The Intelligence Profession Series

Number SIX

The Central Intelligence Agency: An Overview

by

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The Central Intelligence Agency

Introduction

The story of the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the most interesting in the study of our government. CIA is a relatively new agency. It was founded soon after the conclusion of World War II. There were, of course, other American intelligence elements before that. Some of them go back as far as the days of our country's founding and the American revolution. This is not surprising, since nations have always needed intelligence to assist them in making their plans and decisions in world affairs.

To understand the Central Intelligence Agency as it exists today, and as it has evolved from the time it was established, it is first necessary to know something about what intelligence is, and what purposes it serves. **Intelligence** is really nothing more than information that has been collected, evaluated, analyzed and processed. These functions are the heart of the intelligence business. They can also be enormously complex, especially in the world of today.

Collection, the gathering of the information that is to become intelligence (once it has been evaluated, analyzed and processed), is done in many ways. Much of what is collected is from what are called "open sources." This means that they are sources available to the general public, such as newspapers, broadcasts, and academic reports. There is so much information publicly available these days (some observers say that we are in the midst of an "information explosion") that just screening what is there and selecting what may be useful for intelligence purposes is a very big job.

Other information is obtained through clandestine means, or in other words using secret techniques. While this information is much less in volume than that from open sources, it is often of crucial importance. This information is gathered by various means, including human sources (or spies), sophisticated listening devices that pick up various communications, and satellites and aircraft. We will discuss these collection techniques more later on.

Gathering the information of possible interest is only the first step. Next that information must be screened to select what is likely to be

useful. What is selected must be **evaluated**, which means that its probable accuracy must be estimated, and its importance judged. Next the information is **analyzed**. This means that experts in the area to which it pertains add the new material to what they already know and use it to advance our knowledge of the topic. Finally the analysts **process** the information by putting it into various forms for delivery to the senior government officials who are going to use it. The product sent to them is called "finished intelligence."

The term "intelligence" is also used in another, more inclusive, way. (There is a glossary at the back which will help you keep unfamiliar terms straight and serve as a quick reference to refresh your memory as you move through the text.) Besides just referring to what is produced by the analysts, the term intelligence is also used to refer to the whole business in which CIA and other intelligence agencies are engaged. When used in this sense it refers not only to collection and analysis, but also to such functions as counterintelligence and covert action. We will discuss these in detail further on.

All major nations have well developed intelligence capabilities, and most smaller nations do, too. This is because the world of today, as has usually been the case in the past as well, is in many ways a dangerous place. Nations feel that they must have intelligence if they are to plan for their national security, guard against surprise, protect their economic interests, and make sound decisions in all aspects of international affairs.

In the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency is just one of a number of intelligence organizations, although it is in some ways the most important one. It forms a part of what is called the Intelligence Community, along with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, certain elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, intelligence offices of the various armed services, and others. The Director of Central Intelligence, who heads the CIA, is the coordinator of the overall Intelligence Community as well.

CIA differs from all other elements of the Intelligence Community in that it is not part of any other department of government. Rather it is separate and independent, reporting to the President through the National Security Council. It was established that way on purpose to give the most senior officials of our government a source of

intelligence that could draw on all the resources of the Intelligence Community, then produce the most objective and timely intelligence possible.

While other, departmental, intelligence elements serve the needs of their own departments (such as the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the like, and their staffs), CIA provides national foreign intelligence to the most senior officials of the government. **National** means that it is concerned with things that go beyond the concerns of a single department or agency, and of course **foreign** means that it has to do with things that are taking place outside the United States. (CIA has no role in domestic intelligence -- even counterintelligence, which is an FBI responsibility -- except that CIA may, within the provisions of existing law and executive orders, collect information in the U.S., from U.S. citizens, about foreign subjects.)

In the pages that follow we will discuss how the Central Intelligence Agency came into being, and why. We will learn more about what its responsibilities are, and how it is organized to carry them out. And we will examine some of the controversy that has surrounded the business of intelligence in the service of a free society, a problem that has been with us since the beginning and is likely to persist. In the course of this we also will come to know something about the men and women who make up this unique Agency, and about the skills, dedication and patriotism that have enabled them to establish CIA as the world's finest intelligence organization.

I

Beginnings of CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency was formally established under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which came into effect on 18 September 1947. This measure was enacted by the Congress to reorganize the government to deal with the serious security threats that had emerged in the short time since the conclusion of World War II. In addition to creating CIA, the bill also established the National Security Council and a National Military Establishment, bringing together under one head the separate Army and Navy elements and the newly-established Air Force.

The National Security Council was established to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." Its members included the President, the Vice President (added later), and the Secretaries of State and Defense. It was the job of CIA to ensure that these officials had the intelligence they needed to make wise plans and decisions.

The 1947 Act provided that, "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security," the Central Intelligence Agency was to do the following:

- Advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities as relate to national security.

- Make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities as relate to national security.

- Correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government.

In addition to giving CIA this lead role in the provision of intelligence to the nation's senior leadership, the statute did some other interesting things. It specified that CIA should have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers, and that it would have no internal security functions. It provided that the departments and other agencies of the government were to continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate **departmental** intelligence. But CIA was specifically authorized to have access to such intelligence of the departments and agencies as related to national security, and they were directed to make it available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination.

CIA was also charged with performing, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional "services of common concern" as the National Security Council determined could more efficiently be accomplished centrally. Photo interpretation became one such service of common concern, which led to establishment by CIA of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (or NPIC). Monitoring of foreign open source radio and television became another, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which had been taken over by CIA, became another such service of common concern.

The Director of Central Intelligence was also, the act stated, to "be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." This provision was to prove extremely important in later years in ways that we will discuss presently.

And finally, CIA was directed by the statute "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." This provision formed the basis for what later came to be known as "covert action" activities. We shall examine the historical record of Agency covert action in detail later.

Earlier Days of United States Intelligence

Although CIA is a relatively new creation, it was by no means the first American intelligence effort. General George Washington made good use of espionage agents during the campaigns of the American Revolution. Allen Dulles later wrote that "Washington was an outstandingly gifted intelligence chief. He himself directed the entire intelligence effort of the American forces, even to taking a hand

personally in its more important operations."[1]

General Washington made clear his views on intelligence in a wartime letter to one of his fellow officers:

> The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue.[2]

One of the most famous of Washington's spies was Nathan Hale, who was captured by the enemy. He will always be remembered for his last words, "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country," just before being hanged by the British. A statue of Hale stands outside the CIA's Headquarters Building in Langley, Virginia.

For many years, in fact up until the beginning of World War II, the conduct of American intelligence was largely in the hands of the military forces. Codebreaking was a major success, while military attaches accredited to American embassies abroad sought to learn all they could about the military forces of the host nations.

If one event may be said to have led to the formation of CIA, a civilian intelligence agency separate from the military forces, that event would be the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that began American involvement in World War II. Americans were shocked that their military forces there had been taken by surprise, and there were inquiries designed to find out what had gone wrong. One conclusion was that the problem had not been insufficient intelligence, but that the large amount of intelligence available had not been put together and coordinated by any one element.[3]

Coordinator of Information, and Then OSS, Established

Even before Pearl Harbor, though, steps had been taken to develop for the United States a more adequate intelligence capability. War was looming, and in June of 1941 (some six months before the Japanese attack) Colonel William J. Donovan, known as "Wild Bill,"[4] had drafted a recommendation that President Roosevelt establish a new American intelligence service. His key point was that America could

not formulate a strategy that would work unless her leaders had sound information about world events on which to base that strategy.

A month later the President acted, establishing an office called the Coordinator of Information, and putting Donovan in charge. The mission was simply this: to "collect, review, analyze, interpret and correlate government information bearing on national defense strategy," to "make available such information to the President and others," and "to carry out, as requested by the President, 'such supplementary activities' as would be helpful in the securing of information not otherwise available to the government." The supplementary activities were described as those that would "assist friendly elements," "undermine hostile elements," and be conducted "along unorthodox lines, but with the greatest possible circumspection."[5]

Colonel Donovan set about implementing the plan he had drafted, and he was the right man for the job. An Irishman from Buffalo, New York, he had graduated from Columbia University and Columbia Law School (where he had as a classmate Franklin D. Roosevelt). Practicing law back in Buffalo, he also joined the National Guard. When General Pershing led a punitive expedition to the Mexican border to deal with Pancho Villa in 1916, Donovan served under him as a cavalry troop commander. Then World War I broke out, and Donovan went to Europe as a battalion commander in the famed "Fighting 69th," the 69th Regiment of the New York National Guard. There he earned every honor imaginable, including the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Distinguished Service Medal.

Back home and in command of the regiment, Donovan returned to practice of the law, being appointed United States attorney for the Western District of New York. A crusading prosecutor, he lost a few friends when (it was during the era of Prohibition) he raided his own club. Soon he found himself in Washington as an assistant Attorney General of the United States. After leaving government service, he established a distinguished law firm bearing his name in New York. As war again drew near, Donovan was dispatched by the President on fact-finding trips abroad, travelling to England and to the Mediterranean theater in 1940. Thus he had a richly diverse background when he came to his new post as Coordinator of Information.[6]

President Roosevelt put his handwritten "OK" next to each item of the Coordinator of Information's first budget in November 1941, including such activities as "counterintelligence and secret activities in Europe," and collection and correlation of "strategic economic, social, political, and military information from domestic and foreign sources."[7]

One of Colonel Donovan's key decisions was to establish an element known as research and analysis (or R & A, for short), the heart of the intelligence production process in his new organization. He was able to attract a large number of able scholars, both military and civilian, who were knowledgeable about foreign areas and who knew the languages. They set to work using all the information that could be obtained to conduct research and produce reports and estimates in support of national strategy and military operations.[8]

This emphasis on wide-ranging scholarship, and on access by analysts to the whole range of available information, was to be continued in CIA. Years later William Casey, then Director of Central Intelligence and one who had served under Donovan during the war, said: "I have always thought [Donovan's] experience in handling [law] cases -- big cases requiring the assimilation and analysis of large amounts of data -- was the genesis of the Research & Analysis of OSS, and indeed of our Directorate of Intelligence at CIA. Donovan even invented a filing system which later became standard in OSS."[9]

Before establishment of CIA, though, there were to be some further evolutionary steps. In mid-June 1942, America now being fully committed to the war effort, President Roosevelt redesignated the office of the Coordinator of Information as the Office of Strategic Services (the now-renowned OSS). He transferred it (except for certain activities reassigned to the new Office of War Information) to the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation's military leadership. Donovan himself later became a major general as a result of this integration of his operation into the wartime military structure. The mission remained much the same, however, including provision of strategic intelligence and conduct of special services. There were very many bureaucratic battles, even in the midst of a war against real foreign enemies, but OSS survived and prospered.

Under Donovan's leadership, it established operational bases in many parts of the world, collecting strategic intelligence, organizing

and supporting resistance movements behind enemy lines and in occupied countries, and conducting espionage, sabotage, counter-intelligence and covert action operations. Evaluating OSS as a forerunner of CIA, one historical analysis observed that "the diversity of OSS operations, ranging from guerrilla and commando units to the academic analysis of information, gave OSS a character and self-awareness different from those of any other intelligence organization."[10] Donovan had promised President Roosevelt that in OSS he would find officers who were "calculatingly reckless," with "disciplined daring" and "trained for aggressive action,"[11] and he gave him just that. Many who served in OSS went on to become leaders of post-war American intelligence.

Immediate Post-World War II Period

The war in Europe concluded in May 1945 with the unconditional surrender of German forces. In the Pacific, after the atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese surrendered in early August. The United States immediately began demobilizing the forces it had built to fight the war. Soldiers and sailors were mustered out by the millions, and (except for occupation troops left in the former theaters of war), the military establishment quickly returned to the very small garrison America traditionally maintained in peacetime. America's wartime intelligence organization was mustered out, too, as President Truman disbanded the OSS in September 1945.

In San Francisco, an international conference was convened to form the United Nations organization. It was hoped that this would be a mechanism for maintaining the hard-won peace. But even as war was ending and planning for peace was underway, the beginnings of what we later came to call the "Cold War" were becoming evident.

The Soviet Union's efforts to expand its territory and influence were at the heart of it. Instead of reducing its military forces to peace-time levels, as the other allied nations had done, the Soviets maintained millions of men under arms. In eastern Europe, where their armies were positioned when war ended, the Soviets established permanent garrisons and ensured that governments they could dominate came into power. Soviet forces refused to leave Iran as they were supposed to do in accordance with earlier agreements, and the Soviets supported challenges to the legitimate governments in Greece and Turkey. As early as February 1946 George F. Kennan, then

American charge d'affaires in Moscow, had cabled home his assessment that the "Soviet Union represented a real, aggressive, long-term threat to the West."[12]

It was quickly becoming clear that, instead of being able to enjoy a period of peace and tranquillity, the United States was going to have to prepare itself to counter expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union and other communist powers.[13] (The "Cold War" turned hot again in 1950 when the United States, in cooperation with other United Nations forces, repulsed an armed invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops, later joined by Chinese forces.)

Thus within months of having disbanded OSS, President Truman "change[d] his mind completely, becoming an ardent advocate of centralized, coordinated intelligence in the face of failed hopes and dreams."[14] In January 1946 the President issued a directive establishing the Central Intelligence Group. The new organization was placed under a Director of Central Intelligence, and was to be funded and staffed by the State, War and Navy Departments jointly. The following year, as we have noted, a successor organization, to be known as the Central Intelligence Agency, was established under provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. Independent of any other department or agency, and reporting to the President through the NSC, it was the centralized, independent and civilian intelligence organization that Donovan had long advocated.

The President also proclaimed the Truman Doctrine, which held that the United States would support free peoples resisting attempted subjugation from within or by outside forces. He backed this up with requests to the Congress for military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, two nations that were immediately threatened. Realizing that our European allies would need help in rebuilding their wrecked economies, the United States also developed the Marshall Plan to assist in bringing about that recovery. Thus on all fronts -- military, political, economic and intelligence -- America was moving to deal with this new threat to its security and world peace.

While increasing recognition of the expanding Soviet threat was a proximate cause for establishment of CIA, the Agency had its origins in the early American experience in World War II as well. "The emphasis was on the word 'Central' -- there must be one place in the government where all this information eventually comes together,"

later observed Walter Pforzheimer, a former CIA Legislative Counsel who in that role saw the enabling legislation through the Congress.[15] This, it was hoped, would prevent the United States from being surprised so disastrously in the future, as well as enabling the President and his senior advisors to have the timely and comprehensive intelligence they needed to formulate plans and strategy for the dangerous days ahead. As veteran CIA officer Thomas Troy put it in his study of the origins of the Agency, "CIA's establishment in 1947 represented the public determination that Pearl Harbor would not be repeated."[16]

II

Growth of CIA

Within two years of its establishment the statutory basis for CIA underwent substantial revision with enactment of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. The Agency was authorized to transfer to and receive from other government agencies sums for the performance of authorized functions and activities, and other agencies were likewise authorized to engage in such transfers to and from the Agency. These transfers could take place without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations, and without regard to limitations of the appropriations from which such funds were transferred.

Other authorities, necessary for operational purposes, were also provided. These included approval to make alterations to premises rented by the Agency and authority to set maximum and minimum age limits for appointment to operational positions within the Agency. Also authorized was exemption for the purpose of protecting intelligence sources and methods from the provisions of any other law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. The size of the Agency's budget and the number of people it employs continue to be regarded as classified matters, although there is frequent speculation as to both.

The Director, in conjunction with the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration, was also empowered to approve entry into the United States of those aliens, and their families, whose admission was deemed in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission. This provided a means of protecting and obtaining intelligence from certain defectors and other foreigners willing to cooperate with American intelligence.

Finally, the Agency was authorized to expend the funds made available to it without regard to the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds. In cases of a confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature, such expenditures could be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director. The Director's certificate in such cases was to be deemed a sufficient

voucher for the amount involved (and thus such monies came to be known as "unvouchered" funds). The Agency's General Counsel at the time observed that the provision of such funds, and their inviolability from outside inspection, were "the heart and soul of covert operation."[17]

The provision by the Congress of these unusual authorities reflected recognition and widespread agreement that the United States and its allies faced serious threats to their national security, and that CIA must have the means it needed to do its part in dealing with those threats. "Not only Truman but many of the most thoughtful men in government at that time decided that...the need for a concerted and aggressive covert organization made it vital that the CIA should be given teeth, plus the money and priority to use them."[18]

In April 1950 there had been issued National Security Council Directive 68 (or NSC-68, as it is usually referred to) setting forth guidelines for American defense and security policy. This document laid down the strategy of "containment" of further communist expansion. In Europe, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been formed to prevent any additional westward encroachment by the Soviets and their satellites. The first priority of American concerns was clearly Europe, and Agency analytical energies were focused there as well. Soviet and East European capabilities, and Soviet intentions, were the primary concern of the intelligence production effort.

There was also good reason for concern on security and counterintelligence grounds. Kim Philby, who had represented British intelligence in Washington, came under suspicion as a Soviet spy and was recalled. (He later fled to Moscow and wrote a book stating it quite baldly: "All through my career, I have been a straight penetration agent working in the Soviet interest."[19]) The Soviet Union produced an atomic bomb of its own much sooner than had been expected, and it was later learned that the theft of American atomic secrets by such spies as Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had enabled them to close the gap so quickly.

Expansion of Agency Concerns and Activities

There were thus very busy days ahead for CIA. Over a period of some twenty-five years it established its fundamental organization, operational philosophy and approach, and analytical methods and

products. As conditions in the collection environment, the nature of the target, and the needs of its consumers changed, CIA adapted and changed along with them.

Perhaps the most significant change, especially over the long haul, was the increasing availability of sophisticated technical means for collecting intelligence information. These included high performance reconnaissance aircraft, powerful radars and signals interceptors, and eventually space satellites. These systems were very costly, but they also provided enormous amounts of useful data, much of it of a kind that had not previously been obtainable. In fact, one of the problems that came with these new capabilities was a mass of data so plentiful that it was a major challenge just to screen, sort and use it. Only the advent of another important capability, that provided by high speed computers, made it possible to manage and take advantage of all the new data.

An early program utilizing the new high technology involved the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Developed by the Lockheed Corporation under direction of CIA, it was one of the Agency's greatest successes. Since the U-2 could fly at very high altitudes, it was able to pass over the Soviet Union above the range of antiaircraft weapons, taking photographs using newly-developed high resolution cameras. Bases for the U-2 were established in Turkey, Germany, Japan and Taiwan, and the program's director reported that within twenty-four hours he could have a reconnaissance aircraft over any point on earth.[20] By the time the Soviets had developed weapons that could reach the U-2 (and shot one down shortly before the scheduled summit meeting of May 1960), the new photographic surveillance satellites were nearly ready to be placed into orbit.[21] The U-2s continued to perform important service collecting against other targets, and the crucial evidence that the Soviets were emplacing sites for nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba in October of 1962 was provided by photographs taken by the U-2.

The satellites were new means of reconnaissance which provided increasingly timely and comprehensive coverage of Soviet military capabilities, troop dispositions and weapons development. Placed in orbit about the earth, a variety of such satellites provided unprecedented and comprehensive imagery in terms of high resolution photographs.

Besides obtaining information about enemy military capabilities in general, and protection against surprise attack, the satellites made possible another important development: arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Always before, the United States had felt that on-site inspection would be essential to ensure that the Soviets abided by the terms of any such agreement. Since the Soviets would not permit inspection of sites in their country, even by international authorities, there was no possibility of reaching agreement to limit strategic weapons.

When the satellites became available, they offered another means of monitoring compliance by the Soviet Union with the terms of any arms control agreement that might be reached. Referred to by both sides as "national technical means" of verification, the satellites made the first SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreement possible by giving each side the means of verifying independently that the other was observing the limits that had been agreed upon. Henry Kissinger reported that, during the SALT negotiations, "the CIA was asked to assess the verifiability of each weapon limitation proposed -- how we could check up on compliance, how much cheating could take place before discovery, and the strategic consequences of the possible violations."[22]

Organizational Structure

The growing importance of technology was also reflected in the internal structure of CIA. When things had settled down after the initial establishment of the Agency, there were a number of directorates, each responsible for one of the principal missions. While the designations changed from time to time over the years, essentially they included a directorate for intelligence (the analytical part of the business), one for operations (the clandestine services), and one for administration (providing various kinds of support to the rest of the Agency). In the early 1960s there was added to these a directorate for science and technology, replacing a directorate for research. That structure, with a number of internal adjustments and the addition of various special function offices, has continued largely intact to the present day. (We will discuss the current organization and functions more fully in a later section.)

In the analytical field, important mechanisms were established for the development and production of key products. One of these was

termed the Office of National Estimates. First formed under General Walter Bedell Smith, an early Director of Central Intelligence, this mechanism included a number of distinguished scholars. Their job was to function as a Board of National Estimates and to assess the evidence and the conclusions of the National Intelligence Estimates, the Agency's (and the Intelligence Community's) most formal and considered intelligence judgments. An Estimates Staff, also part of the overall Office of National Estimates, prepared these documents.

This arrangement lasted for some two decades, until its replacement in 1973 under William Colby as Director, by a system of National Intelligence Officers.[23] These early arrangements appear to have been highly successful, at least in their earlier days, as President Trumnn later observed: "No President has ever had such a wealth of vital information made available to him in such a useful manner as I have received through CIA."[24]

In the field of operations (or plans, as it was euphemistically called for many years), there were also some adaptive changes in organization. In 1948, in the very early days of CIA's existence, there had been created an organization called OPC (Office of Policy Coordination). Its mission was to manage covert operations, receiving guidance from the Departments of State and Defense. CIA housed this activity, but organizationally it was separate from the Agency. OPC was tasked by the National Security Council to conduct its operations so as to conceal U.S. government responsibility for them and so that, if they should be uncovered, the U.S. could plausibly disclaim responsibility for them.[25] Meanwhile, inside CIA, an Office of Special Operations conducted somewhat competitive activities, at least in terms of sources, although its focus was on espionage. By the summer of 1952 these two elements were merged within CIA under the Deputy Director for Plans. Thereafter CIA enjoyed a monopoly on the conduct of intelligence covert action.

The Agency as an Entity

In its early days CIA was made up mostly of people who had previously served in the OSS, in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or in one or another of the military services. As technology became more important, the Agency brought in a wide range of scientists and engineers. People who knew how to exploit the new capabilities of the computer became important, too, and in the first years of its existence

CIA was in the forefront of information handling. Eventually, as the Agency's interests and responsibilities continued to grow, there were found in its ranks a very wide range of specialists and scholars. These included cartographers, librarians, psychologists, electrical and aeronautical engineers, polygraphers, physicians, draftsmen, econometricians, geographers, historians, illustrators, communications experts, paramilitary specialists, artists, statisticians, biologists, mathematicians, meteorologists, oceanographers, sociologists, computer scientists, data processors, logisticians, computer programmers, analysts, accountants, economists, political scientists, regional specialists of every kind, linguists, finance officers, systems engineers, attorneys, editors, printers, photographers, inventors, pilots, small boat operators, auditors, agronomists, chemists, teachers, writers, demolitions experts, parachutists, photo interpreters, drivers, security officers, secretaries and stenographers, anthropologists, architects, and personnel specialists. In short, the Agency came to include a very rich mix of those people needed to conduct and support its wide-ranging activities in collection, analysis, and production of intelligence and the conduct of counterintelligence and covert action operations.

In the Agency's early days many of these people were scattered around Washington in various buildings, including the wartime "temporary" buildings near the Mall that had become somewhat permanent fixtures. (Others, of course, were stationed overseas at various locations.) In the early 1960s, however, the Agency's present Headquarters Building in Langley, Virginia, on the Potomac River near Washington, was opened. This enabled many of the Agency's staff to work more closely together.

The campus-like atmosphere was something that Director Allen Dulles had insisted upon, believing that it served to emphasize the scholarly nature of the business of intelligence production, and that it would provide the proper atmosphere for that endeavor to be carried on in an objective and factual way. A prominent feature of the building's main entranceway, carved into the marble, is a quotation from the gospel of St. John: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." This serves to reinforce the premise that the Agency is in the business of giving senior policymakers the best possible information as a means of ensuring continued U.S. national security.

By the mid-1980s an expanded Agency population had outgrown the Headquarters Building, and elements were again scattered all over the Washington area. Part of this was also the result of increasing reliance on automated data processing, which meant that computers were taking up more and more of the space previously occupied by people. Construction was begun on an addition of over a million square feet, more than doubling the available space at the Headquarters complex, and occupation of this new facility was begun in the latter part of 1988.

Role of the Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence (the DCI) has three separate responsibilities. First, he is the principal intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council. Next, he is the coordinator of the entire Intelligence Community. And finally, he is the head of one element of that Community, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Over the period of CIA's growth, various Directors have had greater or less success in each of these roles. There have been fourteen Directors of Central Intelligence to date. Their tenures have ranged from less than six months (in two cases) to nearly nine years (in the case of Allen Dulles, who served during the period 1953-1961). Only three (Dulles, Richard Helms, and William Colby) have been appointed from within the Agency. Those appointed from outside have brought varying backgrounds to the job. The present Director, William Webster, came to the job after almost a decade as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His predecessor, William J. Casey, a noted attorney with extensive experience in government as well, was a veteran of the World War II OSS. Others have come to the position from military service, business, or other governmental posts. (See page 58 for a list of those who have served as DCI and their periods of service.)

The task of coordinating the Intelligence Community has been a particularly challenging one for every DCI, regardless of his ability, background or energies. Many elements of what make up the Community are, as pointed out earlier, parts of other government departments. Thus they are under the immediate supervision of powerful cabinet officers who are not necessarily enthusiastic about their intelligence elements being coordinated by someone else, even if

he does have a Presidential mandate to do so. What this means in reality is that the DCI must do a great deal of persuading, and no doubt some compromising, to get the Community moving together in the direction he thinks it should go.

In recent years increased control over formulation of the overall intelligence budget has given the DCI a valuable means of improving such coordination, but even then the senior cabinet officers have another chance to influence the matter during later review processes. There has also evolved over a number of years an Intelligence Community Staff which supports the DCI in his role as coordinator of the Community. This staff includes budget experts, collection managers, policy analysts, and other specialists. Under its auspices there are also organized a number of DCI committees dealing with matters of concern to the Community generally. These range from security to critical collection problems and defector handling.

As senior intelligence advisor to the President, however, the DCI is essentially unchallenged. Other senior officials can, and do, make their case to the President on important matters of national policy based on the intelligence produced within their departments. And they are free to comment on the intelligence produced for the President by CIA. (Dissenting views concerning national intelligence estimates are included in the documents themselves so that policymakers can benefit from the divergence of viewpoints.)

But it is the DCI who leads off most meetings of the National Security Council with an intelligence appraisal of the situation. In the Reagan administration DCI Casey was given added assurance of receiving a hearing by being made a member of the President's cabinet, thus becoming the first and only DCI cabinet member. This step was not repeated in the case of his successor, however; it had, in any event, been a controversial and unprecedented step, with many feeling that it put the Director too much into the realm of policy formulation, as opposed to provision of the intelligence on which formulation of policy was based, and thus involved an inherent conflict of interest.

Key Factors Influencing Agency Development

Over the quarter century from its founding until the mid-1970s, the key factors influencing in a positive way the manner in which the

Agency developed are undoubtedly the Cold War, the emergence of important new technologies, and the growing role of the United States in world affairs. There was a threat to be dealt with. The United States undertook a leading role in organizing resistance to that threat. And the means of obtaining the intelligence needed to support that role were changing rapidly.

The Agency responded by developing research and analytical capabilities that addressed a progressively more diverse range of concerns. It built up a worldwide network of communications, operational capabilities, and liaison relationships with intelligence services of allied and friendly nations. It organized successful resistance to Soviet attempts to dominate world trade union and student movements. It sponsored the overthrow of left-wing governments hostile to United States interests in Iran (in 1953) and Guatemala (in 1954). It conceived and brought to fruition a whole new generation of technologically advanced collection capabilities. It raised from the bottom of the sea, using the *Glomar Explorer* (a ship especially equipped for the purpose), a sunken Soviet submarine, and exploited the intelligence thus obtained.

Not everything the Agency sought to accomplish was achieved, of course, reminding us that intelligence is at best an uncertain business. The most spectacular failure, and the most public, was the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Here a major paramilitary operation planned and supported by the Agency came to an ignominious end with the capture of the U.S.-trained Cuban invasion force, a disaster compounded by universal recognition of U.S. involvement and, what was worse, U.S. incompetence in mounting such an operation. In retrospect, it is easy to perceive that the Agency lacked the background and experience to mount what was essentially a complicated military operation, and that the U.S. role should have been undertaken by the military establishment. But the initial thinking (which also turned out to be wrong) was that U.S. involvement could be kept secret if the Agency had the responsibility. Thus the approach was flawed on both counts: the operation failed **and** the U.S. role became public knowledge.[26]

Another major problem, although one generally known only to specialists, involved the course of CIA estimates of Soviet strategic missile capabilities over a number of years. It is now generally conceded that, over a period of a decade or more, U.S. intelligence

estimates of Soviet nuclear forces systematically underestimated both the pace and scope of development of those forces. How this could happen, and whether it signalled a problem that could affect other key areas of analysis as well, became a major concern of those relying on Agency analysis as the basis for strategic and operational decisions and plans.[27]

In the mid-1970s a number of events that were to have a decidedly negative impact on CIA, and on the entire American intelligence effort, came together. These included the war in Vietnam, the Watergate affair, and the changing public attitudes toward America's role in the world and her government at home produced by those events.

As the war in Vietnam dragged on year after year, with no apparent end in sight and no evidence of the success that government officials had repeatedly promised, public attitudes turned sour. Opposition to the war spread, both among those who thought we should get out (or had no business being involved in the first place) and those who thought we were doing too little and should either step up our effort or write it off. Growing public cynicism resulted from failure of U.S. government officials to make good on their predictions of a successful conclusion of the war in the near future.

The events of Watergate and its aftermath compounded this cynicism. When it became increasingly clear that a U.S. president had participated in covering up an illegal entry perpetrated by people working for his staff, and had lied about his role in the coverup, public attitudes toward government and all its doings became ever more negative.

It was in this atmosphere that certain accusations of misdeeds on the part of CIA were made public. These resulted in major investigations being conducted by the United States Senate (the Church Committee), the House of Representatives (the Pike Committee), and a Presidential Commission (the Rockefeller Commission). For several years, beginning in the mid-1970s, the Agency was exposed to virtually continuous and more or less public scrutiny. An unprecedented amount of information concerning its formerly secret activities was made public.

Senator Church charged that the Agency was a "rogue elephant," operating out of control. When the investigatory onslaught had run its course, it was determined that there had been some genuine excesses. These included the conduct of drug experiments using unwitting subjects and involvement with (unsuccessful) attempts to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Other activities, while judged to have been legal, were repudiated in the light of changing public attitudes. These included infiltration of the anti-war movement to determine whether it was being influenced by hostile foreign powers, examination of certain mail sent to and from the Soviet Union, and certain electronic surveillance operations.

A key finding of all the investigations was that, far from operating out of control, the Agency had undertaken these activities at the direction of the President or other senior officials authorized to direct the intelligence effort (over the course of several presidencies). Senator Church's senior staff assistant, asked later by a group of Agency officers whether the charge of "rogue elephant" had been substantiated, replied: "Was there a rogue elephant? I think not. Perhaps a rogue mouse or two."

Statutory and Regulatory Impact

These events, however, had their reflection in the enactment of statutes and other provisions governing CIA's activities. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 required the DCI to brief a total of eight different Congressional committees in advance of any CIA operation other than intelligence collection. This action was designed to put a damper on the conduct of covert action. President Ford issued an Executive Order setting intelligence policy and guidelines and establishing an intelligence oversight mechanism. The Senate and House both established permanent committees to conduct oversight of intelligence matters. In 1976 the Tunney-Clark Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act forbade continuation of covert action in Angola. The following year President Carter issued his own Executive Order on intelligence matters, a document containing numerous restrictions and limitations on intelligence activities. In 1978 a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act became law; it severely limited the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for intelligence-gathering purposes, and set up a special court to hear applications for such electronic surveillance.

These various measures reflected in part the temper of the times, and in part a reaction to the criticisms that had been made of previous Agency activities and practices. Especially with respect to domestic activities conducted within the United States, the pendulum swing between the interests of society as a whole (including the ability of the society to protect itself against outside threats to its survival) and the rights of individuals had swung markedly in the direction of the individual. As public attitudes again underwent a shift in the next few years, becoming more supportive of national defense and an effective intelligence capability, other laws were enacted which had the effect of improving the operational environment for CIA.

The first of these was the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980. This measure established procedures for protecting against the disclosure of any classified information that might be relevant to a judicial proceeding. This made it possible to try individuals for national security offenses without risking their disclosure of classified matter, and was thus an important improvement in the Agency's ability to protect sensitive material without having to drop charges in such cases. In 1982 the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was passed. This measure made it a crime to intentionally disclose the identities of undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources, and thwarted the efforts of individuals who had sought to undermine U.S. intelligence capabilities by doing exactly that. In 1984 passage of the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act exempted certain operational files of the CIA from search, review, publication or disclosure under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. This not only ensured against inadvertent disclosure of classified matter in such files, but saved literally thousands of man-hours that would otherwise have been devoted to screening those files in response to requests for their release, screening that had previously been required even though the material in such files was legally exempted from release under FOIA.

The cumulative effect of these more recent measures was not only to markedly improve the operational environment for U.S. intelligence, including CIA, but also to reaffirm the national commitment to maintaining an effective intelligence capability. Issuance of an Executive Order by President Reagan emphasizing the positive tasks of intelligence, although with due regard to the legal and ethical framework within which those tasks are to be accomplished, also contributed to this more positive context for CIA operations. These

actions also brought the institution to the beginning of the contemporary era, when a new generation of intelligence professionals has come to the task (DCI William Casey noted during his tenure that CIA was in the process of generational transition, with about half of its personnel having joined the Agency in the preceding ten years).

And the tasks for intelligence have continued to evolve. In recent years, in addition to the traditional intelligence concerns about early warning, Soviet capabilities and intentions, and crisis points in the world, there have emerged many other matters that are either new or increasingly important subjects for intelligence scrutiny. Among these are international terrorism, illegal trafficking in narcotics, arms transfers, international trade and economics, strategic raw materials, the influence of religious fundamentalism in the Third World, technology transfer, Third World debt, nuclear proliferation, food resources, and population growth. Many of these are not accessible by means of the new high technology collection methods, and hence we are seeing a resurgence in importance of human collection (or a renewed appreciation of the continuing importance of that source of intelligence). It is against this backdrop that we turn now to the current structure of the Central Intelligence Agency.

III

The Current Structure of CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency is, as we have noted, a separate Agency reporting to the President through the National Security Council. The Agency is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence. He is assisted by a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Both are Presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation.

The Intelligence Community

CIA forms a part of what is referred to as the Intelligence Community. The Community organization provides one of the main mechanisms for interaction of CIA with other government elements involved in intelligence. The Community includes all the major government agencies and organizations that conduct parts of the overall U.S. intelligence effort (see Figure 1 for its composition).

The Director of Central Intelligence, besides heading CIA, is responsible for coordinating the Intelligence Community and is its principal spokesman. He carries out these responsibilities by formulating the overall budget for intelligence matters, through the activities of an Intelligence Community Staff formed to assist him in this role, and through the action of a number of DCI committees.

It is important to understand that, since most elements of the Intelligence Community (other than CIA) are part of larger departments or agencies, they also report to the heads of those organizations. Thus the DCI is not in a position to exercise line authority over them, but rather must seek to coordinate their activities with those of CIA and the Community at large.

As Figure 1 illustrates, many of the elements making up the Intelligence Community are also part of the Department of Defense. This is the case with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which provides departmental intelligence for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the case with the National Security Agency (NSA), responsible for communications intercepts, code breaking, and the security of cryptographic material. The intelligence components of

Figure 1

The Intelligence Community

Interaction with the Users of Intelligence

The interactions described so far take place **among** the elements producing United States intelligence for the senior policy makers of the government. They are designed to produce the best possible intelligence, to ensure the greatest possible efficiency and economy in doing so, and to make prudent preparations to continue that capability by adapting to the inevitable changes of the future world environment.

Of even greater importance are the interactions with those who will make use of the intelligence produced, often referred to as the "consumers" of intelligence. These consumers, beginning with the President, receive a wide variety of intelligence products (about which we will talk more later on). These include daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports on various topics, and alerts and spot reports when crises arise or are anticipated. Written reports are supplemented by oral briefings. Maps, photographs and drawings supplement the written and oral material.

But all of this intelligence is not prepared in a vacuum. Intelligence producers make strenuous efforts to stay in touch with their clients, and to make sure they are meeting the intelligence needs of those clients. This means producing intelligence on the problems which confront policy makers at any given time, and being prepared to provide intelligence on new problems as they emerge. This interaction with consumers involves a continuous stream of visits, telephone calls, exchanges of notes and memoranda, and the like. In CIA, it means that everyone from the Director himself to individual analysts is in contact with consumers at various levels, trying to ascertain what they need and how best to meet their needs.

It is important to note, however, that serving those needs means to the professional intelligence officer providing accurate and timely intelligence that addresses the problems at hand, **not** sending in intelligence that has somehow been slanted to support a given policy or course of action. CIA was established as a separate entity reporting to the President (through the National Security Council) specifically to provide an independent source of unbiased intelligence, and its members prize their reputation for that independence and analytical integrity.

Oversight Mechanisms

CIA also interacts with numerous other governmental elements on substantive, policy, procedural, and legal and regulatory matters. The National Security Council, for example, includes what is called the Senior Interagency Group, Intelligence. It is composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, the Deputy Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group is responsible to the overall NSC for intelligence matters and intelligence policy, and monitors the execution of previously approved policies and decisions.

Another group which maintains close watch over the activities of the Intelligence Community, including CIA, is called the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (or PFIAB). It is composed of a group of citizens from outside the government who are appointed by the President (usually there are about a dozen or so members). Over the years a number of very distinguished scientists, academicians, business executives, and former public officials have served on this board. Their purpose is to develop recommendations for actions that will improve the performance of U.S. intelligence activities. The PFIAB is credited with, among other things, having taken the lead in getting the Intelligence Community to develop the sophisticated high technology systems that are now so important a part of its collection capabilities.

If the coordinating and oversight groups we have mentioned so far have as their primary purpose ensuring the effectiveness of intelligence operations, there are other oversight mechanisms whose primary purpose is to ensure their compliance with law and regulations. The Attorney General plays an important role here, and within the Justice Department there is a special staff element dealing with intelligence law. There is also a President's Intelligence Oversight Board, again consisting of members from outside the government (three in this case) appointed by the President. This board's responsibility is to discover and report to the President any intelligence activities that raise questions of propriety or legality in terms of the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or applicable Presidential Executive Orders.

the military services -- the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- are also included in the Intelligence Community and are integral parts of the Department of Defense. Finally, there are within the Defense Department certain offices responsible for the collection of specialized kinds of national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs, and they are also part of the Intelligence Community.

Certain other departments have Community elements as well. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research belongs. That part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (which comes under the Justice Department) having to do with counterintelligence is included in the Community. Specialized intelligence units of the Departments of the Treasury and Energy round out the Community's membership.

Members of the Intelligence Community Staff include representatives on detail (temporary assignment of one or two years' duration) from the various elements of the Community. This provides a valuable means of coordination, and helps to ensure that the viewpoints of the constituent elements of the Community are represented. Within the Community Staff are located elements having to do with policy and plans, budget, tasking and requirements (for collection and production of intelligence), and counterintelligence. In addition, there are under the auspices of the Community Staff a number of DCI committees. These committees are established by the Director of Central Intelligence to develop coordinated approaches to topics of concern to all members of the Community. These matters include, for example, security, information handling, counterintelligence, and critical intelligence problems. Members of the committees come from throughout the Community, providing yet another means of interaction. (See Figure 2 for details of the Intelligence Community Staff organization.)

National Foreign Intelligence Board

The Director of Central Intelligence chairs a senior-level coordinating mechanism known as the National Foreign Intelligence Board (or NFIB). Its membership includes the senior official of each of the elements making up the Intelligence Community. Using this forum, the Director obtains advice from his senior associates on matters ranging from intelligence judgments (as represented in National Intelligence Estimates) to intelligence priorities and resource allocations.



Finally, the Congress has established permanent committees in each house responsible for oversight of intelligence activities. In theory, these committees (the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) are responsible for both aspects of oversight: evaluation and improvement of intelligence performance, and monitoring compliance with law and regulations. They also review and are the authorizing committees for the budgets prepared for intelligence activities.

Funding for CIA

Funding for CIA is provided by the Congress in accordance with a process that is essentially the same as that applicable to other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. Some adjustments have, of course, been made in the interests of security.

CIA formulates its own budget proposal at the appropriate time each year (just as other departments and agencies do). The Agency's Comptroller takes the lead in this process, but senior executives are involved in deciding priorities and tradeoffs to meet the target ceiling. The CIA's input is considered in conjunction with the budget proposals of all the other elements of the Intelligence Community. When, with assistance of the Intelligence Community Staff and under direction of the DCI, a consolidated budget for the Intelligence Community has been worked out, this is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. There the requests for funds for intelligence purposes have to contend with requests for all the other activities of the Executive Branch. Specially cleared people in OMB handle the intelligence requests so as to protect security.

When the President's budget request is forwarded to the Congress, the funds for intelligence are not specifically identified. By agreement with the Congress, they are included under various other categories so as to deny critical information to potential adversaries. In the Congress, however, the oversight committees for intelligence in each house go over the intelligence budgets in minute detail, scrutinizing every line item. When they have approved the budget proposals (amended as determined by the committees), the funds are authorized. Then, just as with other types of expenditures, the intelligence budget must be reviewed by the Appropriations Committees, which vote to appropriate whatever funds they agree upon. Finally, the Congress votes on both authorization and appropriation.

Thus, although the amounts provided for intelligence are kept secret, the budgets receive detailed review within the Executive Branch (by OMB) and in the Congress (by the intelligence oversight committees and the appropriations committees).

The funds appropriated for CIA, like those of most other government agencies, are used for a variety of purposes. These include personnel expenses (recruiting, training, and paying staff employees and others), operational expenses (everything from maintaining facilities to transportation, equipment and supplies), and research, development and acquisition of new intelligence capabilities. In recent years the high technology collection systems have become more and more expensive, forcing some hard decisions about priorities and allocation of resources.

Internal CIA Structure

CIA Headquarters is, as previously noted, located in Langley, Virginia, not far from downtown Washington, D.C. Other elements are housed in a variety of facilities in and around the greater Washington area, which includes suburban communities in nearby Maryland and Virginia. There are other CIA offices at various places in the United States, where CIA representatives talk with U.S. citizens who volunteer information they believe to be of foreign intelligence value. Agency recruiters of staff personnel also work from regional offices throughout the country.

Other CIA activities are of course located overseas. These include the CIA Stations involved in human source collection and other activities, and certain specialized technical collection facilities. Typically those CIA personnel stationed overseas return to Washington for assignments between overseas tours, much as is the case with State Department personnel assigned to the Foreign Service. Most CIA people working overseas are not openly acknowledged as Agency employees; they use protective "cover" of one kind of another to conceal their Agency affiliation.

The basic organization of CIA (shown in the chart at Figure 3) is built around four main elements known as directorates, one each for intelligence, operations, science and technology, and administration.[28] Each of these is headed by a deputy director, normally an Agency

Figure 3



professional, although there have from time to time been outside appointments to these positions. There are (as indicated on the organizational chart) a number of other staff elements for the performance of specialized functions.

CIA's internal organization reflects the diversity of its mission requirements, which include collection of intelligence information; analysis of that information to produce finished intelligence; dissemination of the resulting intelligence; counterintelligence; and the conduct of covert action activities. Each directorate has primary responsibility for some aspect of these tasks, or for providing particular kinds of support to those elements which do.

The Directorate of Intelligence

This is the analytical side of the house. Within this directorate are prepared the numerous intelligence products provided by the Agency to senior policy makers and other consumers of national foreign intelligence. To develop these analytical products, the Directorate of Intelligence is organized into a number of offices (see again Figure 3). Five of these are geographic in focus, dealing with the Soviet Union, Europe, the Near East and South Asia, East Asia, and Africa and Latin America. In each of these offices are found specialists in many areas, including economics, military affairs, and political analysis. This provides the basis for multi-disciplinary analysis.

(In earlier years, rather than being organized on an integrated basis around geographical areas, the Intelligence Directorate included an Office of Economic Research, an Office of Political Analysis, and so on, each responsible for all of the geographic areas of the world. Opinion within the Agency has typically been divided as to which is the better way to organize the analytical effort, although there seems to be general satisfaction with the present arrangement.)

The Office of Scientific and Weapons Research performs very specialized analysis relating to foreign scientific and military capabilities. The Office of Global Issues deals with a number of intelligence topics that cut across geographic regions, such as arms transfers, terrorism and technology transfer. The Office of Imagery Analysis is engaged in detailed assessment of certain photographic and electro-optical imagery, the product of reconnaissance satellites.

The Directorate of Science and Technology

This is the most recently established of the four directorates, having been put in place in 1963. It is made up of six offices. The Office of Research and Development conducts (often with contractor assistance) exploratory research and technology development in support of overall Agency activities in collection, processing and production of intelligence. Often it is engaged in state-of-the-art research in exotic technologies. The Office of Development and Engineering seeks out and identifies future intelligence requirements that can be satisfied by technical collection systems. It then pursues the development of advanced technology that will support the design of improved future collection systems. Then it seeks to develop and acquire such advanced systems. These two offices have played a major role in bringing into service the sophisticated systems that now typify U.S. intelligence collection.

The Office of SIGINT Operations (OSO) is responsible for developing and managing elements of the overall signals intelligence (SIGINT) program. This involves collecting and analyzing signals, electromagnetic radiation, and other signals-related data. It also monitors technological advances in foreign communications systems and practices. OSO conducts extensive liaison with other U.S. government agencies, as well as with certain foreign government services, in the course of its work.

The Office of Technical Service is one of CIA's most unique elements. It provides highly specialized technical expertise to support mission requirements of intelligence officers operating worldwide. This includes research, design, production and evaluation in areas as diverse as electronics, chemistry, psychology, photographic sciences, mechanical design, communications, electro-optics, electro-mechanical systems, packaging, security systems, plastics, power sources, microprocessor systems, and monitoring equipment for technical collection.

The Directorate of Science and Technology also manages two elements performing what are called "services of common concern" for the Intelligence Community. This means that they perform a function benefiting the Community as a whole, and that they provide the product for use throughout the Community. These two elements are the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

FBIS is engaged in the collection of information from foreign broadcast and print media. It monitors these open sources, including radio, television, and the press. The results are selectively culled, translated, edited, analyzed and disseminated to a wide range of users throughout the government. Analysis includes correlation of media content and behavior with policy trends and intentions in the foreign countries involved. FBIS editors may serve overseas in bureaus on four continents; people involved in engineering, radio frequency analysis, and editing all serve periodic foreign tours of duty. FBIS has a long-standing arrangement with BBC (the British Broadcasting Corporation) under which they divide regional responsibilities for monitoring and translating foreign broadcasts, then exchange the results on a daily basis.[29]

NPIC is responsible for analyzing the imagery acquired by overhead collection systems (satellites and aircraft) and making the results available to the intelligence production and foreign policy communities. Working in the Center are imagery analysts from many elements of the Intelligence Community, alongside photogrammetrists, data processing and systems specialists, and engineers. Given the importance of the results of overhead reconnaissance to strategic warning, these specialists work in a decidedly time-sensitive and high pressure atmosphere.

The Directorate of Administration

The Directorate of Administration provides a complete range of services and support to the rest of CIA. For this reason, it has perhaps the greatest diversity of career fields of any of the directorates, ranging from physicians and logisticians to communicators and financial managers.

The Office of Medical Services (OMS) manages and operates the Agency's medical program. This includes medical screening of applicants, periodic examinations of staff employees, provision of immunizations for people being assigned to work or travel overseas, and psychiatric services (including the provision of psychiatric expertise in support of intelligence production). OMS conducts medical training, provides advice on survival, makes health assessments, and directs and supports the Agency's overseas medical program.

The Office of Current Production and Analytic Support gets out the daily publications and runs the Operations Center, a watch center that operates twenty-four hours a day. The Office of Leadership Analysis produces assessments of foreign political leaders and other prominent personages of interest from an intelligence standpoint. The Office of Information Resources provides research support, in both classified and open source materials, for analysts and their research assistants throughout the Directorate of Intelligence, and for other clients elsewhere in the Agency.

In addition to these regular organization elements, it is the practice in times of crisis to form task forces, drawing on whatever parts of the directorate have the expertise required, to produce the high volume of very timely intelligence normally required at such times. Also from time to time more permanent centers are established to deal with high priority analytical and operational matters.

While not formally a part of the Directorate of Intelligence, there is one other closely related element that should be mentioned here. Known as the National Intelligence Council, it is made up of the National Intelligence Officers, and has a small analytical group supporting it. The National Intelligence Officers are senior analytical people appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence to take the lead in the production of intelligence in their areas of specialization. Typically there are NIOs for critical regions and countries (such as Africa, Europe, the Near East and South Asia, China, Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific, and the USSR). Other NIOs cover important functional areas, including strategic programs (nuclear forces), general purpose forces (conventional military forces), nuclear proliferation, warning, political economics, terrorism, and narcotics.

NIOs are responsible for ensuring that the production of intelligence in their areas meets the needs of policymakers. They try to identify any gaps in intelligence coverage and make sure they are covered. And they try to avoid unintentional duplication of effort and the waste of resources which that would involve.

The Directorate of Operations

The Directorate of Operations, responsible for clandestine collection, counterintelligence and covert action, does not normally publish a description of its internal organization. Nevertheless, over the years there has been enough information entering the public domain that a general description can be provided. The directorate is composed of Headquarters elements and those in the field. At Headquarters, typically there are area divisions. These are organized along regional lines, much as was the case with the analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence. At overseas locations, situated in most foreign countries, are CIA stations, each headed by a station chief and including a number of operations officers and support personnel.

The Directorate of Operations is also responsible for activities of an overt operation in the United States. This is devoted to interviewing cooperating businessmen and other travellers to areas of intelligence interest who volunteer information about current conditions and developments. The directorate also includes a counterintelligence element, a highly specialized mechanism designed to detect and thwart hostile efforts to penetrate the Agency, and to make use of identified hostile intelligence operatives to serve U.S. purposes. There are also a number of other specialized staffs within the Directorate.

In recent years counterintelligence, along with other topical areas such as counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism, has become of increasing concern. As one result there has been established within CIA a new center, the Counterintelligence Center, which incorporates both analytical and operational elements in one unit, physically located together. Headed by a senior operations officer, the center provides analysis of hostile intelligence threats and past espionage cases, and also guidance for Agency personnel going abroad.

Also contributing to strengthening the counterintelligence capability of the overall Intelligence Community have been recent emphasis on increased cooperation among various agencies and a program for rotation of intelligence officers among those agencies involved in counterintelligence.

The Office of Security (OS) develops and maintains CIA's worldwide security program. This is designed to protect Agency personnel, and the facilities, equipment, information and activities of the Agency, against compromise. There are thus programs for personnel, physical, technical, industrial and computer security. An ongoing security education program is also provided. OS also carries out a counterintelligence research program intended to inhibit, prevent or detect any penetration or provocation by foreign intelligence services. The Agency's program of polygraph examinations is also conducted by the Office of Security.

The Office of Training and Education (OTE) researches, designs and conducts an extensive and diverse complex of training for Agency staff and selected others. In a typical year, as many as half of all CIA employees may attend some sort of training provided by OTE. Training in twenty-five different languages forms one part of the instruction. Other courses cover clandestine operations, intelligence analysis, and information sciences. OTE runs the Agency's various training centers, and a Center for the Study of Intelligence in which basic research on the profession is conducted. It also manages publication of *Studies in Intelligence*, the classified CIA quarterly journal.

The Office of Financial Management provides highly specialized operational and administrative support throughout the Agency. In addition to paying CIA personnel, sometimes through rather unusual channels, it conducts worldwide funding activities using a variety of currencies, maintains the Agency accounting system, and audits commercial and industrial contracts.

The Office of Logistics is a highly diverse office. It manages CIA's real estate and construction program. It is responsible for the supply and maintenance of Agency facilities and activities worldwide. It manages the Agency's procurement and contracting system. It moves Agency material around, stores it, issues it, repairs it, turns it in. It runs a modern printing and photographic facility, and CIA's mail and courier system, motor pool, and food services facilities.

The Office of Information Technology is a fairly recent addition to the Directorate for Administration. It was formed by combining the previous Office of Data Processing with elements of the Office of Security and the Office of Communications to take on a challenging

task. That task is figuring out how to merge modern communications systems and modern data processing functions. While most other complex organizations are struggling with the same problem, it is complicated in CIA by the requirements of security, the frequent urgency of communications, the worldwide nature of the operation, and the high volume of data to be dealt with, particularly in periods of crisis.

The Office of Communications (OC) is responsible for providing secure, instantaneous and reliable communications between CIA headquarters and its facilities around the world. The Agency's global telecommunications network supports elements of the diplomatic and intelligence communities, as well as many other federal government agencies. Given the specialized requirements of such a system, the components (including hardware and software) can seldom be acquired ready-made. Thus OC is involved in devising and installing sometimes unique means, and in maintaining the resulting system under operational conditions.

The Office of Personnel recruits and manages the Agency's work force. It should already be apparent, given the range of training and skills represented by the other Agency components we have already discussed, what a big job that is. Not only is the work force large and diverse, it is almost constantly on the move. People rotate from Headquarters to overseas assignments and back again, go on temporary duty for varying periods of time, have rotational assignments out of their components or outside the Agency altogether. And periodically there are what amount to generational changings of the guard as large numbers of people retire and others move up to take their place.

Under these circumstances OP is fully engaged in recruiting the required mix of people (and not just people having the skills that are needed, but ones who can get through the Agency's tough screening process and be cleared for access to classified information). For this purpose it operates ten recruitment offices in major metropolitan areas across the country, and conducts numerous visits to college campuses. Once qualified people have been brought on board, there are the usual tasks of managing their development, assignments, and promotions. OP administers the Agency's comprehensive benefits program, which includes insurance, health benefits, retirement and a number of other special provisions. It also maintains the position management program

for the Agency, determining where the authorized number of people are to be allocated and what the grade and pay level for each job ought to be. OP also maintains a central travel service for personnel from throughout the Agency.

Special Staff Offices

In addition to the elements that make up the four directorates just described, there are a number of special staff offices that come directly under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence. We have already mentioned the Intelligence Community Staff, and the National Intelligence Council. Others include the Offices of the General Counsel, the Inspector General, Congressional Affairs, Public Affairs, and the Comptroller.

The General Counsel is CIA's chief legal officer. He and his staff are responsible for representing the Agency's interests in all matters relating to the application of law and regulations. The General Counsel interprets the law, offers opinions on the legality of contemplated actions, and participates with Department of Justice attorneys in litigation involving the Agency. Legal research, writing opinions, and drafting proposed regulations and legislation form an important part of OGC activity. Attorneys also serve as advisors to CIA boards and panels; represent CIA in negotiations with federal, state and private organizations; and review contracting activity engaged in by Agency components.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provides the means of internal oversight for CIA. It is composed of an Inspection Staff and an Audit Staff. The Inspector General reports directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. The Inspection Staff is made up mainly of experienced senior officers on rotational assignment from throughout the Agency. It conducts periodic in-depth inspections of Agency components and activities wherever they are located worldwide. Special investigations are conducted as necessary to inquire into possible cases of wrongdoing or negligence on the part of Agency personnel. Grievances of Agency employees are also looked into by members of the Inspection Staff. The Audit Staff conducts comprehensive program audits, including financial compliance aspects, of all Agency activities. Reports of both inspections and audits are referred to appropriate line managers for corrective action and, when necessary, with recommendations to the Director.

The Office of Congressional Affairs maintains contact with the oversight committees in the Congress responsible for review of CIA activities and with a number of other committees, including Appropriations and Foreign Affairs. It keeps track of pending legislation, argues the Agency position on provisions which affect it, and arranges for Agency personnel to provide testimony before the committees in accordance with their requests.

The Public Affairs Office is the Agency's channel to the general public. It makes available that information which can be publicly released, to include information on career opportunities, and responds to press inquiries.

The Comptroller is responsible for formulation of the Agency's budget, and for budget execution in accordance with authorized purposes.

There is one additional office which, while not shown separately on the organizational chart, deserves to be mentioned. That is the CIA History Staff. This office is principally engaged in researching and writing classified histories of CIA and its activities, development, and role in government. It also helps to preserve the Agency's historical records and institutional memory, and provides a specialized reference service.

IV.

CIA's Current Function

Much of CIA's function has been described in considering how it was established, how it has developed, and how it is currently organized. The central functions have remained essentially unchanged from the beginning. The Agency exists to provide a central source of independent national foreign intelligence to serve the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other senior policymakers. It is also responsible for carrying out such special activities as may be directed by the President; these include political, psychological and paramilitary covert actions as the occasion demands.

In order to perform these tasks, there are certain other things that have to be done. These include collection of intelligence information, from open as well as clandestine sources. They include maintenance of an extensive capability for the processing, collation, and analysis of what is collected, and for turning it into finished intelligence. Also included is a system for promulgating that finished intelligence, for getting it into the hands of those who need it, and in an effective and timely way.

While all this is going on, there needs to be effective counterintelligence and security to protect the organization against hostile intelligence services. And the full range of support mechanisms needs to be in place to sustain those doing the substantive work.

The central purpose of much of this activity is simply to turn out the best possible intelligence. This results in publication of a number of analytical products. One of the most important of these is the *President's Daily Brief* (or PDB, as it is called inside the Agency). This document provides on a daily basis, and drawing on the entire range of intelligence information from all available sources, the most current and sensitive facts and analysis. As the document's title implies, it goes only to the President and a very small number of his key associates. (The President and other members of the National Security Council also normally receive briefings from the Director of Central Intelligence himself at the beginning of NSC meetings. These concentrate on the topic or topics on the agenda for the day.)

Another daily product, called the *National Intelligence Daily* (or NID), receives somewhat wider circulation within government circles, but is still fairly restricted. It typically contains all but the most sensitive of the material that has been brought to the President's attention, and additional material as well.

Besides these regular daily publications, there are many, many other scheduled and ad hoc intelligence products. These range from surveys of economic matters in particular regions to the full-scale National Intelligence Estimates developed as coordinated Intelligence Community publications (although they remain the Director's estimates, and he has the final say as to their contents and judgments). There are periodic reports on the USSR, international energy developments, terrorism, political instability, and many other similar topics. There are biographic publications on foreign leaders, research reports, and annotated maps.

In times of crisis, special task forces are often formed, bringing together from wherever they may be found within the Agency people who possess the range of knowledge and skills needed to deal with the problem of the moment. Such a task force might be formed in response to events in Angola, Afghanistan, or Cuba, for example. While some ad hoc arrangements of that kind continue for extended periods, usually they are disbanded when the immediate crisis is past. In some cases a "center" (a Cuba Analysis Center, perhaps) may be formed to bring together multidisciplinary talents on a given topic for a more extended time.

During any given year there are also prepared under the DCI's aegis a number of "set piece" analyses, known as National Intelligence Estimates. These typically deal with major intelligence concerns of long standing, such as Soviet strategic forces. Usually a National Intelligence Officer (or a similar senior analyst from some other element of the Community) will take the lead in drafting the document, with participation and input from other elements of the Community. While the finished product is the Director's statement, and he has final approval authority for its contents, it is usual to reflect in the document any dissenting views on the part of participants in the drafting process. That way the policymakers who receive the finished product will be aware of the range of viewpoints existing on the matter at hand.

An Intelligence Example: The Cuban Missile Crisis

The impact of these multiple intelligence documents is often difficult to judge, simply because policies are made over time, just as the intelligence base on which they often rest is built up over time. Sometimes there will be a startling new development first revealed by intelligence sources. But more often the sum of what is known is gradually increased, refined and absorbed over time.

The exception comes usually in moments of crisis. Even then it takes some time, even many years, before enough is known publicly to be able to cite specifics in illustrating the role played by intelligence. For this reason it is not possible to provide definitive examples or the details of CIA's current operations. Instead, for illustrative purposes, we will rely on an historical example.

One of the most famous cases, and one well suited to our purposes, involved what we now call the Cuban Missile Crisis. Taking place in October of 1962, this was one of the key events during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. It was (many believe) the closest approach to war between the superpowers that has yet occurred in the nuclear era. United States intelligence detected activity later determined to be Soviet preparation of sites for the launching of strategic nuclear missiles from Cuba. The President was alerted, the United States took measures to cause the missiles to be withdrawn, the Soviets complied, and the crisis was ended. How this came about, and the contributions to the outcome on the part of many elements of the Intelligence Community, reveals much about the way in which intelligence is collected and collated, how various means of intelligence collection assist and reinforce one another, and how policymakers put the resulting intelligence product to use.

The earliest indications that the Soviets might be putting some type of missiles into Cuba came from Cuban exile debriefings in Miami and the results of an August 1962 U-2 reconnaissance flight over the island.[30] The U-2 photographs showed that a surface-to-air missile site (a defensive type of installation) was under construction. The agent reports, although imprecise, helped to stimulate further U-2 overflights. The early photographs also generated preparation of a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) about the situation in Cuba. The Soviets had begun an extensive operation to provide Russian military equipment to the Cubans earlier in the year. This focused attention on

the island and what else might be going on there, especially if it appeared to be threatening to the United States.

Subsequently an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, examining the U-2 photographs showing construction of SAM (surface-to-air missile) sites, noted that the sites formed a trapezoidal pattern and that this matched the pattern previously observed in certain SAM sites in the Soviet Union that were emplaced to protect missile bases.

On 8 September, a naval reconnaissance aircraft on routine patrol over the Atlantic had obtained a photograph of a Soviet freighter, the *Omsk*, steaming toward Havana. Closed hatches concealed the cargo in the hold, but the ship was riding high in the water, indicating that she was carrying a bulky cargo of large volume and low density.

On 12 September, three days after the *Omsk* had unloaded her unknown cargo under cover of darkness, a Cuban accountant in a small town southwest of Havana observed a large missile being towed through the streets. Fortunately, he was able to estimate its precise length. He immediately packed his things and headed for Florida. Eight days later he reached CIA's refugee debriefing center at Opa Locka, Florida, where he reported what he had seen. The dimensions of the missile he told of matched those of a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile, an offensive nuclear weapon.

Soon thereafter CIA received through the international mails a message in secret writing from another agent in Cuba. He reported that all civilians had been evacuated from the area around San Cristobal.

In September CIA prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate on "The Military Build-Up in Cuba." It concluded that it would not be in keeping with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles in Cuba, and that the Soviets "would not do anything so uncharacteristic, provocative and unrewarding." This judgment turned out to be wrong but, given the absence at that time of definitive evidence that the Soviets were about to embark on an entirely new tack, it was probably the judgment that should have been made.

DCI John McCone disagreed, however. He told President Kennedy that "something new and different was going on" in Cuba, and flatly stated his opinion that the Soviets were on the point of introducing

offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. Then, departing with his new bride for a wedding trip to France, he continued to press his viewpoint in a now famous series of "honeymoon cables."

Meanwhile signals intelligence was to come into play. The U.S.S. *Oxford*, a World War II Liberty ship converted into a platform for electronic eavesdropping, was assigned to patrol the eastern coast of South America. Occasionally she would relieve the U.S.S. *Muller*, a similar ship assigned to stand a Cuban watch.

Further U-2 coverage of Cuba, including the western end of the island, was also ordered. But it was not until 14 October (due to cloud cover that precluded taking photographs) that coverage of that sector was obtained. The U-2, flying at over 60,000 feet, obtained photographs that showed a missile launching pad, some buildings of the type normally associated with ballistic missile bases, and an MRBM on a trailer; other reports indicate that a total of fourteen such missiles in varying states of readiness were observable, lying in a wooded area near San Cristobal.

By late the next afternoon photo interpretation experts had alerted CIA's senior analytical personnel, and missile experts who analyzed the evidence confirmed that the Soviets were making a major advance that would double the number of nuclear warheads it could deliver on targets in the continental United States. The Agency's deputy director for intelligence warned the DCI, the White House, and other senior officials that a crisis was at hand.

Early the following day, Tuesday, 16 October, the U-2 photographs were taken to the White House and shown to President Kennedy; later that same morning they were shown to the National Security Council, which had been called to an emergency meeting. The resolution of the photographs was sufficient to make confident judgments as to the types of missiles being emplaced and their state of development (resolution of three to five feet is necessary for such assessments, and the U-2 photographs probably provided better than three feet resolution). But the President, understandably wanting to be sure beyond any doubt, ordered that low-level reconnaissance flights also be undertaken. Air Force and Navy aircraft undertook that mission, and photographs with three inches resolution were obtained.

Armed with the new U-2 evidence, CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community went into high gear. CIA began publishing a special daily situation report on Cuba, under the codeword *Psalm*. A Special National Intelligence Estimate on "Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba" was published 19 October. By that same date, additional U-2 photographs provided evidence that a total of nine medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were being constructed. The next day, 20 October, yet another Special National Intelligence Estimate, this one entitled "Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action in Cuba," was published. These SNIEs were supplemented with frequent memorandum reports from CIA.

DCI McCone, now back in Washington, met frequently with White House officials and others seeking to deal with the problem. The diplomatic correspondence which President Kennedy sent to Soviet leader Khrushchev was shared with McCone, keeping him fully informed of the course of U.S. diplomacy being served by intelligence.

The pace of U-2 flights was increased until it reached some six or seven a day. Nearly twenty sorties were flown between 14 October, when the first confirmation of offensive missile sites was obtained, and 22 October, when the President addressed the American public and laid the evidence before them. (On 27 October, a U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a surface-to-air missile.) Frequent low-level reconnaissance missions by the Navy and Air Force were also continued, with more than 160 sorties flown through the middle of November. The sense of urgency was increased when it was observed that the Soviet construction crews building the missile sites had speeded up their progress by working through the night under floodlights.

Photo interpreters and other analysts poring over the take from all these flights were helped immeasurably by the fact that they had in their possession actual Russian manuals for the missile systems involved. These had been provided by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet military officer who had volunteered his services as an agent to the West. One of the most important spies ever known, he delivered thousands of pages of Soviet military documents, including specifications of Soviet missiles. These enabled U.S. analysts to make precise judgments as to the stage of construction the new missiles were in, which in turn gave the President an accurate idea of how much

time he had to deal with the crisis before the missiles would be operational.

This time was used in detailed discussion at the highest levels of the government as to what course to take. Invasion of Cuba, air strikes to destroy the missiles, or a naval blockade of the island were the main alternatives considered. While these deliberations went on, the President dispatched diplomats and intelligence officers to show the critical U-2 photographs to friendly foreign leaders so they would understand the basis for whatever actions the United States decided to take. A senior CIA officer was sent to brief West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Bonn. Dean Acheson and another senior CIA officer called on French President Charles de Gaulle, who responded by accepting that it might be necessary for the U.S. to take pre-emptive military action against Cuba. In Brazil, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon showed the U-2 photos to Brazilian President Joao Goulart, who promised to support U.S. initiatives at the United Nations and in the Organization of American States.

The President and his advisors decided to initiate a naval "quarantine" of Cuba, thereby preventing any additional Soviet materials from reaching the island (including the nuclear warheads for the missiles, which were believed not yet in place). The case had been made, convincingly backed by the U-2 photographs (and other evidence), to the American public, friendly foreign governments, and the Soviets themselves. Faced with the prospect of having to deal with the United States Navy a long way from home, sixteen Soviet ships en route to Cuba turned around in mid-Atlantic and went back where they came from. The crisis was at an end.

All-source intelligence had played a major role in bringing about this favorable outcome. CIA, DIA, the military services, and other elements of the Intelligence Community had each contributed and worked cooperatively. Key intelligence data had been derived from the analysis of imagery of the USSR (for patterns of SAM deployments protecting MRBM/IRBM sites); Soviet ship movements monitored at sea; U-2 photographs of Cuba; low-level military aircraft reconnaissance photographs of Cuba; communications intercepts by electronic eavesdropping ships off the Cuban coastline; data on Soviet strategic systems capabilities, and on the specific systems being emplaced in Cuba, from human source intelligence (Colonel Penkovsky and agents in Cuba); and information provided by Cuban refugees.

Moreover, intelligence officials and policymakers had maintained an excellent working relationship throughout the crisis.

After it was all over, DCI McCone took steps to improve CIA's ability to deal with scientific and technical information. These led, in August of the following year, to conversion of the Directorate of Research into a new Directorate of Science & Technology. The satellites were coming into service, and the contributions of technological means to warning, collection and verification were growing apace.

Summary

The Cuban Missile Crisis, while largely a success story from the standpoint of intelligence support to policymakers, also serves to illustrate the inherent difficulties of the intelligence profession. Often judgments must be made on the basis of incomplete, ambiguous or contradictory information. Frequently there is the pressure of time; to be useful, intelligence must be ready when the consumer needs it, and that is not necessarily when the analyst is ready to provide it. The capabilities of adversaries may be determined, but their intentions with regard to using those capabilities are often extremely difficult to discover (in part because people can change their minds, sometimes without warning). It is clear that, as in the Cuban missile crisis, it is desirable to bring as many methods of collection to bear as possible. That gives the intelligence officer the best chance of obtaining corroboration of his tentative judgments (or of correcting them if they prove wrong).

That is what CIA is doing today: focusing on the pressing intelligence requirements of senior policymakers all the assets it can bring to bear, while seeking to develop the capabilities it will need to continue to be effective in the environment of the future.

V

Conclusion

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in a time of crisis. It was intended to give the United States a capability essential to defending its interests, and those of its allies, in an increasingly dangerous world. And it was intended to ensure that never again would America be the victim of surprise attack by those who meant her harm.

CIA is still a young agency in comparison to many elements of our government. Established some four decades ago, it has already experienced many challenges, many crises. Along the way it has had notable successes (some perhaps never to become publicly known) and its share of failures (virtually all well known). It has been charged with carrying out some of the most difficult missions of any government agency. And these have sometimes been made more difficult by the ambivalence, and at times even hostility, of some or all of the public it exists to serve toward the whole business of intelligence.

Certainly the period of the latter half of the 1970s was exceptionally difficult for CIA and the people who make it up. While most of the criticisms were directed at the operational side of the house, the impact was felt throughout the Agency (which has, as one of its strengths, a strong sense of reciprocal loyalty that binds its people together). It is probably fair to say that no public enterprise can continue to perform well over the long haul without general support of the public it serves for what it is engaged in doing.

At this stage in its institutional life CIA seems to have earned back a good measure of the respect and support that were at low ebb a decade ago. It will need all the support it can get, for the tasks it faces in the future promise to be increasingly challenging.

The range of topics on which intelligence is required seems to be constantly multiplying. The countries and regions of genuine importance to the United States are also expanding. The number of consumers, each with a strong sense of his own priority and the intelligence he requires, continues to grow. The pace of change also continues to increase. This compounds the warning problem, and

threatens technological obsolescence as well if wise plans and investments are not made for future intelligence capabilities.

Meanwhile the collection environment threatens to become more hostile. Modern means of encryption make it ever more difficult to obtain usable communications intercepts. The evolution of strategic weaponry seems to be moving in a direction that will make tracking and counting adversary arsenals much harder to accomplish using technical means. And intelligence on some targets currently of high priority, such as terrorism, is just inherently more difficult to obtain than more traditional types of essentially military intelligence.

Against all this CIA can bring to bear, as its most valuable asset, a remarkable group of people. Diverse in their backgrounds, talents and roles to be played, they are notable for their dedication to their work, loyalty to one another, and sense of commitment. CIA is regarded by its people as a special place to work, and this is reflected in turnover rates among its employees that (compared to other enterprises, in and out of government) are notably low. It is also viewed as a good place to work by many who aspire to join its ranks, and the number of applications seems to increase year by year.

There will be problems ahead in maintaining an intelligence agency of the highest quality. One problem, certain to be shared by CIA with every other government department and agency, will be getting adequate funding. High technology collection systems, communications networks, and the like can only grow more expensive. Yet it seems clear that the assets available to government in general are going to be scarcer in the future, and that CIA will have to absorb some share of impending cutbacks. This will make it particularly difficult to balance off maintaining current capabilities; expanding in ways necessary to deal with more intelligence subjects, more consumers, and a more difficult collection environment; and making the investments in research, development and acquisition necessary to provide for future capabilities.

More satisfactory resolution of the problems involved in oversight of intelligence may also be a problem. The House and Senate have established permanent oversight committees for dealing with the Intelligence Community, including CIA. These committees seem to have functioned with varying effectiveness, depending on their membership, and especially their leadership. It would be most helpful

to CIA if both committees could operate in ways that are not politicized, and if they could concentrate a share of their efforts on finding ways to strengthen intelligence capabilities (along with ensuring, as they must, that those capabilities are properly used in accordance with law and regulations). And finally, it is clear by now that there must be a basis of shared trust if the relationship between the Agency and its overseers in going to be one that is good for the state of American intelligence. An absolute essential for the creation of such trust is a record on the part of the oversight committees of trustworthiness in handling and protecting sensitive classified information provided by the intelligence agencies.

Related to this is the question of covert action. It is not apparent at this point that any meaningful covert action, which after all depends for much of its effectiveness on secrecy, can be carried out. Present arrangements, with their potential for compromise of an operation at many levels, are significantly inhibiting to covert action. Nevertheless there continue to be situations in which the availability of a covert action approach (whether political, economic, propagandistic, or paramilitary) could be advantageous to American interests.

It is clear that no major nation can hope to make its way in the world of today without an effective intelligence capability. CIA has, by and large, provided such a capability to the United States in the years since its establishment. There is much to be done if it is to maintain that capability in the years to come. In every substantive realm -- analysis, collection, counterintelligence, covert action -- there are problems to be dealt with and inevitable changes to be adapted to. What seems likely is that the American people will get the kind of intelligence agency they deserve. A CIA that is supported by the public it exists to serve, a public that understands and accepts the need for competent intelligence activities, can be expected to continue to attract able people who care about their work, are good at it, and bring a sense of dedication to it that makes it more a way of life than just a job.

Given that kind of support, we may expect to see the Central Intelligence Agency continue to provide the input senior officials need to make informed decisions on matters of national security and world affairs. Such support is not assured; intelligence is and will continue to be perhaps the most controversial of governmental functions. And intelligence is, and will always be, an inherently risky and problematical

pursuit. But in CIA today, building on the best of its past, there is the potential for the kind of intelligence support the country will need to remain secure and effective in playing its role in world affairs.

VI

Notes

1. Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 37.

2. Letter of 26 July 1777 to Colonel Elias Dayton, as quoted in Dulles, pp. 7-8.

3. On this point see, for example, John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 54-58.

4. There are differing stories about how Donovan got his nickname. One of the most appealing is that he adopted it from another William Donovan, a baseball player who pitched for the Detroit Tigers. This Donovan walked six batters and hit one in the first three innings of the deciding game of the 1909 World Series. See Ranelagh, p. 42n.

5. See Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency*, pp. 52-65. This study, prepared in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, is richly detailed. It has been reprinted commercially by University Publications of America, Frederick, Maryland.

6. For details of Donovan's early life, see Troy, pp. 23-42, and two other extensive studies of his work and influence: Richard Dunlop, *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982) and Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Times Books, 1982).

7. Troy, p. 112.

8. Troy, p. 176.

9. William J. Casey, Opening Ceremonies for Exhibit: "With the Fighting Sixty-Ninth: Donovan in World War I," Central Intelligence Agency, 2 June 1986.

10. Ranelagh, p. 84.

11. Richard Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 35 (paperback edition).

12. Ranelagh, p. 130.

13. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presidential National Security Advisor in the Carter administration, once told a Washington audience that the Russian empire has been swallowing up territory equivalent to one Vermont -- or one Belgium -- a year for the past 250 years. Washington: "National Leadership Forum," Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 June 1986.

14. Ranelagh, p. 100.

15. See Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates* (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), p. 39.

16. Troy, p. 1.

17. Lawrence Houston, as quoted in Ranelagh, p. 194.

18. Leonard Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network* (New York: Dial Press, 1978), pp. 243-244.

19. Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. xvi.

20. See Mosley, pp. 369 and 436.

21. Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 363. For a detailed account of the events surrounding the shooting down of a U-2 over the Soviet Union, see Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).

22. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 148. See also Meyer, p. 58.

23. See William Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 351-353, for a discussion of the Board's functioning and why Colby decided to replace it with the NIOs.

24. Remarks made by President Truman to Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith at the conclusion of Truman's presidency, and quoted by Smith in his own farewell letter to CIA personnel. See Ranelagh, p. 192 and 192n5.

25. Ranelagh, p. 135.

26. For an excellent account of this matter, see Peter Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).

27. For a detailed account of this problem and its implications, see John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength* (New York: Dial Press, 1982).

28. The following discussion draws on the publication *Reference Manual to Career Opportunities in the Central Intelligence Agency* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Personnel, n.d.).

29. Cord Meyer, "The Collectors," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection*, ed. Roy Godson (Washington: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1982), p. 199.

30. This account is based on the following sources: John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 394-395, 399; Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. 101, 161-162, 348; David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 141-143; John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength* (New York: Dial Press, 1982), pp. 127-150, 156, 172; Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 375, 503; James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Amrom Katz, "Technical Collection in the 1980's," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection*, ed. Roy Godson (Washington: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1982), p. 107; Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 89, 159-170, 364-365; and Harry Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), pp. 71 and 106.

VII

Directors of Central Intelligence

Officials Who Served as Director of Central Intelligence and Head of the Central Intelligence Agency

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter	26 Sep 1947- 7 Oct 1950
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith	7 Oct 1950- 9 Feb 1953
Allen Welsh Dulles	26 Feb 1953- 29 Nov 1961
John Alex McCone	29 Nov 1961- 28 Apr 1965
Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr.	28 Apr 1965- 30 Jun 1966
Richard Helms	30 Jun 1966- 2 Feb 1973
James R. Schlesinger	2 Feb 1973- 2 Jul 1973
William E. Colby	4 Sep 1973- 30 Jan 1976
George Bush	30 Jan 1976- 20 Jan 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner	9 Mar 1977- 20 Jan 1981
William J. Casey	28 Jan 1981- 2 Feb 1987
William Webster	26 May 1987- Present

Officials Who Served as Director of Central Intelligence Before Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers	23 Jan 1946- 10 Jun 1946
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg	10 Jun 1946- 1 May 1947

Note: Admiral Hillenkoetter's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence began before establishment of CIA. He continued as DCI, and became head of CIA as well, after the Agency was created.

VIII

Glossary

Agent

Person acting under control of an intelligence or security service to obtain or help obtain information for intelligence purposes.

Analysis

Review of collected information to determine its significance, collate it with other information in hand, and draw conclusions resulting in intelligence judgments.

Case Officer

A staff member of an intelligence service who is responsible for handling agents.

Central Intelligence Group

CIA's immediate predecessor, estabaished by President Truman in January 1946.

Clandestine Operations

Operations carried out secretly.

Clandestine Services

Elements of CIA engaged in clandestine collection, covert action and counterintelligence.

Classified

Restricted to individuals who are cleared for access to the level of information involved (Confidential, Secret or Top Secret) and who have a demonstrated need to know that information.

Collection

Acquisition of information to be processed for intelligence purposes.

Communications Intelligence (COMINT)

Intelligence derived from intercepted communications.

Consumer

Person or organization that receives and makes use of intelligence.

Coordinator of Information (COI)

Early U.S. intelligence organization in World War II, converted into Office of Strategic Services in 1942.

Counterintelligence (CI)

Activities undertaken to thwart efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate or compromise one's own intelligence service and operations.

Cover

Protective guise assumed by an individual or activity to conceal its true identity and affiliation.

Covert Action

Clandestine activity undertaken to influence foreign events, governments or persons; may include political, economic, propaganda or paramilitary actions.

Cryptanalysis

Codebreaking.

Defector

Person who has repudiated his country of citizenship and may possess information of intelligence interest.

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

Principal intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council, coordinator of the Intelligence Community, and head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Dissemination

Distribution of intelligence to consumers via written, oral or electronic means.

Espionage

Clandestine intelligence collection.

Estimate

An intelligence product analyzing and assessing future possible developments and courses of action.

Evaluation

Determination of the probable validity, pertinence, and utility of intelligence information.

Foreign Intelligence

Intelligence concerning areas and activities outside the U.S.

Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT)

Intelligence collected by means of agents or informers.

Imagery

Representations of objects reproduced on film, electro-optical display, radar, or other means.

Information

Unevaluated raw data not yet processed to produce intelligence.

Intelligence

The product of collection, evaluation, and analysis of information.

Intelligence Community

Those U.S. departments and agencies, or elements thereof, engaged in intelligence activity and subject to coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence.

National Foreign Intelligence

Foreign intelligence for use by senior government officials above departmental level.

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

Formal estimate prepared under DCI supervision presenting the Intelligence Community view on a major topic of intelligence concern.

National Security Council (NSC)

The coordinating body, headed by the President, responsible for developing coordinated U.S. policy on military, political, economic and other matters related to national security.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

U.S. intelligence service during World War II, a predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Paramilitary Operations

Operations undertaken by military forces separate from the regular armed forces of a nation.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

Panel of citizens from outside the government appointed by the President to make recommendations aimed at improving U.S. intelligence capabilities.

Processing

Manipulation of collected raw information of intelligence interest to make it usable for analysis.

Product

Finished intelligence disseminated to consumers.

Reconnaissance

Observation mission undertaken to acquire by various means information about a target of intelligence interests.

Requirement

Statement by a consumer of an intelligence need to be filled.

Security

Measures taken to protect sensitive activities, data, and personnel against compormise.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Intelligence derived from the interception, processing and analysis of communications, electronic emissions, or telemetry.

Strategic Intelligence

Intelligence supporting national and international level forumulation of policy, plans and strategy.

Target

Person, place or thing against which intelligence operations are directed.

Telemetry

Electronic signals given off by, for example, missiles or rockets during operational testing.

IX

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