months ending last Sept. 30 to classify information and protect it, the National Archives Information Security Oversight Office reported Wednesday. The figure does not include the costs incurred by the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and two other large intelligence agencies; their spending to create and protect secrets is itself a secret.

In the same period, spending on declassification sank to $43 million, continuing the long-term reductions during the Bush administration. Declassification costs topped $230 million a year in the final years of the Clinton administration, but plunged dramatically after George W. Bush took office.

Oversight office chief William J. Bosanko recommended to Obama that more resources were needed for declassification, employee training and management of government secrets.

Echoing language he used earlier to open more government information to the public under the Freedom of Information Act, Obama said, "A democratic government must be as transparent as possible and must not withhold information for self-serving reasons or simply to avoid embarrassment."

Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, a private group that gathers and publishes declassified government documents and lobbies for more open government, applauded the memo.

Blanton said the tasks assigned to the two studies and language in the memo make clear "the president's gut is in the right place. He's opting for transparency. This is about as clear a signal as you can get in a bureaucratic environment."

Among the tasks Obama set for Jones' study was to recommend whether to set up a National Declassification Center where officials from various agencies could work together on declassification of documents. Currently, there is a backlog of 51 million pages, scheduled for automatic declassification on Dec. 31, that have not been completely reviewed for release because the material had to be referred to as many as 10 different agencies for evaluation.

Obama also asked Jones to recommend whether to restore Clinton's "presumption against classification," that would bar classifying documents when there is significant doubt about the need for it. Bush eliminated that presumption.

And Obama asked Jones to recommend changes to increase sharing of classified information among appropriate agencies and to prohibit reclassification of material already released to the public properly. Blanton's group found that between 1999 and 2006, more than 150,000 publicly available pages had been reclassified government-wide. [AP/29May2009] 

U.K.'s MI6 Plans 100th Birthday Worthy of James Bond, WSJ Says. Britain's foreign intelligence service, known as MI6, is planning a black-tie ball worthy of fictional spy James Bond to celebrate 100 years of operations, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with the plans.

Spies past and present, government officials and members of Britain's Royal Family attending the top-secret dinner and dance have all been closely vetted and many will pay their own way with no cost to the taxpayer, the newspaper reported.

The location, the menu and bands playing are all on the "For Your Eyes Only'' list and Sir John Scarlett, the current director-general, signed off personally on the food to be consumed, the newspaper reported; no mention was made of the fictional spy's favorite tipples, Bollinger champagne or a dry martini consisting of Gordon's Gin, grain-based vodka and Kina Lillet, a Vermouth-like drink, shaken not stirred, with a twist of lemon.

By contrast MI5, MI6's sister organization responsible for domestic intelligence, plans no more than the publication of an academic history, "Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5,'' by Cambridge University's Christopher Andrew. And there won't even be a book launch party, the Journal said.

The initial MI in both organizations' titles refers to their creation in 1909 as the Secret Service Bureau, part of Britain's Military Intelligence branch. [Peterson/Bloomberg/28May2009] 

CIA Seeks to Broaden Foreign Language Skills. The CIA is undertaking a five-year plan to boost the agency's fluency in foreign languages, Director Leon Panetta said Friday.

Less than a third of CIA analysts and overseas spies are proficient in a foreign language and Panetta said he aims to raise foreign language proficiency inside the CIA to at least half of all analysts and intelligence operatives within the next five years.

CIA spokesman George Little said less than 30 percent of analysts and intelligence collectors are currently proficient in a foreign language, but would not say how many officers speak which languages.

The actual numbers those percentages represent in CIA employees are classified because the number of agency employees is secret. But agency officials say its staff suffers shortages in some of world's critical languages, including Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Pushto, Urdu and Persian.

The CIA will both increase language training and recruit Americans who already speak the necessary foreign languages. Panetta said the initiative would require significant new funding, but did not specify an amount. [Hess/AP/26Ma2009] 

Lebanon Colonel Held for Spying for Israel. A Lebanese army colonel has been detained on suspicion of spying for Israel, security sources said on Tuesday.

The sources said the colonel was arrested last week and was being questioned about links to Israeli spy agencies.

Lebanon is holding up to 30 suspects in what security sources say is a widening investigation into espionage for Israel.

At least 21 suspects have already been charged, some in absentia, and several have confessed, the authorities say. Israel has not commented on the arrests.

Lebanese officials have displayed what they say is sophisticated communications equipment and other gadgets found in the homes or offices of some of the suspects.

Lebanon says at least two spies fled to Israel last week and has demanded Israel hand them back.

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Lebanese Islamist group Hezbollah, last week called for the death penalty for all suspects convicted of spying for Israel.

Senior Lebanese security officials say the arrests have dealt a major blow to Israel's spying networks in Lebanon.

They say many of the suspects played key roles in identifying Hezbollah targets that were bombed during a 34-day war between Israel and the Shi'ite group in 2006.

Other suspects have been charged with monitoring senior Hezbollah officials and at least one is alleged to have played a role in the 2004 assassination of a commander of the group. [Bassam&Ladki/Reuters/26May2009] 

Prosecutors Retrace Steps of Suspected Chinese Spy. A Chinese tourist was arrested on Monday in Taipei on a charge of spying on a military facility, prompting accusations from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators yesterday that the government was neglecting national security.

Military police had detained the tourist, Ma Zhongfei, chairman of a high-tech company in China, for taking photos of military property at the Armed Forces Recruitment Center in Taipei. He was placed under arrest late on Monday night and detained for questioning.

Taipei prosecutors said they transferred the case to the Taiwan High Court Prosecutors' Office at midnight on Monday because the case fell under the High Court's jurisdiction.

Prosecutor Tseng Chiun-che yesterday took Ma back to the recruitment center to question him about the exact locations where he had taken photos and where he had aimed his camera.

This would be important in determining Ma's reasons for taking the photos, prosecutors said.

Ma told prosecutors that he came to Taiwan on a nine-day tour and had planned to return to China today.

He left his tour group on Monday afternoon saying he was going to Sindian in Taipei County to pay his respects to a deceased Taiwanese friend. As he traveled along Keelung Road, he stopped at the recruitment center and took some pictures.

Ma said he entered the recruitment center to take photos of the buildings.

He said he asked the guards on duty at the center whether he could look around and take some pictures.

They told him it was permitted, as the building is open to the public, Ma said. The suspect took some photographs of the buildings, vehicles and people inside the center, Ma said.

He said had no intention to steal military secrets.

Yu said Ma violated Article 112 of the Criminal Code, for which he faces a prison sentence of up to 12 months if found guilty.  
[Chang&Huang&Chuang/Taipeitimes/27May2009] 

Showdown in NSA Wiretap Case: Judge Threatens Sanctions Against Justice Department. The Obama administration has until Friday to convince a federal judge not to levy sanctions against the government for "failing to obey the court's orders" in a key NSA wiretapping lawsuit.

U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker is threatening to summarily decide the 3-year-old lawsuit in favor of the plaintiffs, and award unspecified monetary damages to two American lawyers who claim their telephone calls were illegally intercepted by the NSA under the Bush administration. The lawyer represented a now-defunct Saudi charity that the Treasury Department claimed was linked to terrorism.

If it survived appeal, such a ruling would be a blow to the government, but it would fall far short of deciding the important question the case asks: Can a sitting president, without congressional authority, create a spying program to eavesdrop on Americans' electronic communications without warrants, as George W. Bush did in the aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks?

The San Francisco case began when the government accidentally sent the plaintiffs documents that showed their overseas communications with Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation officials were intercepted without warrants. The pair sued, but were forced to return the document because it was marked "top secret."

The Justice Department, under the Bush and Obama administrations, has repeatedly maintained that the lawsuit should be dismissed because it threatens to expose state secrets.

But after years of legal wrangling, Walker decided in January that the documents were admissible, and ordered the government to craft a protective order that would allow the plaintiff's counsel to review the documents in secret, without them being disclosed to their clients or the public. A similar process has been applied to lawyers representing Guantanamo Bay prisoners.

This month the Obama administration refused to comply with Walker's order. The government is "refusing to cooperate with the court's orders because, they assert, plaintiffs' attorneys do not 'need to know' the information that the court has determined they do need to know," Walker wrote Friday.

The refusal came after the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals declined to override the judge. Until Walker directly orders the government to turn over the classified document to the plaintiff lawyers, the appeals court will not consider hearing the case. In defying the court order, the government urged Walker to go ahead and order the release of the secret documents to the lawyers, so the Justice Department could appeal. But Walker declined that invitation to become the nation's first judge to disclose data the government has classified as a state secret.

Now Walker has given the Justice Department until Friday to explain why he shouldn't sanction the government by simply deciding the entire lawsuit in favor of the plaintiffs.

A hearing on the matter is set for June 3.

Walker is the same judge overseeing a class-action lawsuit targeting the nation's telecommunication companies of being complicit in Bush's once-secret spy program. Congress, with the vote of then-Sen. Barack Obama, legalized the spy program last summer.

That legislation allows electronic eavesdropping of Americans without obtaining a warrant if the subjects of the wiretap are communicating overseas with somebody believed connected to terrorism.

No such congressional authority was in place when lawyers Wendell Belew and Asim Gafoor's telephone calls were intercepted in 2005. The United States had designated the Al-Haramain charity a terror organization.

The legislation authorizing the spy powers also immunized the telcos from being sued for their part in Bush's eavesdropping program. Walker is entertaining a constitutional challenge to the immunity legislation. [Kravitz/Wired/29May2009] 

Archives Offers $50,000 Reward for Missing Data. The National Archives is offering a $50,000 reward for recovery of a missing computer drive containing sensitive Clinton administration data.

The Western Digital My Book external hard drive was discovered missing about March 24 from an Archives processing room in College Park, Md. The Archives said Friday that its inspector general and the Secret Service have not uncovered any evidence of theft or targeting of the device for its data.

The drive can hold enough data to fill millions of books. It contains backup tapes from the Executive Office of the President, including some Social Security numbers, addresses and Secret Service and White House operating procedures.

Those with information are asked to call the Secret Service at 202-406-8800.  [Philadelphia/29May2009] 

Infamous Terrorist Flees to Lebanon. A master bomb maker who once targeted commercial airliners and was suspected of aiding the Iraq insurgency has fled to Lebanon, an FBI official has confirmed.

There is information that 73-year-old Abu Ibrahim was reportedly in Tripoli, the official said earlier this week. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the investigation is ongoing.

The Palestinian terrorist is accused of multiple bombings in the 1980s. He was indicted in the 1982 bombing of Pam Am Flight 830. The explosion killed a 16-year-old boy and wounded more than a dozen passengers as the plane headed to Honolulu from Tokyo.

The FBI has been looking to catch Ibrahim for decades and has recently increased its efforts to arrest him. In April, an FBI committee recommended Ibrahim be placed on agency's list of most wanted terrorists.

The FBI is also trying to tap a State Department reward program to boost the bounty for his capture to millions of dollars. Ibrahim's real name is Husayn al-Umari.

Ibrahim has remained out of reach for decades while living in Baghdad. With the help of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Ibrahim ran a much-feared terrorist organization called "15 May," which was named for the date Israel was founded.

Ibrahim, a devout Sunni who was born in Tripoli, Lebanon, is suspected of carrying out more than two dozen attacks on mainly American, Israeli and Jewish targets in a career that spans decades.

The Iraqi government also used him to conduct terrorism operations against Syria and Iran. In his book, former CIA spy master Duane R. Clarridge wrote that Ibrahim had a "talent for constructing ingenious machines of death, such as refrigerator trucks whose cooling pipes were filled with liquid explosives."

He trained a slew of operatives in the art of bomb making whose expertise metastasized across the Middle East like Mohammed Rashed and Abu Zyad. Rashed is behind bars at the Supermax maximum-security prison in Florence, Colo. He's scheduled to be released in less than four years.

Some still remain unaccounted for like Zyad.

Zyad, 60, who was born in Bethlehem, assisted Ibrahim in Baghdad in the early 1980s, according to CIA investigative notes obtained by The Associated Press. The notes say Zyad lived in Sudan for two years before leaving for Algiers in 1989. His current whereabouts are unknown.

A former senior CIA official who was stationed in Baghdad after the Iraqi invasion in 2003 said there were serious suspicions that Ibrahim had helped the insurgency.

The official said Ibrahim had recently slipped into Lebanon through Syria after coalition forces began to increase efforts to drive insurgents out of the Mosul area and the Saladin Province in Iraq, where Ibrahim had been operating.

The former CIA official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he still works in the Middle East, said that Ibrahim had also gone to Tripoli. Ibrahim's second wife, Selma, is from Tripoli.

"He's got a lot of resources there," the former CIA official said.

Ibrahim's family also has connections to the Badawi Palestinian refugee camp on the northern fringes of Tripoli, according to the CIA notes.

The U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Lebanon. [Goldman&Herschaft/AP/ 29May2009] 

CIA Officials Hold Talks in Yemen. Deputy Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen R. Kappes, held talks Thursday with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on cooperation in the fight against terrorism, Yemen's state news agency reported. The agency said the talks dealt with "aspects of bilateral relations between Yemen and the United States, including the cooperation in security field and combatting terrorism."

It said the visiting Kappes met with Saleh in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz.

Kappes "hailed Yemen's efforts in fighting terrorism," and promised more support to Yemen to enhance its anti-terrorism capabilities, the agency said.

The US official's visit comes as Yemeni and US authorities are stalled on the fate of Yemeni detainees at the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Hundreds of prisoners have been released from the Guantanamo prison since it was set up in 2002, but only 14 of them were from Yemen.

Around 100 Yemenis are now locked at the controversial prison without charge, making them the largest single group among the 241 prisoners remaining at Guantanamo.

In January, Saleh said his country had rejected a US proposal to send 94 Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo Saudi Arabia, where they could be sent through a rehabilitation programme.

He said his government would build a rehabilitation centre, where the returnees would be re-educated to shun extremism and fanaticism.

On Tuesday, dozens of relatives of Yemeni detainees held in Guantanamo protested outside the Cabinet's headquarters during its weekly meeting in Sanaa urging the government to step up efforts to secure their release. [EarthTimes/27May2009] 

Iran Holds Aid Worker Silva Harotonian on Espionage Charges. Journalist Roxana Saberi is breathing easier these days, back in the United States after spending four months in Iran's notorious Evin prison on charges of spying for the United States. Saberi's was a cause c�l�bre, but Evin is home to numerous political prisoners, arrested for crimes against the regime both real and imagined.

One of Saberi's former cellmates, who has thus far escaped international attention, is Silva Harotonian. She's being held on espionage charges that - like Saberi's - the State Department in Washington asserts are without merit. Harotonian is an Iranian citizen, but her family in Los Angeles is hoping that Saberi's release could also help free her. A last-ditch appeal filed by defense lawyers has yet to be ruled on.

While drinking a cup of tea in her mother's Tehran apartment last June, Harotonian was arrested and charged with fomenting a "Velvet Revolution" against the Iranian government. The 34-year-old was convicted in January and sentenced to three years in prison, where family members say she is in poor and worsening health. They say she is a well-intentioned aid worker wrongly accused. "She never even read the news or followed politics. She just wanted to do something good for her country," says her cousin, Klara Moradkhan, who lives in Los Angeles.

At the time of her arrest, Harotonian was working for the International Research and Exchanges Board, a Washington-based organization that for four decades has facilitated exchange programs around the globe. The group receives some funding from the U.S. State Department, and U.S. officials insist that IREX and its employees were not involved in anything either illegal or nefarious.

Unlike Saberi, an Iranian-American who was born in the United States, Harotonian is an Iranian citizen of Armenian descent, although her mother and cousins are naturalized U.S. citizens. Harotonian applied for a U.S. green card in 2001, it had not been issued when she was arrested.

Harotonian had been arranging travel for Iranian medical workers who were to attend a conference in the United States about maternal and child health education. She worked out of the IREX office in Armenia and had traveled to Tehran on three previous occasions for projects before being arrested last summer. A similar conference had gone off without a hitch, and IREX had made no secret of its work in Iran, says the group's president, W. Robert Pearson. Sitting in his Washington office and sporting a postage-stamp-sized freesilva.org pin on his lapel, Pearson says that it's the first time that an IREX employee has been accused of spying. "Whatever the misunderstanding, we'd like to know what happened so that we can help to clear it up," he says.

Because the case involves Iran detaining one of its own citizens, U.S. officials have little leverage to act on Harotonian's behalf. Indeed, some of her backers quietly worry that too much support from Washington could backfire in a case where the defendant is trying to prove she wasn't working for the U.S. government. Even as they await the ruling on the final appeal, supporters are campaigning for leniency. [USNews/29May2009] 

Iraqi Intelligence Sues Guardian. Iraq's national intelligence service has launched a court action to sue the Guardian, claiming to have been defamed by a story that characterized the regime of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki as increasingly autocratic.

The story, by award-winning correspondent Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, was published in April, when the Iraqi leader was in London on an investment drive. It included interviews with three unnamed members of the Iraqi national intelligence service (INIS), who said elements of Maliki's rule resembled a dictatorship.

Maliki called for legal action to be launched on his return to Iraq and the ostensibly independent INIS filed a writ demanding $1m in damages for what it said was a "false and defamatory" report.

The INIS also demanded that Abdul-Ahad reveal the identity of the agents who spoke to him, which the Guardian has refused to do.

The Iraqi government initially ordered the paper's Baghdad bureau to be closed, but has backed away from that threat.

The Guardian is standing by the story and has retained an Iraqi lawyer to contest the charges. Alan Rusbridger, editor in chief, said: "We are disappointed that prime minister Maliki has launched this misguided action against the Guardian. We will, of course, contest it."

The case was postponed until 23 June.

Staff of Iraq's interior ministry, meanwhile, are suing the New York Times over a report that 35 of them had been sacked. [Guardian/26May2009] 

Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE

Spy Fired Shot That Changed West Germany. The killing in 1967 of an unarmed demonstrator by a police officer in West Berlin set off a left-wing protest movement and put conservative West Germany on course to evolve into the progressive country it has become today.

Now a discovery in the archives of the East German secret police, known as the Stasi, has upended Germany's perception of its postwar history. The killer, Karl-Heinz Kurras, though working for the West Berlin police, was at the time also acting as a Stasi spy for East Germany.

It is as if the shooting deaths of four students at Kent State University by the Ohio National Guard had been committed by an undercover K.G.B. officer, though the reverberations in Germany seemed to have run deeper.

"It makes a hell of a difference whether John F. Kennedy was killed by just a loose cannon running around or a Secret Service agent working for the East," said Stefan Aust, the former editor in chief of the weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel. "I would never, never, ever have thought that this could be true."

The revelation last week that researchers, looking into Berlin Wall deaths and East German intelligence, had stumbled across Mr. Kurras's Stasi files raised a host of uncomfortable issues that are suddenly the subject of national debate.

For the left, Mr. Kurras's true allegiance strikes at the underpinnings of the 1968 protest movement in Germany. The killing provided the clear-cut rationale for the movement's opposition to what its members saw as a violent, unjust state, when in fact the supposed fascist villain of leftist lore was himself a committed socialist.

There is the sobering reminder of the Stasi infiltration of West German structures, but also the question of whether it went much deeper than has ever been uncovered. The Stasi's reach in East Germany is well known; Chancellor Angela Merkel said just last week that the security service had tried to recruit her, though she had turned it down.

The most insidious question raised by the revelation is whether Mr. Kurras might have been acting not only as a spy, but also as an agent provocateur, trying to destabilize West Germany. As the newspaper Bild am Sonntag put it in a headline, referring to the powerful former leader of the dreaded East German security agency, Erich Mielke, "Did Mielke Give Him the Order to Shoot?"

The historians who unearthed the 17 volumes of files that revealed Mr. Kurras's double life say there is no evidence to support the theory that the Stasi was behind the killing. Berlin officials have resisted public calls from victims' groups and others to retry Mr. Kurras. He was acquitted in 1967, the year of the shooting, of manslaughter charges and was later allowed to rejoin the police force after the verdict was upheld.

In an interview with the Bild, Mr. Kurras, 81, confirmed that he had been in the East German Communist Party. "Should I be ashamed of that or something?" Mr. Kurras was quoted as saying. As for the Stasi, he said, "And what if I did work for them? What does it matter? It doesn't change anything," the paper reported.

Mr. Kurras does not deny that he shot the demonstrator, Benno Ohnesorg, in the back of the head, but has said the shooting was an accident. He denied records showing he had been paid by the security service, and said the agents who had put those details in his file must have been lining their own pockets.

Mr. Kurras was born in East Prussia and volunteered for military service in 1944 when he was 16 years old. He was imprisoned not long after the war by the Soviets at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp for three years. He was known to be an enthusiastic gun collector and an excellent marksman.

He began leading a secret double life in 1955, when he went to the authorities in East Berlin and asked to move to East Germany and join the police there. Instead, according to files unearthed by the historians Helmut M�ller-Enbergs and Cornelia Jabs, he was told to stay with the police in West Berlin while spying for the Stasi, and he had a cover name, Otto Bohl.

If Mr. Kurras seemed to fit the bill of the "fascist cop," Mr. Ohnesorg came across as the most innocent of victims. A student who also wrote poetry, he was married, his wife pregnant with their first child, when he went to a demonstration against a state visit by Iran's leader, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Mr. Ohnesorg's death had a powerful mobilizing effect. The photograph of a woman cradling his head as he lay on the ground is among the most iconic images in Germany. Average students who might never have joined the 1968 protest movement were moved to action. And on a darker note it became the chief justification for violent action by terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction and the Second of June Movement, which even took its name from the day of Mr. Ohnesorg's killing.

"The biggest milestone on the road toward violence was not what people thought it was," said Mr. Aust, who also wrote a book on the Red Army Faction. "The pure fact that he was an agent from the East changes a lot, whether he acted on orders or not."

While the East German government highlighted the killing for propaganda purposes, the dissension and upheaval sowed by the shooting were temporary and had the unintended consequence of making the West a far more attractive alternative to the East in the long run.

According to Marek Dutschke, the son of the student-movement leader Rudi Dutschke, Mr. Ohnesorg's death ignited the modernization of West Germany, leading to greater democracy, gender equality and sexual freedom.

"Germany would not have become this liberal place, not in the same way, if this event hadn't happened," Mr. Dutschke said.

Victor Homola and Stefan Pauly contributed reporting. [Kulish/NewYorkTimes/27May2009] 

Gulags, Nukes and a Water Slide: Citizen Spies Lift North Korea's Veil. In the propaganda blitz that followed North Korea's missile launch last month, the country's state media released photos of leader Kim Jong Il visiting a hydroelectric dam and power station.

Images from the report showed two large pipes descending a hillside. That was enough to allow Curtis Melvin, a doctoral candidate at George Mason University in suburban Virginia, to pinpoint the installation on his online map of North Korea.

Mr. Melvin is at the center of a dozen or so citizen snoops who have spent the past two years filling in the blanks on the map of one of the world's most secretive countries. Seeking clues in photos, news reports and eyewitness accounts, they affix labels to North Korean structures and landscapes captured by Google Earth, an online service that stitches satellite pictures into a virtual globe. The result is an annotated North Korea of rocket-launch sites, prison camps and elite palaces on white-sand beaches.

"It's democratized intelligence," says Mr. Melvin.

More than 35,000 people have downloaded Mr. Melvin's file, North Korea Uncovered. It has grown to include thousands of tags in categories such as "nuclear issues" (alleged reactors, missile storage), dams (more than 1,200 countrywide) and restaurants (47). Its Wikipedia approach to spying shows how Soviet-style secrecy is facing a new challenge from the Internet's power to unite a disparate community of busybodies.

"Here is one of the most closed countries in the world and yet, through this effort on the Internet by a bunch of strangers, the country's visible secrets are being published," says Martyn Williams, a Tokyo-based technology journalist who recently sent Mr. Melvin the locations of about 30 North Korean lighthouses.

An economist who studies developing countries and has traveled from Turkmenistan to Zimbabwe, Mr. Melvin started his project in early 2007 to designate places he visited on two group tours to North Korea earlier this decade. He shared it on several North Korea-related Web sites.

People soon started sending him locations they knew, from tourist sites to airfields tucked into valleys near South Korea. Mr. Melvin says that sadness for North Koreans' plight, and the fascination of discovery, motivated him to continue.

Many updates later, Mr. Melvin and his correspondents have plotted out what they say is much of the country's transportation network and electrical grid, and many of its military bases. They've spotted what they believe are mass graves created in the 1995-98 famine that killed an estimated two million people. The vast complexes of Mr. Kim and other North Korean leaders are visible, with palatial homes, pools, even a water slide.

An official at North Korea's consulate in Hong Kong declined to grant an interview. Its embassy in London didn't respond to a faxed request for comment.

Mr. Melvin says he cross-checks what information he can and adjusts other facts with the help of collaborators. He says he has met only a few of the contributors. Some have identified themselves as former members of the U.S. military who once studied the country professionally. Some have been anonymous.

Joshua Stanton, an attorney in Washington who once served in the U.S. military in South Korea, used Google Earth to look for one of the country's notorious prisons. In early 2007, he read an international news report about a mass escape from Camp 16, which the report mentioned was near the site of a nuclear test conducted the year before.

No pictures of Camp 16 are believed to have been seen outside the country. But Mr. Stanton had pored over defector sketches of it and combed the map for familiar structures. "I realized I had already noticed the guard posts" on Google Earth the previous year for the nuclear test site, he says.

Mr. Stanton traced what he believed is Camp 16's boundary, enclosing nearly 300 square miles, and those of other large North Korean prisons and shared them with Mr. Melvin. The fences aren't easy to follow because they go over mountain ridges, he says. But satellite images often reveal gaps in the vegetation along the fence line, because trees are cleared on either side to prevent people from climbing over.

Last year, Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas used Mr. Stanton's maps in a floor presentation criticizing the North's human-rights record. "Google has made a witness of all of us," Mr. Brownback said. "We can no longer deny these things exist."

Mr. Williams, the technology journalist in Tokyo, first contacted Mr. Melvin two months ago after he ran across a notice that North Korea filed with international maritime authorities ahead of its April 5 missile launch. The filing gave coordinates where North Korea believed its missile or rocket stages would likely fall.

The pair figured they could mine other international filings for other interesting sites. Mr. Melvin found one that helped him pinpoint North Korea's aeronautical beacons. Mr. Williams turned up the lighthouse locations, which he sent to Mr. Melvin, along with links to a site with lighthouse images from North Korean postage stamps.

"If North Korea came out and published all this, no one would be interested," says Mr. Williams. "But when you're playing detective, it's a lot more fun."

The project has also attracted Andrei Lankov, a Seoul-based historian of North Korea who grew up in the Soviet Union and went to college in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Last summer, Mr. Lankov wrote about how the evolution of public markets in North Korea has challenged Mr. Kim's authoritarian government. He sent Mr. Melvin the location of several markets, including one called Pyongsong near Pyongyang that the two men think is the biggest in the country.

The market is in a town about 10 miles outside the city, the closest that nonresidents can get to the capital. "At the same time, this is a place where the dwellers of Pyongyang can go anytime," Mr. Lankov says.

On the satellite images of North Korean towns, it's easy to see many people gathered around the markets and no one in the giant plazas that are tributes to Mr. Kim's government.

Mr. Melvin says the images also make clear the gulf between the lives of Mr. Kim and his impoverished people. "Once you start mapping the power plants and substations and wires, you can connect the infrastructure with the elite compounds," Mr. Melvin says. "And then you see towns that have no power supply at all."

Mr. Melvin says he spends hours at the computer tracing power lines, looking for telltale shadows of electric towers or posts. The work is often tedious.

Other times it's revelatory. The recent report of Mr. Kim at the hydroelectric station in Wonsan, for example, showed Mr. Kim looking at a painting of the complex. Mr. Melvin studied the painting, noticing it depicted a unique pattern of roads. He then spotted the roads on the satellite image, along with the giant pipes, and added the station to his map.

"We're relying on the North Koreans to keep publicizing" Mr. Kim's movements, Mr. Melvin says. "This leads to great discoveries." [Ramstad/WallStreetJournal/22May2009]

Stabilizing Iraq: Intelligence Lessons for Afghanistan. After the U.S. initiation of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, Washington's focus shifted away from the conflict in Afghanistan. Until recently, U.S. policy focused on winning the war in Iraq while securing an apparent coalition victory in Afghanistan. Although this policy yielded positive results in Iraq, it led to drift and a series of security reverses in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, despite vastly different circumstances, the United States has learned many lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom that can be applied to Operation Enduring Freedom, particularly in the intelligence arena.

Not long ago, sectarian violence, brutal attacks with improvised explosive devices, ambushes, assassinations, and kidnappings were the norm in Iraq. This situation, however, has changed dramatically over the last eighteen months, and the frequency of these types of events has diminished significantly. Some observers attribute the dramatic changes in security to the 2007 "surge" of U.S. military ground forces into Iraq, while others believe the Sunni Awakening, in which U.S. forces helped establish local Sunni militias, should be credited with much of the success. Both factors contributed to the remarkable turnaround in Iraq; however, the major reason for success can be traced to timely and accurate intelligence, born of new technologies and innovation, new leadership at the combat support agencies (CSAs), and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) derived from lessons learned on the battlefield, which enabled U.S. forces to undertake highly effective, intelligence-driven operations.

In Iraq, initially, the enemy was always one or two steps ahead of the coalition, but improved intelligence capabilities and adjustments in TTPs changed this dynamic. Accurate, timely intelligence allowed coalition forces to be proactive rather than reactive - often disrupting the enemy during the planning or implementation phase of an operation. Army and Marine intelligence along with the Department of Defense (DOD) and national intelligence agencies have made significant changes to better support counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

The entire intelligence community and each intelligence discipline - human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial or imagery intelligence (GEOINT), as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems - primarily unmanned aerial vehicles - have contributed in varying degrees to the effort in Iraq. The CSAs have begun to replicate in Afghanistan the support they have provided in Iraq, increasing the strain on the most precious resource - manpower. But with a shift in priority from Iraq to Afghanistan, and with Washington committed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, the manpower burden should ease.

Human Intelligence. Initially, HUMINT operations in Iraq were difficult and did not yield timely and accurate information: it takes time to develop HUMINT capabilities in any environment, especially under combat conditions, due to the need for operators to become familiar with their surroundings and understand the society and culture they are operating in. HUMINT was particularly important for exploiting the opportunities created by the Sunni Awakening, which yielded a torrent of information as local citizens began to identify al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) facilitators and operatives in their communities, allowing coalition forces to deliver a serious blow to AQI's infrastructure.

HUMINT has improved significantly in Iraq, and many of the lessons learned are being incorporated into training and preparing forces for future deployments. HUMINT units have also benefited from increased resourcing. HUMINT platoons are now being established in every military intelligence company at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, and two robust HUMINT companies are being incorporated into every battlefield surveillance brigade military intelligence battalion, providing an unprecedented level of tactical HUMINT capability. Experienced HUMINT planning and management sections have been added at the BCT and division levels. Civilian contractors have been employed to fill the need for more interpreters.

Lessons from Iraq have also informed an upgraded HUMINT in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, HUMINT assets are being pushed down to the BCT level, and operational commanders now have a better grasp of how best to employ HUMINT assets. Consequently, HUMINT teams and unit leadership are now more familiar with their surroundings and Afghan culture. Finally, through the use of civilian contractors and refocusing of the Army's language program, more interpreters and interrogators are being provided. Despite these successes, more needs to be done. U.S. forces must continue to make sensitive HUMINT information available to its coalition partners and the Afghan government. And NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must train Afghan military and civilian personnel to conduct HUMINT operations so they can collect, analyze, and disseminate this information to their own forces.

Signals Intelligence. SIGINT was very important at the onset of hostilities in Iraq, but became less relevant after the Iraqi army was defeated. With the reconstruction of Iraq's communication infrastructure, however, SIGINT has reemerged as a valuable source of information. The National Security Agency (NSA) has pushed cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level and deployed assets in theater so that information and support is timely and relevant. Because NSA has control over all SIGINT operations, it is able to lead effectively and synergize these operations. NSA hosts weekly meetings and video teleconferences in Iraq and Afghanistan with all SIGINT-producing entities to guide SIGINT collection, discuss successes and failures, share TTPs, and assess emerging enemy tactics.

SIGINT support continues to improve in Afghanistan, and as the country modernizes and the infrastructure improves, opportunities for collection and exploitation will increase. As it did in Iraq, NSA has started pushing cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level in Afghanistan. The biggest challenge in Afghanistan is being able to share intelligence with coalition partners without divulging sensitive collection methods. As with HUMINT, the Afghan government needs to be trained to conduct SIGINT operations on their own.

Geospatial Intelligence. In the area of imagery or geospatial support, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) continues to enhance the operational commander's ability to visualize the battlefield. In Iraq, NGA established geospatial support teams at the force, corps, and division levels, and in coordination with NSA recently provided manning down to the BCT level. NGA analysts were integrated into cryptologic support teams providing near-real-time actionable SIGINT and GEOINT to brigade combat team commanders. In conjunction with NSA, NGA developed the TTPs and identified requirements for integrating GEOINT into SIGINT and HUMINT "find-fix-finish" support operations. In addition, NGA advisors, working with the Iraqi Directorate of Imagery and Mapping-Intelligence Affairs (DIMA), forged an effective relationship with their Iraqi counterparts and helped them develop the analytic skills to support Iraqi combat units. These interactions also led to the development of a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement between NGA and the Iraqi DIMA. The agreement facilitates the exchange of geospatial data, allows the Imagery and Mapping Directorate to support Iraqi military forces with GEOINT, and decreases Iraq's reliance on U.S. forces. No other CSA has developed this level of intelligence cooperation and sharing with its Iraqi counterparts.

In Afghanistan, GEOINT has eclipsed the other intelligence disciplines in sharing of information and TTPs as well as training of analysts, just as it did in Iraq. NGA established geospatial support teams at various levels within ISAF and, again, similar to Iraq, plans to integrate NGA analysts into cryptologic support teams. In 2008, NGA advisors developed an excellent relationship with the Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office. As a result, Afghan GEOINT analysts are providing products at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement has been developed between the two organizations.

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. DOD's 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review Report states that persistent reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems have proven to be invaluable force multipliers in Iraq and Afghanistan. ISR platforms such as these give ground forces the ability to cover more territory, including previously inaccessible terrain. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, commented that "employment of ISR, according to the current counterinsurgency doctrine, set the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets allowed brigade combat team and regimental combat team commanders (faced with vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the fight."

The robust ISR currently available to brigade-level commanders in Iraq provides them with an unprecedented level of situational awareness and is now being deployed to Afghanistan, where ISR use on the battlefield is becoming critical and decisive. Commanders will now have the flexibility to push ISR assets - which are among the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today - to the lowest tactical echelon. Afghanistan is a large country, roughly the size of Texas, with diverse and treacherous terrain, which in many places is not easily accessible. Persistent surveillance will significantly multiply coalition combat capabilities in Afghanistan.

While Iraq and Afghanistan have many similarities, one major difference is the presence in Afghanistan of forty nations working as part of ISAF, under NATO command. The complexity of interoperability, data management, and data sharing (in part due to classification issues) is one of the top issues that NATO faces in day-to-day operations. The recent establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Center in Afghanistan, where analysts from NATO nations work together on critical intelligence products, provides an excellent example of needed cooperation. Sharing sensitive data in a multinational environment is challenging, but these issues must be resolved in order to win the counterinsurgency campaign and provide a peaceful and secure environment in Afghanistan. [Harris/WashingtonInstitute/26May2009]

Section III - COMMENTARY

Editorial: Lost In Space. It's a little late for a "Danger, Will Robinson" warning. The United States has a serious security problem in cyberspace. The government thinks more bureaucracy is the answer. It isn't.

The Department of Defense, FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service all were hit last week by a computer virus resulting in partial shutdowns of their cyber systems, according to sources with knowledge of the situation. The Defense Department would not confirm or deny the virus, but the FBI and U.S. Marshals confirmed their problems to the Associated Press.

These are mere skirmishes in a larger war in cyberspace. The Pentagon spent at least $100 million defending against an untold number of cyber attacks within the past year. To address the issue, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates plans to add a new layer of bureaucracy by establishing the National Security Agency as head of a new cyber command reporting to U.S. Strategic Command. Instead of increasing efficiency, this is likely to increase confusion in the already cumbersome defense and intelligence bureaucracies.

Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, Strategic Command chief, admitted in April that the U.S. military does not have a full grasp of the problem. The Pentagon isn't even sure what machines are connected to the classified Defense Department Intranet. "We know we don't have the answers and oftentimes don't even know what the right questions are to ask," he said of the military's cyber-security problem.

According to Defense Department sources and documents prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that The Washington Times obtained, NSA Director Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander will take over the new command while continuing to run existing NSA operations. It remains to be seen how much power he will have over Pentagon cyber policy.

Congress has its own ideas about how to tackle the problem. Legislation proposed by Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia Democrat, and Sen. Olympia J. Snowe, Maine Republican, mistakenly aims to establish the Commerce Department as the federal clearinghouse for information on critical cybersystems. The agency has no real expertise in the area. Another bill would establish a White House-level director of cyber policy to oversee all federal efforts. Coordination is essential, but so is lean, fast-moving response.

All these proposals share a common problem. They seek to address a fluid 21st-century information system with a bloated and outdated bureaucratic model. Creating new federal agencies to address a lack of interagency cooperation has proved less than effective in recent years, as the Department of Homeland Security and director of National Intelligence have shown.

The answer to ineffective bureaucracy is not more bureaucracy. [WashingtonTimes/26May2009] 

How Washington Works: An Intelligence Turf War - Or Just Unfinished Business, by Marc Ambinder. The Associated Press's Pamela Hess reports that the nation's top intelligence officials, Director of National Intelligence Denny Blair and CIA director Leon Panetta are "locked in a turf battle" over whether non-CIA personnel should be the DNI's formal representative in a country, or whether the CIA's station chiefs - traditionally the senior intelligence officer at any embassy - should retain their supervisory role. "Turf battle" is one way to describe it, but don't draw from that the notion that Blair and Panetta are at daggers drawn. They've simply asked the White House to resolve a question that Congress dropped in their laps when it created the DNI structure and took away the CIA chief's power to direct the activities of the nation's other 15 intelligence agencies. 

In 2004, as part of its major post-9/11 reform bill, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, Congress created a new intelligence bureaucracy to oversee the activities of the entire community. The CIA director, who had also been the director of central intelligence - would now be, in essence, the chief human intelligence collector and analyzer - and the CIA would no longer be, at least in a symbolic sense, the hub of the community. When the CIA director was also the DCI, CIA station chiefs had dual authority, too. They managed the activities of CIA personnel and assets in a station and they signed off on any intelligence activity by any other agency in that country.

Congress changed the system, but it didn't offer any guidance. The DNI was given less budget authority than he needed and few tools to fight through the bureaucratic tangles. The two DNIs before Admiral Blair tried to consolidate their power. Blair simply inherited his grandmother's furniture.

The reality is that this dispute needs to be resolved. If a National Security Agency signals intelligence officer travels to [REDACTED] to visit a special collection facility, does he or she need the approval of the station chief to visit or liaise with other agencies? If the US intelligence presence in, say, the former Soviet Republic of [REDACTED] is primarily a technical one and not a repository of spies and their human sources, does it make more sense for the NSA chief, who might have a better relationship with the country in question - and we're primarily talking about countries with whom the US has intelligence relationships - to serve as the de-facto chief of station? Also: who does the chief of station report to? The CIA Director? The DNI? Questions about the line of authority run from the mundane to the serious - if the DNI orders a station chief to go do something, does the station chief first ask his or her supervisor at the CIA's National Clandestine Service?

The CIA and NSA, through a still-classified entity called the Special Collection Service, jointly run large codebreaking and signals intelligence collection facilities at dozens of embassies across the world. The NSA's presence at smaller embassies is limited to code rooms; NSA officers don't run spies. But as the NSA's external footprint has grown, its liaison arrangements with other countries have blossomed. In certain very friendly countries, NSA operates joint collection facilities with the host government. The result is that there are far more NSA employees in a number of countries than there are CIA employees.

Ironically, one of the first officials to wrestle with this problem was Michael Hayden, fresh from his service as NSA director. While serving as John Negroponte's principle deputy DNI, he wanted flexibility for the DNI. When Hayden became the CIA director, he became an advocate of the CIA station chiefs.

The solution is fairly obvious, as one former CIA officer put it to me: "I think the station chiefs should be selected based on their experience and based on the situation of the specific country, and if that somebody is from an agency that is not CIA, I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing."

The CIA wants to preserve its traditional role, but it worries about an intelligence structure that artificially evens the playing field between agencies. The DNI wants the power Congress theoretically granted to his office.

Kudos - from an institutional standpoint - to whoever leaked this story. It puts pressure on the White House to resolve the situation fairly quickly. [Ambinder/TheAtlantic/26May2009] 

U.S. Intelligence - or the Lack Thereof - on North Korea, by Keith Thomson. A North Korean Taepodong-2 missile is about the size of six U-Haul vans sitting bumper to bumper. North Korea is smaller than Mississippi. So how is it - given a skyful of satellites, every other manner of electronic surveillance and legions of human spies - that we were surprised by North Korea's April 5 Taepodong-2 launch?

At the same time, the lives of Kim Jong Il and his family could be made into a soap opera. How is it that we remain in the dark not only about which of them will succeed Kim, but, at times, whether they are alive or dead?

How is it that we know so little about North Korea?

Research for my novel Once A Spy (Doubleday, 2010) has brought me into contact with an array of intelligence community personnel and experts ranging from a temp to a Director of the CIA. I asked several with relevant experience: What's the problem with intelligence collection in North Korea? And what, if anything, is being done about it? Taepodong-2s currently are capable of reaching the United States. Granted, they are the Edsels of ballistic missiles. But the North Koreans (a) are working out the kinks, if this week's nuclear tests are any evidence, and (b) might sell the technology to all comers.

The primary obstacle to collecting intelligence on North Korea, I learned, has been the country's singularly insular nature. As has been well-documented, practically no civilians have telephones, let alone access to e-mail. A glance at a nighttime satellite imagery may best sum up the situation: "You see South Korea all lit up; the North is completely dark," says an expert on the region (not the temp*).

And even if we were to airdrop BlackBerrys to all North Koreans, it's doubtful that we would learn much, the latest escapades of Kim's personal troupe of strippers notwithstanding. "Gossiping can get people shot," said the expert.

The bottom line, according to an intelligence analyst:

Lack of sources in a highly dangerous, ethnically defined, ruthlessly guarded area. We tend to rely on third parties for access to such areas. Look at how hard the National Clandestine Service is trying to reinvent itself to deal with the realities of Iraq and Afghanistan, away from the consular cocktail party environment of the cold war.

A case officer adds:

We don't have any decent agents [North Korean nationals recruited by American intelligence officers]. It's simply too risky to communicate with them. And it's not that North Korean counterintelligence is especially good, it's that the society is so closed that information is strictly compartmented and there are very few opportunities to recruit penetration agents or for defectors to defect. To know what's going on in North Korea you have to penetrate at high levels of government, and to know plans and intentions you need to be in Kim's office. We don't have an embassy or other secure facility to work out of. We're more or less limited to legal traveler operations where we brief people before they go in and debrief them when they return.

I also spoke to former CIA operations officer Ishmael Jones (a pseudonym). In his memoir The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture (Encounter, 2008), Jones writes:

After President Bush gave his 'Axis of Evil' speech, the Agency began sending my colleagues on missions to these and other rogue states. They didn't conduct any intelligence operations there - just visited, stayed in hotels and returned to write detailed after-action reports about their itineraries...This became known around HQs as Axis of Evil Tourism.

While recognizing that "the new administration and the CIA get a pass for the incidents in recent days because North Korea is such a difficult place to operate," Jones faults the agency historically: "North Korea is our oldest and most obvious intelligence target," he told me. "We've known it for sixty years. To get at the target, we had millions of South Koreans who spoke the language and had relatives in North Korea. Even using our antiquated embassy structure, we should have been able to establish intelligence networks. More than ninety percent of [CIA] employees live in the United States. We need to get more of them abroad, closer to the targets."

In the interim, what about all of our satellites and drones? (The Musudan-ri test facility reportedly is watched more closely than the ball in Times Square on New Year's Eve, and, for what it's worth, the Taepodong-2 was photographed during the preparation for its April 5 launch).

"Eyes in the sky can't tell us everything we need to know," says the case officer. "[The North Koreans] could be moving empty tubes around for all the eye can tell."

Accordingly, the bulk of U.S. intelligence on North Korea, what there is of it, comes from our liaison counterparts in South Korea, Japan and China.

"The South Koreans [Agency for National Security Planning] have an ear to the ground and an ability to penetrate that the others don't," the regional expert says. Adds the case officer, "But they have the same problems we have. Japan doesn't have a foreign intel service - unbelievable but true. They use a branch of the National Police, which is now very good." On the North Korean case, however, "basically all they do is liaise with other intel services."

And China? The Ministry of State Security plays it close to the vest. "The Chinese may pay lip service to UN attempts to get North Korea to drop its nuclear program, but they won't do anything concrete about it," the case officer says. "China isn't a target and it gets some pleasure from the fears the rest of the region displays over North Korea's aggressive behavior."

So what do we do?

Logic dictates that the threat of being turned to powder will deter North Korea from launching a Taepodong-2 at the United States. The problem is that logic may have no role in Kim's planning - it's debatable whether "Dear Leader" is crazy like a fox or garden-variety certifiable. In either case, the threat remains that he'll sell nuclear material - or even a plug-and-play atomic bomb - to Al Qaeda.

So our dealings with North Korea have become analogous to a hostage situation - think Kim wearing a vest packed with high explosive in a crowded shopping mall, his finger on the button. Our diplomats negotiate with him. Meanwhile our intelligence agencies scramble behind his back for ways to neutralize the threat.

Myriad plans for removing him from power have been and continue to be explored. The fresh regime-changing wounds from Iraq dim even staunch advocates' enthusiasm, however. And then there's the youngest of Kim's three sons, Kim Jong Un, the odds-on favorite to assume the top spot in Pyongyang: He may cause us to look back fondly on the devil we knew.

As a result, continued isolation of North Korea is regarded as the best tactic for now, the goal being containment. In the worst-case scenario, should Kim Jong Il push the button, the hope is that America need not respond unilaterally - after all, others have more chips on the table.

The greater hope is that the CIA or DIA or NSA or SEALs have some other, innovative operation underway - an operation about which a novelist has no need to know - that will yield a better outcome. [Thomson/HuffingtonPost/29May2009] 

The CIA Seeks To Hold On To Its Mojo. The United States decision, five years ago, to create yet another office (the DNI, or Director of National Intelligence) to control all intelligence has, as expected, diminished the CIAs long time role as the "Central" Intelligence Agency. The latest blow is a recent proposal to allow the chief intelligence officer (the CIA "station chief") at each U.S. embassy be someone other than a CIA officer. The main alternatives are someone from the DIA (the Department of Defense intelligence agency) or the NSA. The problem, as the CIA sees it, is that, if the intelligence station chief is from NSA or DIA, the senior CIA guy there would have another layer of bureaucracy to go through, and this would slow things down. Although the DNI, technically, has the power to order this change, the CIA is, unofficially, threatening to use its considerable influence (in Congress, the media and elsewhere) to oppose the move.

This proposal actually makes some sense. For example, there are a lot of talented espionage operatives in NSA and DIA who would make good station chiefs. Moreover, in many small countries, the DIA has more agents and intelligence operations than the CIA. Same deal with the NSA, whose electronic eavesdropping is often the primary source of intel on some nations.

All of these turf wars are the result of the huge growth in intelligence activities since the end of World War II 64 years ago. As some of these new agencies, especially DIA and NSA, grew quite large, it became a problem getting everyone to play from the same sheet of music. Each intelligence agency has its own little fan club in Congress, and elsewhere in the federal government and among major defense contractors, and knows how to play the media game to get what they want.

With fifteen different intelligence organizations, the problem of coordinating all of them is nothing new. The CIA was created in 1947 to coordinate intelligence activities for the president. Unfortunately, each of the fifteen organizations has a different boss, a different mission, different traditions and, well, you get the picture. Just to drive the point home, here are the fifteen intelligence agencies, along with short description of what they do, and who they do it for.

- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The main customer is the White House, but is also supposed to keep the Department of Defense, and everyone else who works for the president, supplied with accurate and up-to-date analysis of what's going on in the world. But when the CIA analysts present information that does not conform to what people in the White House want to see, there is pressure to modify the conclusions. This causes problems with all the other intelligence agencies. The director of the CIA is also the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence), which is supposed to mean the "intelligence czar." Doesn't work out like that because, as new intelligence agencies grew, or were created, over the last half century, the DCI did not control their budgets. In Washington, you really only control an organization if you control its budget.

- National Security Agency (NSA). One of the most underestimated of the intelligence agencies. The NSA collects and sorts out "signals intelligence" (messages sent regularly by radio, telephone, Internet and so on) information. More importantly, NSA develops ciphers (methods to encode secret American messages) and decipher the secret codes of other nations. The United States has always been very good at breaking codes, but doing that is only useful if the other guy doesn't know you have broken his codes. Thus all the secrecy at NSA.

- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). A relatively new organization (created from the Defense Mapping Agency and some other small outfits), which takes all those satellite and aerial photos and makes sense of them. NGA exists largely because of all the neat new computer tools for working on digital photos and creating useful maps and videos.

- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Builds and maintains spy satellites. NRO gets the biggest chunk of money spent on intelligence, mainly because spy satellites are so expensive. As a result of this, too much emphasis has been placed on information (and its often misinformation) gained from these satellites. NRO just collects the data, and passes it on to other agencies for analysis and interpretation.

- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Is something of a Department of Defense CIA. DIA collects and sorts out intelligence information from the various services and tries to eliminate duplication of effort. DIA is also big enough to go head-to-head with the CIA in disputes over resources (getting use of spy satellites) and access to the White House on intelligence matters. The head of the DIA is sort of an "intelligence czar" for all the intel shops connected, in one way or another (like NGA and NRO) to the Department of Defense.

- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Intelligence Organizations. Each service collects information it needs for its own operations. The DIA is used to prying stuff from the CIA, NSA and NRO (who will often hold on to material the armed forces could use because it's "too sensitive." That's another way of saying they don't trust the troops to keep a secret, even if keeping the information from the troops gets some of the troops killed in combat.)

- Coast Guard Intelligence. The Coast Guard becomes part of the navy in wartime, but in peacetime it's part of the Department of Homeland Security and is mainly interested in information about what's going on off American coasts.

- Department of Energy. Because the Department of Energy got control over all matters nuclear, it has developed a large intelligence operation that concentrates on what other countries are doing with nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Because of the military importance of all this, the Department of Energy intelligence is seen as part of the military establishment.

- Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The new kid on the block, is supposed to take care of intelligence on terrorism. But so far, DHS is way behind the Big Four and has to beg a lot.

- Department of State. Has always had an intelligence operation, but it was never well organized. Seemed to collect interesting gossip, and considered detailed data too geekish for diplomats. But the State Department does have one enormous advantage in that they understand foreign cultures, and that makes a big difference when they analyze what information they do have.

- Department of Treasury. Collects information that has an impact on American fiscal and monetary policy. Most of this stuff is rather easily obtained from large American financial organizations.

- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Not really an intelligence organization, and never meant to be one. The FBI is a police and investigative organization. It deals in collecting information, but for the purpose of prosecuting and convicting criminals, not for providing information on anything on a continual basis (which is what intelligence agencies do.) The FBI is trying to get permission, and money, to become a major player in the intelligence area.

Everyone talks about getting the intelligence agencies to work together, but in over half a century, no one has been able to make it happen. In fact, no one, at the moment, is making a serious effort to make it happen. It's also illuminating to remember what one real Russian czar said about the subject, "I do not rule Russia, 10,000 clerks do."

Speaking of Russia, other nations have had similar problems with competing intel agencies. For decades after World War II, the Soviet Union had two different organizations running spies overseas. Most of the effort was from the KGB (a sort of combined CIA/FBI/Border Patrol/Coast Guard/Etc.) and a much smaller GRU (military intelligence). GRU was thought to be more dangerous, perhaps because they were a smaller operation and hustled a bit more as a result. Having two Soviet spy agencies to worry about did make counterintelligence more difficult. [StrategyPage/29May2009] 

Section IV - COMING EVENTS

COMING EVENTS

EVENTS IN COMING TWO MONTHS....

1 - 4 June 2009 - Washington, DC - 19th annual Computers Freedom and Privacy (CFP 2009) conference at the Marvin Center at George Washington University
Major privacy and security conference - full program here: http://www.cfp2009.org/wiki/index.php/Program
Some intelligence-related highlights:
The Future of Security vs. Privacy - Security and privacy, says the conference promo material, do not need to be in conflict with each other. Yet when push comes to shove, different people and different institutions frequently place different weights on these two fundamental values. How should we think of the relationship between these two core values in order to make intelligent policy?
Panel: Bruce Schneier, CSTO, BT, Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, CATO Institute, Stewart Baker, former Assistant Secretary for Policy, DHS and former General Counsel, NSA; Valerie Caproni, General Counsel, FBI. Moderator: Ryan Singel, Wired Magazine
The Psychology of Security and Privacy - Bruce Schneier, CSTO, BT; Alessandro Acquisti, Associate Professor of Information Systems and Public Policy, Heinz College, CMU;
Christine Jolls, Professor of Law and Organization, Yale Law School; Rachna Dhamija, CEO, Usable Security Systems; Fellow, Center for Research on Computation and Society, Harvard University.
Does Government Secrecy Still Make Sense In The Internet age? - The compartmentalization of information often plays a role in misleading intelligence analysts and policymakers, yet classification rules that restrict information sharing have not been amended. Meanwhile, purportedly secret operations like the CIA's rendition program are exposed by hobbyist plane-spotters that track aircraft tail numbers as they hop-scotch around the world, and the results of a supposedly errant airstrike in Afghanistan [if not a propaganda play] are instantly uploaded to the Internet to exploit claimed failures by our enemies. This panel will ask fundamental questions challenging assumptions about how to protect the nation's security: In the age of the Internet, does government secrecy actually help or harm national security? Are the services of a covert intelligence agency necessary or useful in an interconnected world?" What if the government posted all its intelligence on the Internet, where it could be confirmed, corrected, augmented, or refuted by a million eyeballs – would that produce more reliable information?
Panel: Steve Aftergood, Senior Research Analyst, Federation of American Scientists; Mike Levin, security consultant; former chief information policy officer, NSA; Bill Leonard, former director, U.S. Information Security Oversight Office; Eric Biel, former Staff Director, Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy (invited). Moderator: Mike German, ACLU Policy Counsel, former FBI agent
Hacking as a National Security Threat: How Real Is It? - Much attention is being paid to cybersecurity policy issues. But how real is the threat behind these policy debates? Does hacking -- whether by foreign governments, organized crime, or lone hackers -- pose a national security-level threat? This panel will complement the session on "Cyber-Security and the New Administration," which will focus on the policy issues involved.
Panel: Herb Lin, National Research Council; Amit Yoran, former Bush Administration cybersecurity czar; Michael Tanji, former supervisory intelligence officer, Defense Intelligence Agency. Moderator: Kevin Poulsen, Senior Editor, Wired News
**NOTE: There are hotel rooms still available at the Conference Hotel ** Contact www.cfp2009.org if you need a room at the conference rate

Tuesday, 2 June 2009, 8 a.m. -4 p.m. - Alexandria, VA - AFIO Members are invited to the CI Centre’s first ever Counterterrorism Course Preview Day

WHO: Supervisors; managers, decision makers and others to evaluate this training for their organizations
WHERE: DGMA Headquarters, 5650B General Washington Drive, Alexandria VA 22312
COST: Free; refreshments included
DETAILS: The CI Centre, a David G. Major Associates, Inc. (DGMA) company is pleased to announce the first Counterterrorism Courses Preview Day. This is for those interested in national security, who are interested in learning more about the threat and how to have their organizations expand and enhance their training programs. You will hear from the subject matter experts and professors, including Drs. Tawfik and Maha Hamid, USAR Major Stephen Coughlin, Brian Weidner, Clare Lopez, and David Major who teach in the following courses and others:
-361: The Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine
-560: Middle Eastern Intelligence Services and Terrorist Organizations
-268: Jihadi Strategies in Africa
-267: An Introduction to Hezbollah: A Top Terrorist Organization
RSVP Now: Adam Hahn at 703-642-7454 or adam.hahn@cicentre.com

Tuesday 2 June 2009, 6 p.m. - Nellis AFB, NV - The AFIO Las Vegas Chapter event features: The Development, Testing, and Operation of the U-2 and A-12 High Altitude Reconnaissance Programs at Nevada’s Groom Lake

Members of the Roadrunners Internationale will speak about the recently declassified CIA U-2 program at Taiwan; U-2 Project Aquatone at Groom Lake; the CIA A-12 Project Oxcart (which was the recently declassified CIA plane preceding the more commonly known Air Force SR-71) at Groom Lake and its operational phase; and Operation Black Shield at Kadena, Okinawa.
Their presentation will include a short video of the first flights of the U-2 and A-12 at Groom Lake, a PowerPoint presentation about the aircraft, and a large photo display of the aircraft test, evaluation, and operations. They will also recount their CIA recruitment, cover stories, living and working at Groom Lake, and the excitement of foreign missions. Their story was declassified a little over a year ago at the CIA’s 60th Anniversary. Location: Nellis Air Force Base Officers’ Club. (If no military ID, contact 702.295.0073 by May 25th for base entry information)

Wednesday, 3 June 2009; 6:30 pm – Washington, D.C. – Pakistan Today: The ISI, India, and What the Future Holds [at Spy Museum].
With the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, the tense relationship between Pakistan and its eastern neighbor was again headline news. Pakistani government officials condemned the attack, but the incident raised questions again about links between the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Islamic terror networks. How does the history of the ISI— and its partnership with the CIA during the 1980s—affect its actions and worldview? How do the United States and Pakistan look on their partnership in today’s circumstances? These pressing questions will be considered by: Shuja Nawaz, director, South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States, author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within; Bruce Riedel, senior fellow, foreign policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, former CIA officer and senior advisor to three U.S. presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues; and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, the director of the South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has written extensively and testified before Congress on Pakistani issues.
WHERE: International Spy Museum, 800 F St NW, Washington, DC, Gallery Place/Chinatown Metrorail Station
Tickets: $15 per person. To register: https://web.spymuseum.org/e-commerce/ItemList.aspx

Monday, 8 June 2009 - Newport News, VA - The AFIO Norman Forde Hampton Roads Chapter is planning a meeting and address by member Dr. Larry Wortzel on U.S.-China relations. Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, 1988 - 1990 U.S. ARMY ATTACH� U.S. EMBASSY, BEIJING, PRESIDENT, ASIA STRATEGIES AND RISKS, LLC., COMMISSIONER, U.S. - CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, WASHINGTON , D.C. The presentation will be followed by a reception. Guests are welcome. Please spread the word and bring friends!. Questions to Melissa at MWSaunders@cox.net or call her at 757-897-6268

Wednesday, 10 June 2009, 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. - Annapolis Junction, MD - The National Cryptologic Museum Foundation Spring Cryptologic program features Professor Kristie Macrakis, on her book "Seduced by Secrets: Inside the STASI's Spy Tech World."

Professor Macrakis, an authority on German espionage, teaches the History of Science and the History of Espionage at Georgia Tech in Atlanta. She studied in divided Germany for several years, and returned to reside in Berlin for a year after receiving her Ph.D. in the History of Science from Harvard University. Besides the aforementioned book, which has been described as "more fascinating than fiction," Professor Macrakis also wrote Surviving the Swastika: Scientific Research in Nazi Germany and Science under Socialism: East Germany in Comparative Perspective. She is also author of an acclaimed magazine article, "The Case of Agent Gorbachev," which appeared in American Scientist and was reprinted in AFIO's Intelligencer.
The program is followed by lunch and includes a book signing and opportunity to purchase Macrakis's latest book.
Location: L3 Conference Center located at 2720 Technology Dr, Annapolis Junction, MD 21076 in the Rt. 32 National Business Park. Cost: $25. Please register by 3 June to cryptmf@aol.com Send payment to NCMF PO Box 1682, Ft Meade, MD 20755

13 June 2009 - Boston, MA - AFIO Boston Pops Committee commemorates the 40th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing. Join AFIO Boston-based members at Symphony Hall for a special Boston Pops Concert celebrating our nation’s triumphant achievement. Historic footage of the lunar landing provided by NASA will accompany a program of stirring patriotic music including Holst’s The Planets. Honor one of America’s proudest moments in space exploration with a spectacular Pops concert.  The AFIO Pops Committee has relocated the event back to Boston for our seventh annual Pops social event. Conductor Keith Lockhart will lead the Pops at Symphony Hall, 301 Massachusetts Avenue Boston, MA 02115. Join other AFIO members and friends in the Hatch Room lounge located behind the orchestra level for a social hour before the performance begins. For tickets, call Symphony Hall Charge at 888-266-1200 or online at www.bso.org. Tickets sell from $18.00 to $85.00 and are now on sale.  After purchasing your tickets, please contact Gary at wassinmaryland@aol.com  so I can add your name to the list to look for at the 1 hour social prior to the concert. Ticket prices for attending this concert does not include a gift to AFIO however the Association of Former Intelligence Officers relies greatly upon the generosity of members, corporations, foundations, and the general public who understand and wish to encourage sound intelligence policy and education in the United States.  These gifts allow AFIO and its chapters to carry out important activities in the areas of education, advocacy, seminars, publications, and conferences. Please help by making a financial donation to AFIO. Tax receipts will be issued for donations of $100 or more (does not include Pops ticket cost).  All gifts to AFIO are tax deductible.  AFIO is an IRS approved 501(c)(3) charity. We request this be done separately if you are able to contribute to AFIO. Gifts may be made here.

Sunday, 14 June 2009, 4:00pm - St. Charles, IL - AFIO Midwest Chapter has a two speaker meeting. We will have two speakers do a combined presentation. One speaker is a former Lt. Col USAF who was Chief of Counter Intelligence and Deputy District Commander in Ankara, Turkey (81-82) who was assigned to Office of Special Investigations. He is now currently Director of Security at Northrup Grumman in Rolling Meadows, IL. The other is a former FBI Special Agent. Both will discuss the interrelationships amongst the US intelligence agencies. St. Charles Place Restaurant 2550 E. Main Street, St. Charles, IL. Telephone number 1-630-377-3333. For more information regarding meals and to confirm your attendance, please contact Angelo Di Liberti ASAP at 847-931-4184.

25 June 2009 - Los Angeles, CA - AFIO L.A. Area Meeting Notice to hear Sheriff Jeff Blatt. Jeffrey J. Blatt, deputy sheriff (res) with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, assigned to the Emergency Operations Bureau, will address the on-going militant Islamic insurgency in Southern Thailand. Deputy Blatt will review the historic causes of the insurgency, ideology, recruitment, tactics and attacks, Thai counterinsurgency operations, as well as the potential for regional escalation. Deputy Blatt is the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department's liaison on the ground in South East and South Asia.
Meeting will take place 6/25/09 at 12:30 PM on the campus of Loyola Marymount University in the Hilton Business building with lunch provided for $15, payable at the door. Please RSVP via email, by 6/19/2009 for your attendance: AFIO_LA@yahoo.com

Saturday, 27 June 2009 - Northampton, MA - AFIO New England hosts Summer Meeting to hear Ilana Freedman on counterterrorism.
Our speaker will be Ilana Freedman, the CEO & Founder of Gerard Group International, an internationally respected expert in counter-terrorism preparedness. She is a highly regarded analyst and a prolific writer. She has framed the mission at the Gerard Group to provide leading edge programs to prepare and protect American interests and those of its friends and allies from the impact of terrorist attacks. She has put together a team of leaders in the field from around the globe to provide the blue-ribbon service that defines the Gerard Group. Her interactive presentation will cover Intelligence issues facing the US and the Globe. Please join us for a most interesting presentation.
Location: This 2009 Summer meeting will be held at the Hotel Northampton, 36 King St, Northampton, MA 01060. A full description of services as well as directions to the hotel, are available on-line at http://www.hotelnorthampton.com.
Our Saturday schedule is as follows 1100 - 1200 Gathering & Registration, 1200 Luncheon followed by our Keynote Speaker with adjournment at 1430.
Cost: Paid in advance the cost of the luncheon is $20 per person. Unsold seats will be available at the door for $25 each. This registration form only-not the announcement-should accompany your check made payable to AFIO/NE and received by June 17th.
Address questions to afionechapter@gmail.com Or send registration to Mr. Arthur Hulnick, 216 Summit Avenue # E102, Brookline, MA 02446

7 July 2009, 07:30 - 08:45 a.m. -- Arlington, VA -- The National Intelligence Education Foundation holds breakfast meeting featuring LTG, Chief of Intel Staff/ODNI

This is a Post-Graduate breakfast lecture. Details and registration at: http://www.niefoundation.org/events/event_details.asp?id=62233

20 - 24 July 2009 - Alexandria, VA - Espionage Investigations and Interviewing Techniques - Course 518
This course is designed to provide an introduction to the complexities of and the decision making processes associated with investigating and prosecuting espionage cases in the United States in the 21st Century.
The course examines the psychology of espionage and the basis for opening espionage investigations. It explains the evolution of key legal and policy decisions associated with prosecuting espionage cases.
The course provides tools for conducting successful counterintelligence interviews.
These tools include a self assessment of the interviewer's behavioral skills; counterintelligence interviewing techniques; detecting deception during interviews; questioning techniques; and practical exercises in interviewing espionage suspects.
This course provides espionage investigators in the US national security community a deeper understanding of the status of counterespionage today, and their individual roles in the protection of our nation's most vital secrets, plans, and programs. (5 days)

AGENDA

Monday, 20 July 2009, 8:00a-4:00p - Alexandria, VA - Day 1 of 5 - at the CI Centre, Professor Connie Allen
Seminar Introduction and Objectives; The Psychology of Espionage; Anatomy of Espionage; Anatomy of a Sting

Tuesday, 21 July 2009, 8:00a-4:00p - Alexandria, VA - Day 2 of 5 - CI Centre Professors John Martin and Connie Allen
Legal Issues: Understanding past espionage cases which established case law for espionage violations and how these individuals have been exposed; Corroboration: Kampiles; Agent of a foreign power: 1941 case; How long can you talk with a suspect: Pelton; The John Walker case and others; Failures and mistakes encountered during espionage investigations: Cook, Smith, and Koecher cases

Wednesday, 22 July 2009, 8:00a-11:00a - Alexandria, VA - Day 3 of 5 - CI Centre Professor Tawfik Hamid Interviewing an Islamist Terrorist/Extremist Who Belongs to a Jihadist Group or Al-Qaeda Style Organization;

11:00a-4:00p CI Centre Professor Sue Adams: Counterintelligence Interviewing Techniques; Self Assessment for Interviewers - DISC Behavioral Styles; DISC Behavioral Styles and CI Interviewing Techniques: Rapport Building Skills

Thursday, 23 July 2009, 8:00a-4:00p - Alexandria, VA - Day 4 of 5 - CI Centre Professor Sue Adams
Detecting Deception During Interviews: Nonverbal Clues to Deception, Verbal Clues to Deception; Deception and Questioning Techniques

Friday, 24 July 2009, 8:00a-4:00p - Alexandria, VA - Day 5 of 5 - CI Centre Professor Sue Adams
8:00a-4:00p Interviewing Suspects: Theme Development for Espionage Suspects; Interview Plans: Interviewing Suspects; Practical Exercises

TO REGISTER FOR THIS SPECIAL COURSE: A client has allowed us to open up available seats to individuals who hold a current SECRET clearance to attend their running of this course the week of 20-24 July 2009 at the CI Centre in Alexandria, VA. The cost of this five-day course for government attendees is $2,618.70 per person; for corporate attendees is $3,045 per person. To register, fill out this form, or contact Adam Hahn at 703-642-7454.

1 August 2009 - Viera (Melbourne), FL - The AFIO Florida Satellite Chapter luncheon will feature Captain Richard P. Jeffrey USN Retired, Pearl Harbor survivor. Captain Jeffrey’s account of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was video-taped by the U.S. National Park Service and is now an Oral History in the archives of the USS Arizona Memorial in the harbor at Pearl where it may be viewed by visitors. Captain Jeffery is a U.S. Navy Academy Class of 1939 graduate. He is a survivor of the 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor attack, having been an Ensign aboard the Battleship USS Maryland. Later he served on General Eisenhower’s Headquarters Supreme Commander Allied Forces staff in Europe.
The luncheon takes place at the Indian River Colony Club. For further information or reservations contact George Stephenson, Chapter President gstephenson@cfl.rr.com (321 267-6292) or Donna Czarnecki DonnaCZ12@AOL.com Chapter Treasurer.

13-16 October 2009 - Las Vegas, NV - AFIO National Symposium - Nellis AFB, Creech AFB. Details and registration forthcoming.

AFIO 2009 Fall Convention in Fabulous Las Vegas, Nevada
13 October to 16 October, 2009
Cold Warriors in the Desert: From Atomic Blasts to Sonic Booms

Presentations on the testing of atomic weapons, airborne reconnaissance platforms, and more. Onsite visits to Nellis Air Force Base - Home of the Fighter Pilot, the U.S. Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site - the former on-continent nuclear weapons proving ground, and Creech Air Force Base - the home of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (currently deployed for combat missions in the Middle East, yet piloted from Creech).

Details and registration forthcoming.
Harrah's Hotel Registration is available now at: Telephone reservations may be made at 800-901-5188. Refer to Group Code SHAIO9 to get the special AFIO rate. To make hotel reservations online, go to: http://www.harrahs.com/CheckGroupAvailability.do?propCode=LAS&groupCode=SHAIO9
Special AFIO October Symposium Las Vegas rates are available up to Friday, September 11, 2009.

For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events

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