Section I - INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS

CIA Director, National Security Adviser to Meet with Officials in Pakistan. President Obama's national security adviser, James L. Jones, and CIA Director Leon Panetta were set to travel to Pakistan on Monday night for meetings with top government, military and intelligence officials on progress in the Times Square car bomb investigation and concerns about future terrorist attacks.

Officials say the administration has been pleased so far with Pakistani cooperation in the investigation, which has focused on any role insurgent groups there might have played in helping to train and otherwise assist bombing suspect Faisal Shahzad.

But officials said that Jones and Panetta intend to reiterate to the Pakistanis the importance that the administration places on more aggressive military action against groups allied with al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA. Shahzad, a Pakistani American, has said he traveled to the region to train with elements of the Pakistani Taliban, officials say.

The bombing attempt has already given rise to questions from Congress about Pakistan's zeal in confronting radical groups; a successful attack in the United States would severely undermine a bilateral relationship that is a crucial part of the administration's Afghanistan war strategy.

"It's important they hear our latest thinking on the danger to all of us from the tribal areas. That's very, very real," said a U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity about the ongoing investigation and the intelligence relationship with Pakistan.

Shahzad was arrested May 3, two days after the bombing attempt; he waived a court appearance and is said to be cooperating with law enforcement officials. Last week, two men in Boston and a third in Maine were arrested in connection with the case and are being held on immigration charges.

Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. has said that, based on the questioning of Shahzad and other information obtained in Pakistan, the administration thinks that the attempt was facilitated and directed by the Pakistani Taliban. The organization, known in Pakistan by the acronym TTP, is one of several groups based in the FATA - including al-Qaeda and portions of the Afghan Taliban - that the administration thinks increasingly share objectives and coordinate activities.

Until recently, the Pakistani Taliban was believed to be interested exclusively in domestic targets, and it is responsible for numerous attacks inside Pakistan. The Pakistani military has waged a fierce offensive against the group over the past year, including last fall in South Waziristan, the FATA region that was its base of operations.

But many Pakistani Taliban fighters have dispersed to other areas of the FATA, including North Waziristan, where the administration would like Pakistan to expand its operations against the Afghan Taliban network of Jalaluddin Haqqani and al-Qaeda. Although the Pakistanis have begun targeted operations there, they have said their military forces are stretched too thin for an all-out offensive.

"In light of the failed Times Square terrorist attack and other terrorist attacks that trace to the border region, we believe that it is time to redouble our efforts with our allies in Pakistan to close this safe haven and create an environment where we and the Pakistani people can lead safe and productive lives," National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer said in a statement.

Jones and Panetta are scheduled to meet Wednesday with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari; Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani; the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani; and Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of Pakistan's main spy agency. [DeYoung/WashingtonPost/17May2010] 

'Reiss Worked for French Spy Agency.' French citizen Clotilde Reiss, who was arrested in Iran in 2009, worked for a French intelligence agency, a former French spy says.

The French teacher was arrested on charges of taking part in a Western plot against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Reiss worked "very well" for the French spy agency, the British daily The Daily Telegraph quoted Pierre Siramy, a former senior French spy, as saying on Monday.

Siramy, who used to work for the French external intelligence service DGSE, reportedly said she was not a spy "in the classic sense of the word", but worked "� l'anglaise" (in the English style), meaning she "bravely" handed over information on an "amicable" basis for the good of the country.

"She was our representative's contact," he added.

In this sense, Reiss provided reports on domestic politics in the run-up to the June 2009 presidential election in Iran and on a nuclear site under construction next to the central town of Isfahan, where she was a university lecturer, the British paper reported.

"She deserves to be recognized as someone who worked very well (for France)," the former French intelligence agent stated.

Siramy's remarks have stirred up a controversy in the French intelligence community, which has denied his allegations.

Among French papers reporting on Reiss's release, Le Monde was the only one to raise the question as to whether she worked for the French intelligence service.

According to Le Monde, Reiss passed specific intelligence information to a French intelligence agent in Tehran for the past three years.

While receiving training in the French Atomic Energy Commissary (CEA), Reiss wrote a report on Iran's nuclear policy.

Reiss was arrested at Tehran's Imam Khomeini airport last year and released on May 16, 2010.

On July 8, 2009, she appeared in a court hearing where she admitted that she had reported to the French Embassy and to about 50 friends and members of her family about Iran's nuclear program, as well as the country's post-election developments, the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported. [PressTV/19May2010] 

Al-Qaeda Operative Cannot Be Deported, Court Rules. The leader of a terrorist cell planning an attack on Easter shoppers in Manchester cannot be deported back to Pakistan in case he is tortured, a tribunal has ruled.

Police did not find any explosives when they swooped on the cell in April last year, but MI5 has maintained that the men, all students from Pakistan, were "members of a UK based network linked to al-Qaeda involved in attack planning."

The Special Immigration and Appeals Commission said it was satisfied Abid Naseer, the alleged ring-leader, was behind an "imminent" al-Qaeda backed plot but said he risked being tortured if he was returned to Pakistan.

The arrests had to be brought forward by 24 hours after Assistant Chief Constable Bob Quick, then Britain's most senior counter-terrorism officer, was photographed entering Downing Street with plans for the raids under his arm.

The men were never charged but the Home Office attempted to deport Naseer and nine others on national security grounds.

Eight of the ten men, who had all arrived in Britain on student visas, chose to return to Pakistan. The two remaining men, including Naseer, have now won their attempt to remain in Britain.

The Home Office said it was not planning to appeal but it is thought the men are likely to be placed under control orders on their release from prison at huge expense to the public purse.

Theresa May, the Home Secretary, said: "We are disappointed that the court has ruled that Abid Naseer and Ahmad Faraz Khan should not be deported to Pakistan, which we were seeking on national security grounds.

"As the court agreed, they are a security risk to the UK. We are now taking all possible measures to ensure they do not engage in terrorist activity."

The Special Immigration and Appeals Commission said it was "satisfied that Naseer was an al-Qaeda operative who posed and still poses a serious threat to the national security of the United Kingdom and that....it is conducive to the public good that he should be deported."

Nevertheless, it said Pakistan had a "long and well-documented history of disappearances, illegal detention and of the torture and ill-treatment of those detained, usually to produce information, a confession or compliance."

The panel noted that "No open assurances were given by the Pakistani authorities" and as a result they could not find there was a "sufficient safeguard against prohibited ill-treatment of any of the appellants."

SIAC said it had heard a "substantial volume of closed material" and that it was "satisfied to the criminal standard" that Naseer was in email contact with an "al-Qaeda associate" in Pakistan.

The commission panel, headed by a High Court Judge, Mr. Justice Mitting, said it believed the emails, which referred to girls and cars, was actually code for "different ingredients of explosives, their properties and availability."

Naseer's explanation, that he was actually writing about girlfriends, was "utterly implausible" they said.

The panel said the closed material they had considered included "pointers to an imminent attack" and that Naseer had stated his intention to do so between April 15 and 20, although it was unclear whether he would have been able to pull it off.

One of the suspects, Tariq ur-Rehman, was found with a large number of photographs of the exits from the Arndale Centre in Manchester.

But the panel said Naseer, who was suspected of belonging to al-Qaeda. would therefore be "at risk" at the hands of Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence directorate (ISI).

It add that although the country's supreme court had "displayed a genuine interest in those who have been made to disappear" it had "not held a single military official accountable for abuses."

Despite being assessed as a risk to national security, Naseer and his associate Ahmad Faraz Khan won their appeals against deportation on the grounds it was unsafe to return them to Pakistan.

Two other men, Tariq ur-Rehman and Abdul Wahab Khan, lost their appeals on the grounds they had already returned to Pakistan.

A fifth man, Shoiab Khan, was "not a knowing party" to the plans and should not be excluded from returning to the United Kingdom, the panel said. [Garaham/Telegraph/19May2010]

Silmido Agents' Families Get $217,000. The Seoul Central District Court ruled in favor of family members of the espionage agents killed in the Silmido uprising, and ordered the government to pay them a total of 253 million won ($217,000) in compensation.

"The Silmido agents were not informed of the level of danger involved with their training, and the harshness of the training violated their basic human rights," the court said in its ruling.

The court also acknowledged the emotional pain the government caused by not officially disclosing the agents' deaths to family members until 2006.

Twenty-one family members of the deceased Silmido agents sued the government last year, seeking 670 million won in compensation.

The case dates back to the 1960s, when the South Korean government started to implement tighter controls against North Korea. As part of the effort, the government established special espionage units, which included Unit 684 in Silmido, an uninhibited island in the Yellow Sea.

Unit 684 was comprised of convicted criminals and social outcasts, and was formed to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Il Sung after the North's assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee in 1968.

Unit 684's mission was terminated when the two Koreas began to move toward reunification. Seven of the agents had already died during their training, and the South Korean government planned to kill the surviving members to cover up the project. On Aug. 23, 1971, the 24 remaining agents mutinied, killing their trainers in Silmido and hijacking a bus headed to Seoul. After they were stopped by Army roadblocks, most of the agents were either killed or committed suicide with hand grenades. The four agents who survived the confrontation were executed on March 10, 1972.

The government concealed the incident until the early 1990s, and did not release its official report until 2006. In 2003, the local film "Silmido," based on the events surrounding Unit 684, brought attention to the incident. [Cho/JoongangDaily/20May2010] 

Vladimir Putin Laments Soviet Union Ignoring His Spy Intelligence. In his most candid comments on the subject to date, the Russian prime minister said that at least part of his job as a KGB agent in East Germany involved acquiring sensitive technological and industrial secrets from the West.

But he told a meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences that he grew increasingly frustrated as the know-how he passed back to the Soviet Union to help it make good the yawning technological gap with the West went unused.

"When I was serving in a different department (the KGB) in my past life I remember very well the moment at the end of the 1980s when our work and the work of your foreign colleagues obtained through special means was not integrated into the economy of the Soviet Union," he told the scientists and academics.

Mr. Putin, who worked as a KGB spy in Dresden from 1985-1990, said he could not understand why Soviet scientists did not use the intelligence he and his colleagues were "acquiring" from the West.

"We were working really hard on this area and again and again getting what was needed but it was no use. We used to ask: 'Where is it? Where is it being used in our economy?' Nowhere. It was not possible to harness it."

Little is known about Mr. Putin's time in East Germany in the 1980s except that another part of his job was to recruit spies who had access and close links to West Germany.

But his disclosure that he engaged in industrial espionage in a last ditch and fruitless attempt to breathe life into the dying Soviet economy confirms claims made by former East German officials and spies that part of his job was to appropriate Western computer technology for the USSR.

Dresden, the German city where he was based, was a good place for this since East Germany's biggest computer manufacturer, Robotron, had its headquarters there and based its products on Western models. Former company officials have said the firm had its own external industrial espionage unit spying on Western counterparts, while Dresden itself hosted many trade fairs attended by foreign business people. [Osborn/Telegraph/20May2010] 

Obama Starts Deploying Interrogation Teams. The Obama administration has started using special law enforcement and intelligence teams to interrogate suspected militants in the United States and abroad, including the Pakistani-American arrested in the Times Square bombing plot, a top official said.

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced the formation of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) in August and gave the reins to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, replacing the Central Intelligence Agency that did have the lead role in intelligence interrogations.

The program calls for the deployment of Mobile Interrogation Teams, made up of specialists from across the law enforcement and intelligence community, to question important detainees, whether they are in U.S. custody or in the custody of a foreign government.

"There have been a number of deployments of these Mobile Interrogation Teams to include for the Faisal Shahzad case," said John Brennan, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism.

Shahzad, a U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, is charged with trying to set off a crude car bomb in New York's crowded Times Square on May 1. Prosecutors say he has provided valuable intelligence to investigators, who believe he was helped by the Pakistani Taliban movement.

Brennan declined to say whether the mobile teams have also been used in interrogations of the Afghan Taliban's No. 2 leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was captured in the Pakistani city of Karachi in January in a joint operation by the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency.

The HIG is the product of executive orders issued by President Barack Obama shortly after he took office in January 2009. The orders banned harsh interrogation methods put in place by his predecessor, President George W. Bush, and moved to close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp in Cuba along with secret CIA detention facilities.

Republicans in Congress have sharply criticized the Obama administration's decision to send suspected militants to criminal courts rather than military tribunals, arguing that important intelligence is lost by cutting short interrogations.

Officials said the CIA plays a major part in the HIG's activities.

In the United States, the CIA generally provides "subject matter experts with deep knowledge of the individual detainee" or of "the terrorist network in which he operates - its leaders, its methods, the countries from which he comes or in which he operates."

Overseas, the CIA's main role is to gain access to the detainee for questioning.

While there is no legal prohibition against CIA personnel participating in questioning a detainee in the United States, an administration official said "our practice so far and historically has been to leave the questioning to the FBI interrogators and for the CIA to provide subject matter experts outside the room, if you will."

"The purpose ... is to ensure that we optimize intelligence collection," an Obama administration official said. [Entous/Reuters/19May2010] 

Saudi King Slams Intelligence Leak. The King of Saudi Arabia has strongly criticized the country's intelligence officials for disclosing a secret document, which shows Riyadh has links with terrorist activities carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq.

King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz ordered a special committee to investigate the intelligence leak and inform him about those liable in the case.

Some 37 members of Saudi's intelligence service, accused of being behind the leakage of the confidential document, were also reported to have been arrested.

The condemnation by the Saudi monarch comes as the Iraqi news agency disclosed the amount of money transferred by Saudi government officials to al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Saudi officials are also reported to send explosives and weapons to the terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, Secretary General of the Saudi National Security Council Prince Bandar Bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz is said to be the main guilty behind the case.

The report came as earlier last week, Saudi army officer Abdullah al-Qahtani was arrested in Iraq over charges of planning a terrorist attack during the upcoming FIFA World Cup in South Africa.

The Saudi national entered Iraq in 2004 and was involved in militant operations carried out by al-Qaeda. [PressTV/19May2010] 

James R. Clapper Jr. Is the Leading Candidate for National Intelligence Position. In the summer of 2004, as Congress was debating the creation of a spymaster-in-chief, James R. Clapper Jr., then head of a major military intelligence agency, argued forcefully at a lunch with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that the Pentagon's four largest intelligence agencies ought to report to the new office.

Rumsfeld, according to former administration officials familiar with the incident, threw down his fork. He wanted to know how Clapper and Michael V. Hayden, then director of the National Security Agency, could support such an idea.

Rumsfeld's anger reflects the challenges entailed in centralizing authority over the intelligence community, which is divided among several large bureaucracies with leaders intent on keeping their authority intact.

Three years after the lunch in Rumsfeld's office, Clapper, a lanky retired Air Force general with a shaved head and silvery goatee, was installed as undersecretary of defense for intelligence, with control over the agencies that he had argued to Rumsfeld ought to be under the new director of national intelligence, or DNI.

Clapper, who has spent more than 45 years in intelligence work, is the leading candidate to become the next DNI.

The extent of the authorities the next occupant of the post will wield is a significant issue for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will hold the confirmation hearing. "The committee has generally taken the position that the DNI needs to be a strong position, filled with a strong person," a congressional aide said.

Some question whether Clapper would want a job that is widely regarded as lacking sufficient authority to coordinate 16 intelligence agencies, ranging from the CIA and NSA to the FBI and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Clapper's former agency. DNI Dennis C. Blair, who announced Thursday that he was resigning, struggled to fully assume the role of the president's chief intelligence adviser.

Hayden said that if Clapper, 69, were the nominee, he would urge him to secure President Obama's commitment that he is the go-to guy on intelligence. "He has got to believe that the president believes he is senior intelligence adviser," Hayden said.

Sen. Christopher S. Bond (Mo.), the intelligence committee's ranking Republican, said he does not think Clapper is "the right one" for the job. "I believe you need somebody who will work more with the nonmilitary intelligence agencies," he said.

According to former intelligence officials, Clapper worked well with Hayden, who was CIA director from 2006 to 2009, and Mike McConnell, who was DNI in the last two years of the George W. Bush administration. Clapper agreed to report to the DNI as well as to the defense secretary, Robert M. Gates.

Clapper has been a calming presence during his three-year tenure as undersecretary of defense, following the turbulence of Rumsfeld's tenure. Rumsfeld drew the ire of many in the intelligence community by pushing the Pentagon to expand its intelligence collection efforts. By contrast, Clapper and Gates have worked hard to build a more collegial relationship with the rest of the intelligence establishment.

"He's very conventional in his approach to intelligence systems," said a senior military official who has worked with Clapper. "He takes a very traditional intelligence perspective."

Some wonder whether Clapper has the right instincts for the job. "He isn't a big fan of organizational politics," said one former colleague. "He's not a knife fighter, and that's probably what they'd need from a DNI perspective."

Early on in his current position, he dismantled an anti-terrorism database that civil liberties advocates had criticized for gathering information about antiwar groups and activists. He also pushed to end a controversial intelligence program to gather information on terrorist groups in the United States.

Clapper led efforts championed by Gates to increase the number of unmanned surveillance planes in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years and has more than tripled since 2007 the number of drones flying at any one time.

Even military officials who butted heads with Clapper over weapons programs said that he was willing to listen. "He's an amiable individual," one military officer said. "He's someone you can deal with and has brought a lot of stability to the position." [Nakashima&Jaffe/WashingtonPost/21May2010] 

Female North Korean Spy Caught. The National Intelligence Service and prosecutors said Sunday that they had a female North Korean spy in custody who obtained "confidential" information about companies and the National Police Agency from people she met through Internet chat rooms.

They said the 36-year-old woman, identified as Kim Soon-nyeo, had been arrested on espionage charges, as had Oh Byung-doo, a 52-year-old former executive of the Seoul Metro subway service, who supported her financially.

The announcement comes at a time when inter-Korean relations are at their worst in years after the Seoul government confirmed last week that North Korea was behind the sinking of a South Korean warship in the West Sea on March 26, killing 46 sailors. President Lee Myung-bak has vowed to take "resolute countermeasures" against the North in cooperation with the international community.

Also, it was made public with just 11 days remaining before the June 2 elections.

According to prosecutors, Kim, disguised as a North Korean defector, crossed the border into China in February 2006 and worked as an accountant at a hotel in Zhangjiajie, Hunan Province. Running a cosmetics shop there independently, she lured some South Koreans into relationships through Internet chat rooms and obtained information on South Korea from them.

Alongside the former Seoul Metro executive, other South Koreans involved included a 29-year-old college student, and two travel agency workers.

The spy collected "confidential" information about the subway system from Oh, information about local universities from the student, and a list of names of high-ranking police and public officials from the travel agents.

Oh maintained extramarital relations with the spy since his first encounter with her in China in May 2006, and transferred nearly 300 million won ($252,000) to "help" her cosmetics business. In June 2007, he became aware that she was a North Korean spy, but continued the relationship.

"What Oh handed over to the spy included contact information of emergency situation responses and other not-so-important internal data," Kim Jung-hwan, a Seoul Metro spokesman, told The Korea Times, dismissing concerns that it could be used in possible acts of terrorism here by the North. Kim retired from his post in 2008.

Kim attempted to enter South Korea as a "defector" in September last year, but her identity was discovered during questioning by security officials, the prosecution said.

In April, two North Korean spies were caught attempting to enter the country, also claiming to be defectors. They were seeking to assassinate Hwang Jang-yup, the highest-ranking North Korean defector here, Seoul's spy agency said. [Park/KoreaTimes/20May2010] 

Iran Seeks Prisoner Swap Involving Three US Hikers. Iran's intelligence minister has called on Washington to propose a prisoner swap to secure the release of three US citizens arrested last July near the Iraq border.

Heydar Moslehi said he had no doubt they were spies.

Shane Bauer, 27, Sarah Shourd, 31, and Josh Fattal, 27, have been charged with espionage.

Their families said they were hiking and strayed over the border accidentally.

Tehran allowed the mothers of the three detainees to meet them last week, but ignored repeated pleas for their release.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called for the three to be freed.

The case has further strained relations between Washington and Tehran, which are at loggerheads over Iran's nuclear program.

"The status of these three Americans as spies is clear and explicit. There has been no discussion concerning a swap," Mr. Moslehi said in comments reported by the semi-official Fars news agency.

"Our expectation is that the Americans, with their claim on human rights issues, should initiate an action so that we can decide on whether or not there would be one."

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggested in a US TV interview last September that the Americans' release might be linked to the freeing of Iranian diplomats he said were being held by US forces in Iraq.

And the Iranians accuse the US Central Intelligence Agency of abducting one of their nuclear scientists while he was on pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia last year.

US state department spokesman PJ Crowley said last Thursday that Washington was not contemplating any kind of a prisoner swap.

"But if Iran has questions about any of its citizens and whether we have any information as to their whereabouts, we would be more than happy to receive that diplomatic note and respond to it," he said.

He described the three Americans as innocent tourists, adding: "It is time for Iran to do the right thing by releasing these three young Americans and allowing them to go home and be reunited with their families." [BBC/24May2010]

Intel Workers' Pay System Unfair, Study Says. A soon-to-be-released report on the intelligence community's stalled pay-for-performance system is likely to conclude that its implementation was flawed, in part because it was rushed and gave better ratings and raises to higher-ranking employees.

For the full story, follow the link at right: Losey/FederalTimes/23May2010 

Australia To Expel Israeli Diplomat. Relations with Israel are at a low point after Canberra ordered the expulsion of a Mossad agent in response to a wide-ranging probe that found the Jewish state was involved in the forging of Australian passports.

Foreign Minister Stephen Smith admitted it was with "sorrow" Australia took such action against a long-term friend but stressed the passport fraud - part of a hit against a Hamas leader in January - was intolerable.

"This is not what we expect from a nation with whom we have had such a close, friendly and supportive relationship," he told parliament.

The investigation, involving federal police and the nation's key spy agencies, was initiated in March after it emerged Australian passports were used in the killing of senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai in January.

Israel on Monday described the action as regrettable, suggesting it failed to recognize the deep and enduring ties between the two countries.

Australia has long been one of Israel's closest friends and the relationship dates back to creation of a separate Jewish state in the late 1940s.

"We feel it is not reflective of the extensive relationship between the two nations," a spokesman for the Israeli embassy in Canberra said.

Deputy Liberal leader Julie Bishop, the coalition's foreign affairs spokeswoman, attacked the government for over-reacting, a sentiment echoed by former foreign minister Alexander Downer.

And she accused the government of taking the decision to try to garner Arab votes in Australia's bid for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council.

"I am concerned this is a purely political decision," Ms Bishop told Sky News.

"There is no absolute proof that the Israeli government did it."

The expulsion may precipitate some uncomfortable conversations between Canberra and Washington when United States President Barack Obama visits Australia later this year.

The US - which received an early alert of Canberra's decision - finds itself in the difficult position of being an ally of Australia, as well as Israel's closest friend.

But Australia is not the only country to take stern action in response to the use of its passports in the murder plot.

Britain - involved in the passport scandal with France, Germany and Ireland - expelled a diplomat in March.

The government is refusing to disclose details of the expelled diplomat but the online edition of the Haaretz newspaper is reporting the official is the Mossad representative for the Israeli embassy in Canberra.

Australia admits the relationship will take time to repair following this episode.

Mr. Smith acknowledged it could diminish co-operation, particularly in areas of intelligence and security.

"Clearly as a result of today's events there will be something of a cooling-off period so far as relevant agencies are concerned," he said.

He refused to put a timetable on the normalization of relations.

"We would want very much for those cooperative relationships to proceed but there does require a rebuilding of trust and confidence."

He stressed, however, Canberra took no pleasure from the turn of events.

"This decision is made much more in sorrow than in anger," he said.

It has sparked an outcry from the Israeli community in Australia, generally a strong supporter of the Australian Labor Party.

And it could create headaches for the government in tight inner urban seats with big Jewish communities.

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry warned little good would come from taking punitive action against Israel, while the Australia-Israel and Jewish Affairs Council described the move as unhelpful. [O�Malley/SMHAustralia/23May2010] 

Move to Enhance Spy Chief's Clout. President Barack Obama's decision to fire his national intelligence director has accelerated a review of whether the post is invested with enough clout to carry out its mission effectively.

Lawmakers already are weighing whether new legislation would make the post more powerful, while former intelligence officials said the president should clarify the director's role.

The White House on Friday said it soon planned to name a successor to Dennis Blair, whose forced resignation was disclosed Thursday. The leading candidate is James Clapper, the top defense intelligence official, though it isn't clear whether he would fill the job permanently, officials familiar with the matter said.

White House spokesman Robert Gibbs declined to comment on specific candidates.

Mr. Clapper's spokeswoman, Lt. Col. Ren� White, said he "is just as surprised to hear about this as everyone else." She said Mr. Clapper would "support the president in whatever way the president wants."

The position of director of national intelligence was created in 2004 in response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks and intelligence failures related to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The legislation generated fierce debate over how far the director's powers would extend, and the resulting compromise didn't specify budget and personnel authority.

Critics said the post was designed to fail because the director was made responsible for ensuring intelligence is properly collected and analyzed, yet the 16 spy agencies nominally under the office's purview can't be forced to take specific actions.

Lawmakers now are considering whether to revise the law to give the director more heft.

Sen. Joseph Lieberman, an author of the bill and chairman of the Senate homeland-security committee, said in an interview Friday that he planned to examine the director's powers to "see whether we want to try, based on this experience, to strengthen the authority of the office for the benefit of our security."

Mr. Lieberman, a Connecticut independent, said he would like to explore a recommendation by Mr. Blair's predecessor, Mike McConnell. Last month, Mr. McConnell called for creating a full-fledged Department of Intelligence - in place of a sole office like Mr. Blair's - whose chief would have a fixed term of at least five years.

Mr. Lieberman said he was inclined to support giving an intelligence chief a five-year stint.

Mr. Blair's successor would be the fourth person to hold the post in about five years.

The president's decision had been building for awhile, one U.S. official said, and was influenced by a report two weeks ago by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. The report was "sharply critical" of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's performance over the past 15 months, concluding it was overstaffed and dysfunctional, this official said.

White House frustrations with Mr. Blair weren't so much about specific incidents such as intelligence failures before the attempted Christmas Day airliner bombing in Detroit, but more day-to-day issues, such as the way the director presented information, this official said. Mr. Blair had also clashed repeatedly with White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan.

Current and former intelligence officials said Mr. Blair's exit was an indication that the White House had minimized the role of the intelligence director.

The post was a cabinet-rank position in the Bush administration, but Mr. Blair's staff was surprised to learn the position had lost that ranking only when they saw a document recently issued by the White House. An administration official said that decision had been made when Mr. Obama took office.

Some intelligence officials said the White House didn't give Mr. Blair the backing he needed to exert control over the 16 reporting agencies.

"The president's real intelligence adviser was John Brennan," said Michael Hayden, a former Central Intelligence Agency director and deputy director of national intelligence. Mr. Brennan has taken on key duties such as reviewing lapses that opened the door to the Christmas Day incident.

Former 9/11 Commission co-chairmen Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton said in interviews Friday that the only way to fix the structure, short of a new law, was for Mr. Obama to make clear that the intelligence director is in charge of all the intelligence agencies. "The burden clearly is on the president to clarify who is in charge of the intelligence community," said Mr. Hamilton, who serves on the President's Intelligence Advisory Board.

A White House official disputed the notion that the director's role had been diminished, noting that Mr. Blair presented the president's daily intelligence briefing and played a lead role in other gatherings. The official said Mr. Blair "came in at a time when there was a lot of uncertainty with the position, and he did a lot of great work trying to break down barriers and improve intelligence sharing."

To make the position workable, Mr. Hamilton said, the director needs control of all intelligence spending but must use the power judiciously. Mr. Blair battled Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta over the right to appoint the senior intelligence officers in key posts.

Mark Lowenthal, a former senior intelligence official, said the directors of national intelligence to date are "three of the smartest men I ever had to work with or for." If none have been able to make it work, he said, "you have to begin to ask yourself why the job doesn't function well."

On Friday, Mr. Blair spoke to a group of retired intelligence officers and later attended the ceremony to open the Pentagon's new Cyber Command and award a fourth star to Gen. Keith Alexander, who will head the command. He didn't deliver the president's daily intelligence briefing, but it isn't uncommon for others to do the briefing, his spokesman Arthur House said. [Gorman/WallStreetJournal/22May2010] 

Section II - CONTEXT & PRECEDENCE

NATO and the Spy from Estonia. When former Estonian senior defense official Herman Simm was convicted in 2009 of sharing NATO secrets with Russia, it wasn't immediately known how much harm he'd done. But according to a classified NATO report, the consequences of his espionage, which spanned 12 years, were far-reaching indeed, earning Simm the dubious distinction of being the "most damaging [spy] in alliance history."

The admission, however bold, shouldn't come as much of a surprise. As head of the security department of Estonia's Ministry of Defense until 2006, Simm, who was sentenced to 12� years in jail after pleading guilty to being a Russian informant, had access to classified NATO and European Union information. According to the report, Simm "compromised a wide range of NATO intelligence reports and analyses"; the thousands of documents he is believed to have leaked included details of alliance defense policies, outlining "installation, maintenance, procurement and the use of cryptographic systems."

The scandal exposes just how vulnerable NATO has become in the wake of its post-Cold War expansion to include states formerly behind the Iron Curtain. Before Estonia broke away from the Soviet Union in 1991, Simm was, secretly, a KGB colonel who had earned 44 awards and three medals for his exemplary service. Though at the time he presented himself as a champion of independence, he never abandoned his allegiance to Russia. In 1995, after being dismissed from his post as head of the national police amid charges of corruption, he says he was recruited by a Russian intelligence officer while on a trip to Tunisia. (He claims the officer threatened to expose his KGB past if he didn't co-operate.) He began working in Estonia's defense ministry after his return.

For reasons that are still unknown, Western counterespionage officials put Simm under surveillance in 2008, which ultimately led to his arrest. But, by then, the damage, which is described as significant and indefinite, had been done. [Macleans/20May2010]

The History Of NSA Computers. Well, Up Until 1964 At Least. Part I. Recently a formerly classified document was declassified describing how the NSA used computers to crack codes.

Before the NSA, its predecessors used punch card systems for about 15 years, beginning in 1935. There were 750 such systems in use by the end of World War II. Several types of punched-card devices were used: tabulators, collators, sorters, reproducers, and the keypunch. As we know now, the use of punched-card equipment would not last for ever. Finally, in December of 1950, the first real computer arrived.

ATLAS I's beginning can be traced back to a series of lectures in 1946 at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering on electronic computing. The Navy had a young mathematician named LCDR James T. Pendergrass who attended. The lectures inspired Pendergrass to suggest that the Navy should have a computer. The computer was constructed by a contractor for the Navy at a cost of $950,000, it had 2700 tubes and used parallel circuitry.

Originally the computer was intended to have 36-bit words, but the design eventually used was 24-bit words. These words would be stored on a magnetic drum that would hold 16,384 of them. The drum had a fascinating feature called an "interlace" where it allowed memory to be accessed by a plugboard system that gave programmers the freedom to design programs that could jump one step forward or backward in memory using pre assigned addressing via the plugboard. Access time was as low as 32 microseconds using this system. Unfortunately, the average access time was 8,500 microseconds and in more proving situations, could jump as high as 17,000 on occasion. Later on, the interlace was upgraded to support jumping in steps larger than one in memory.

ATLAS I was not the only computer available to the Navy at the time. ABEL, was created to serve as a training machine for new programmers. Although logically identical to ATLAS I, ABEL was several hundred times slower and only supported 2,047 words on its drum. After presentation to the Albert Einstein High School in 1963, ABEL was permanently dismantled.

Three years after ATLAS I's initial arrival, a second computer, identical to ATLAS I arrived in May of 1953. Both machines were upgraded in 1956 with high-speed core storage units of 4,096 word capacity. Before the high-speed core memory was installed, programmers used the interlace function excessively. Now they could store constants in the high-speed memory for quick access. Only three more years later, both machines were removed from operation. One was salvaged for parts and the other was shipped to a NATO Anti-Submarine Research Center in Italy.

If ATLAS I had a design flaw it was its lack of magnetic tape storage. When the machines were dismantled, this was likely the reason. Other than that the machines were operational above 90% of the time. The lack of tape storage restricted their used to problems with small volumes of data. [This article is the first in a series of articles on NSA computers up until 1964.]

For more in depth reading: http://www.governmentattic.org/3docs/NSA-HGPEDC_1964.pdf. [Trent/SecurityProNews/20May2010]

Great Writers of Spy Fiction Have Often Been Spies Themselves. I just finished a fascinating book about a World War II spy plot. It's the story of fake intelligence planted on a dead Welshman with a bogus identity - and it's all true.

I picked up "Operation Mincemeat" (Harmony) because it's by Ben Macintyre, who wrote "Agent Zigzag," the spellbinding chronicle of a charming British criminal/double agent in World War II (also all true). "Mincemeat" features some of the same characters, eccentric British intelligence operatives with exceedingly vivid imaginations.

This band of soldiers, sailors, coroners and aristocrats hatched a plan to float a dead body onto the Spanish coast, supposedly a plane crash victim, actually left to drift by a U-boat-dodging British submarine. Its pockets were stuffed with the detritus of an imaginary life (bar tabs, theater tickets, love letters). Its briefcase was filled with fake intelligence documents alleging that the Allies would mount their main invasion somewhere other than Sicily. The Germans bit. They reinforced other fronts, the Allies invaded Sicily, and the rest is history (this story was also the basis of the 1953 book and 1956 movie "The Man Who Never Was," but Macintyre has substantially enhanced the story).

But I digress; here is a point Macintyre makes. He writes of spies in the "Mincemeat" gang and others: "The greatest writers of spy fiction have, in almost every case, worked intelligence before turning to writing:" Here's a partial list:

- Graham Greene, a wartime intelligence officer in West Africa who based his novel "Our Man in Havana" on a real spy code-named Garbo.

- John Buchan, author of the World War I-based spy thriller, "The Thirty-Nine Steps."

- Ian Fleming of the James Bond books, an author who mined his own real-life work for British intelligence. His inventor of spy gear in the Bond books, "Q," was informed by the work of Charles Fraser-Smith, a real person who invented "shoelaces containing a vicious steel garrote" for agents parachuting into France.

- John le Carr�, author of the George Smiley trilogy ("Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy," "The Honorable Schoolboy" and "Smiley's People,") as well as the Cold War classic "The Spy Who Came In From the Cold."

This got my little gray cells going, and I thought of some more recent examples, including former MI5 director-general Stella Rimington ("At Risk," "Secret Asset") and Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism adviser to the National Security Council ("Breakpoint").

I believe I have only scratched the surface of this topic, so in the interest of a long, lovely summer reading about spies, here's a call to readers. What is your favorite spy novel written by a spy? If you just can't come up with one of those, what is your favorite spy novel, period? E-mail those suggestions to me at mgwinn@ seattletimes.com, and I will present the results in a future column. [Gwinn/SeattleTimes/24May2010]

Section III - COMMENTARY

Dennis Blair Erred - But He Had An Impossible Job, by David Ignatius. Adm. Dennis Blair was accident-prone, from his first days as director of national intelligence. But his real problem was that he occupied a job with a fuzzy mandate and powers that existed more on paper than in fact.

Blair announced his resignation today after a rocky 15-month tour in which he discovered the limits of his authority by repeatedly stubbing his toe. He was supposed to be a coordinator who would ease the turf wars that are endemic in the intelligence community. Instead, he picked a fight with CIA Director Leon Panetta, not a good idea in a town where Panetta has vastly more political clout than does Blair, his nominal boss.

Blair's first political misstep was to select Chas Freeman as head of the National Intelligence Council, a group of top analysts who are supposed to offer independent and iconoclastic judgments. Freeman, a brilliant former diplomat who speaks Chinese and Arabic, was a good choice for the job except for one thing - his irreverent comments over the years had included some impolitic criticism of Israel. Critics also argued that he had been overly supportive of Saudi Arabia after serving as ambassador there in the early 1990s.

The Freeman nomination immediately became controversial. One former official of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) called it a "profoundly disturbing appointment." The White House was relieved when Freeman withdrew his name, angrily charging that he had been the victim of a smear campaign by the pro-Israel lobby.

The real problem for Blair was that he occupied a job whose powers were defined in law, but not in practice. The DNI post was created in 2004 as part of the reorganization of the intelligence community following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The idea was to create a CEO for the intelligence community - someone who could "connect the dots" among the nation's 16 different intelligence organizations.

Blair was the third person to hold the job, and he inherited the confusions and conflicts that had been part of its creation. Critics argued that the DNI operation just added more layering and bureaucracy to an intelligence community that already had too much of both. The DNI's staff kept on expanding, and other agencies balked at what they saw as redundant functions.

Blair thought, reasonably enough, that his job was to run the intelligence community. But nearly all of the intelligence chiefs have other bosses. The FBI director reports to the attorney general. The heads of the surveillance agencies, the NSA and NRO, report to the Secretary of Defense. That left the CIA director as Blair's only important direct underling, which led to the battle with Panetta.

The flashpoint was Blair's demand last year that he be able to review the appointments of chiefs of station overseas and, where he thought appropriate, install his own representative as the top U.S. intelligence officer in a foreign country. Panetta went to the White House to protest what he saw as an attempt to gut the power of a politically weakened CIA. Blair, the retired four-star admiral, was enraged by what one of his aide's described as Panetta's "insubordination."

The Obama White House didn't need this intramural quarrel, and it was clear from the beginning that the elbows-out admiral was going to lose. Vice President Joe Biden was called in to adjudicate, and he basically sided with Panetta and the CIA. Blair was supposed to get on with the coordination mission.

The final accident that befell Blair was the Christmas Day bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. As the White House reconstructed the chain of missed signals and poorly coordinated intelligence, officials concluded that this was another failure to "connect the dots" - a repetition of precisely the problems that the DNI operation was supposed to fix. The rumors started flying soon after that Blair would be out.

Changing the person who occupies the DNI position will reduce friction temporarily, but the real problem is the definition of the job. If the DNI is supposed to be the intelligence czar, then he can't have such a high-profile political underling as the CIA director. A better idea, in my view, is for the DNI to be a low-visibility facilitator - an intelligence community version of the director of the Office of Management and Budget. The OMB has power, through its review of budgets and personnel, but it doesn't pretend to have line operating authority. That's the right model.

Blair was asked to do an impossible job. His successor should be given clearer direction about what this position is, and isn't. [Ignatius/WashingtonPost/22May2010] 

The Job Failed More than DNI Blair Did, by E.J. Dionne. There will be many postmortems as to why Dennis Blair had to resign as Director of National Intelligence. Many will point to this or that failure on Blair's part. But the truth is: The job he held turns out to be a bad idea. David Ignatius had it right yesterday when he wrote that Blair's "real problem was that he occupied a job with a fuzzy mandate and powers that existed more on paper than in fact." I can't imagine a worse combination than a position that involves a lot of responsibility - for dealing with some of the most dangerous problems the country faces - and very little real power. God help the next person who gets it.

It's no wonder that Leon Panetta, the CIA director, won his battles with Blair. (Panetta is also an excellent politician.) Like Panetta, John Brennan, the head of the White House counter-terrorism office, also had a secure power base, and also apparently prevailed over Blair. The DNI seems more a kibitzer or a loose coordinator than a director. Yes, President Obama could have made clear that Blair was the unchallenged authority on intelligence. Maybe such a presidential commitment could make the job work. But Obama chose not to do that, and the truth is that the CIA will always wield enormous power in this sphere. I think the DNI has a hopeless task.

What is to be done? In the short run, I agree with David that the DNI should be "a low-visibility facilitator - an intelligence community version of the director of the Office of Management and Budget." But in the long run, Congress and the White House should revisit the reform of the intelligence agencies - and reform the reform. If we want a DNI to ride herd over all the intelligence agencies, the job should get real power. If that's not possible (and I don't think it is), then we should re-conceive the position and its function. The point of all this was always about "connecting the dots" and making sure that intelligence was shared. Maybe there are better ways of getting those dots connected.

There is said to be an enormous longing out there for bipartisanship. Surely this is an issue that does not break down as left-right, liberal-conservative, Democrat-Republican. Let's have a bipartisan review, in full cooperation with the White House, and get the lines of authority straight. That would be better than turfing out one Intelligence Director after another because the job itself is impossible. It would also be better than leaving things as they are until there is a real cost for a serious intelligence failure. [Dionne/WashingtonPost/24May2010] 

After Intelligence Report, Leiter Should Go, by Jeff Stein.  Another day, another wake-up call for U.S. Intelligence. How many of those have we heard since the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center?

It's uncanny how similar the 9/11 Commission's report is to Tuesday's verdict by the Senate Intelligence Committee on the so-called underwear bomber incident.

The only thing missing is the dots.

"The attacks were a shock," the 9/11 Commission said almost six years ago, "but should not have come as a surprise."

Likewise, on Tuesday, the Democratic-led SSCI said "there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community."

Or as Republican Senators Saxby Chambliss (Ga.) and Richard Burr (N.C.) put it in their minority report: "Some of the systemic errors this review identified also were cited as failures prior to 9/11."

But it was the National Counterterrorism Center, specifically created after 9/11 to be "the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating" threat intelligence, which took the biggest hit, surely dashing any dreams its director, Michael Leiter, might have harbored for higher office.

Specifically, the committee said, "NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill its missions."

Really? If U.S. intelligence hasn't completely eluded accountability - and there's widespread doubt about that - then somebody's got to take the fall.

Why not start with Leiter?

Of course, the NCTC says it's doing its best to fix the problem, particularly by setting up "pursuit teams" to follow up on tips.

But we've seen these kinds of quick fixes before.

The committee identified "fourteen specific points of failure - a series of human errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities - which resulted in [Umar Farouk] Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on December 25, 2009."

The CIA didn't do this, the State Department didn't do that, NSA didn't do this, the FBI didn't get the memo, and so on.

The director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, says "institutional and technological barriers remain that prevent seamless sharing of information."

Note the passive voice. Blair certainly doesn't accept responsibility.

And to be sure, the Intelligence Committee pointed the finger at Leiter, in all but name.

"NCTC personnel had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key reporting with the other relevant reporting," the committee said. "The NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions."

We're told again and again how the analysts work themselves to the bone, yet the report fairly screams (in a red-lettered headline): "NCTC's Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find Additional Derogatory Information to Place Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist."

Further, another headline yells, "Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying Abdulmutallab and Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant Reporting."

Evidently, as with Sept. 11, 2001, the intelligence agencies, with an estimated $75 billion annual budget, remain a few light bulbs short of an imagination.

"Prior to the 12/25 plot," the SSCI said, "counterterrorism analysts at NCTC, CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of terrorist attacks in Yemen, but were not focused on the possibility of [al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] attacks against the U.S. homeland. These other priorities contributed to the failure of analysts to recognize and collate the several pieces of intelligence reporting that mentioned Abdulmutallab."

That's even after Abdulmutallab's father told the U.S. Embassy in Lagos that his son had fallen in with a bad crowd and might be up to no good.

But it turns out that the NCTC didn't even know what its job was. At the time the report was written in March, it still didn't.

As Chambliss and Burr put it, "Despite its statutory mission, NCTC did not believe it was the sole agency in the IC for piecing together all terrorism threats."

"In fact," the senators noted, "NCTC flatly declared to the committee that, "no one entity within the IC has sole responsibility nor bears the entire burden of either connecting dots or accountability for failing to do."

Sure, they're Republicans - and therefore not shy about beating up on a Democratic administration.

But there's not much daylight between them and the Democrats on this latest intelligence failure.

"Almost nine years after 9/11, we are concerned about whether or not the Intelligence Community is organized effectively to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks," Chambliss and Burr said.

Who isn't? [Stein/WashingtonPost/18May2010] 

US Addressing Intelligence Gaps In Pakistan, by B. Ramen. The US may re-look its human and technical intelligence apparatus in Pakistan following the attack on seven CIA officers in Khost and the failed New York bombing plot.

General James Jones, the national security adviser to US President Barack Obama, and Leon Panetta, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reached Pakistan on May 18 for talks with President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, Army Chief General Asfaq Pervez Kayani and senior intelligence officials of Pakistan. They are also to hold discussions with US intelligence officials based in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

While the visit has been projected by the Pakistani authorities as one of the periodic consultations on intelligence-sharing and liaison between the two countries, it is reliably learnt from Pakistani sources that the visit has been sparked by US concerns over serious gaps in intelligence coverage, which made possible a successful suicide bomber attack through a Jordanian double agent on a group of seven CIA officers based in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30, 2009, and the attempt by Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, to bomb Times Square in New York on May 1.

Shahzad had almost completed the task which he had been given by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan during training in the North Waziristan area. The Times Square plot fizzled out as the incendiary car bomb left by Shahzad malfunctioned and partly due to the alertness of a T-shirt vendor, who alerted a policeman after noticing smoke coming out of the car.

The TTP headed by Hakimullah Mehsud had been involved in the successful strike against the CIA officers in Khost and the failed attempt at Times Square. In both cases, US intelligence was badly caught napping.

Human intelligence has always been a weak point for the US despite the recent improvement which has made possible some successful Drone strikes on terrorist suspects in the two Waziristans, but the technical intelligence coverage of the US was of a high order.

It was better TECHINT coverage by the National Security Agency which led to the arrests of many Al Qaeda operatives in the Af-Pak region since the US forces went into action in Afghanistan in October 2001.

Both HUMINT and TECHINT agencies of the US failed to detect the preparations of the TTP for the Khost attack and the Times Square attempt. According to Pakistani sources, the NSA failed to pick up any intercept even remotely connected to the two incidents. Shahzad had been frequently visiting Pakistan and was in Pakistan for about five months the last time he visited during which he underwent training and went back to the US to launch the attack.

Neither the HUMINT agencies nor the NSA picked up any piece of intelligence related to his being groomed by the TTP for the Times Square attack. The US immigration too failed to notice anything worrisome about his frequent travels to Pakistan despite his financial difficulties.

How to address these serious gaps in intelligence coverage? One way is by the US strengthening its intelligence presence in Pakistan for which a request is to be made to the Pakistani authorities by the visiting officials. They are unlikely to reject this request.

A more difficult proposition is to make the Pakistani intelligence agencies improve their intelligence coverage not only in the tribal belt, but also in Karachi and other cities. A nagging question without answer is whether the Pakistani intelligence had noticed the suspicious activities of Shahzad but refrained from alerting their US counterparts.

One could understand the poor intelligence coverage of the Pakistani agencies in North Waziristan, but their coverage ought to be better in Karachi, where Faisal initially met elements in the Jaish-e-Mohammad and took their help for going to the TTP camp in North Waziristan.

Jihadi elements in Karachi seem to have played an important role in assisting Shahzad in obtaining money for his attempted attack and in contacting the TTP just as jihadi elements of Karachi had played an important role in assisting Richard Reid, the thwarted shoe bomber in 2001. It was to identify the Karachi elements that Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the Wall Street Journal, went to Karachi in 2002 and paid with his life.

Under US prodding, the Pakistani government strengthened the intelligence collection role of the Intelligence Bureau under the Pakistani ministry of the interior, and restored the leadership role of the police officers in the IB. The IB does not have much of a capability in the tribal belt where one has to depend on the Inter-Services Intelligence, but one would have expected the IB's coverage to have been better in Karachi through the local police, but even the IB seems to have missed the contacts of Shahzad with JeM elements in Karachi before he went to Peshawar and from there to North Waziristan.  [Raman/Rediff/19May2010]

The Secret Pentagon Spy Ring, by Marc Ambinder. Michael Furlong, the long-time Defense Department official who set up and ran network of private intelligence collectors for the military, is being hung out to dry by the very forces that precipitated the network's formation in the first place.

Here's the skinny: form follows function in the military, and the U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, has been aggressively moving into territory traditionally occupied by other military elements and the Central Intelligence Agency. They're doing it under the cover of something called IO - Information Operations - which they've adapted as one of their core missions. (The others: cybersecurity, which overlaps with IO, nuclear weapons, and space defense.)

Around 2004 or 2005, STRATCOM set up what it calls the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas. IO ops are run from here. Most everyone involved in this controversy, from Furlong to his superiors to the contractor intelligence gatherers, went through the JIOWC at some point in their careers.

The CIA doesn't think STRATCOM should play in this lane. But neither does Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary, or the State Department, or the National Security Staff. Information Operations involves five fields: deception, psychological operations, computer network operations, electronic warfare and operations security. When you hear these terms, you think military, war, penetration of secret bunkers and the like. The State Department and the others want to make sure that Information Operations don't conflict with what they call Strategic Communications - getting the message out that the US isn't fighting against Islam, that the Afghan military is a credible institution. State sees IO from the perspective of an ad agency: what does the customer need? STRATCOM sees IO from the perspective of a military targeter: what's the target, and how to we use all resources to manipulate it.

The problem is that the main thrust of the current administration's strategy for combating terrorism involves strategic communication, State Department-style. There is room for both approaches, of course, but there isn't room for an entity like STRATCOM to make unilateral decisions about how to influence the adversary.

Inside the Defense Department, there are a lot of people who work in Information Operations and few of them who actually are well trained in the art of deceptive communications. And other parts of the military already "own" parts of the portfolio. The Special Operations Command is in charge of psychological and unconventional warfare. It's not surprising the STRATCOM wants all the territory it can get. Electronic Warfare is particularly lucrative, because all the technology feeds hundreds of millions of dollars to major defense companies like Boeing and Northrop Grumman.

This leads to a final point - who in the government actually owns information operations and strategic communications? Good question. A 1991 law tried to split the baby by saying that attribution is the main issue - if some activity is stealth and covert, then it belongs to the CIA as "covert action"; if it's an obvious attempt to influence opinion, then it belongs to the DoD.

What has all this to do with Furlong, et al? Well, the lack of a unified IO field theory has left serious gaps. Into those gaps go the contractors - mostly retired military, intelligence or government people - who provide the needed services.

As it shifted to a counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq, the Pentagon stood up so-called "Human Terrain Teams" under the aegis of the doctrine and training command, composed of social scientists and anthropologists who are supposed to help combat units understand the culture of the non-combatants they inevitably come across. This sounds more innocuous than it is. The social science itself is questionable. And the question of what the HTTs are supposed to do - help the military kill people more efficiently - has set up a nasty debate inside academia and the Pentagon. Should the civilians use their skills to help military intelligence folks construct databases of relationships between tribal leaders? If they shouldn't, is that what they're doing? Are military contractors using the HTTs to create more opportunities to profit? (Absolutely). Being on an HTT is also dangerous. Civilian scientists are getting killed. The HTTs are being looked at.

In the case, Furlong provided a service and was left by senior executive service types to hold the bag while they ran for it when they got caught with their hand in the cookie jar.

That's the main reason why Furlong's operation is still running. It's providing a useful service for the military, though it might be illegal, and there's nothing, really, that's ready to replace it. [Marc Ambinder is the politics editor of The Atlantic. He has covered Washington for ABC News and the Hotline, and he is chief political consultant to CBS News.] [Ambinder/TheAtlantic/20May2010] 

Intelligence Director Knew His Days Were Numbered, by Kimberly Dozier. For months, National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair has been a dead man walking - and he knew it. So constant and vicious were the leaks from the White House and Congress of his imminent departure that he opened a recent speech on intelligence reform with a joke that his replacement would be Redskins quarterback Donovan McNabb.

The crowd's laughter was just a little uncomfortable, as Blair himself spotlighted the elephant in the room by suggesting that even the just-traded NFL star was being mentioned to fill the job.

Everyone seemed to know this just wasn't working.

His 16-month tenure had been studded with public intelligence failures, turf wars and that uniquely inside-the-Beltway ritual humiliation via leaks to the press.

Blair's official decision to step down came Thursday after an Oval office meeting with President Barack Obama, according to two senior congressional staffers. They said it became clear by the end of the meeting that Blair had "lost the confidence of the president."

In a message to his work force, Blair said his last day would be May 28.

"It is with deep regret that I informed the president today that I will step down as director of national intelligence," Blair said.

Obama released a brief statement Thursday night that did not acknowledge Blair's impending resignation.

"During his time as DNI, our intelligence community has performed admirably and effectively at a time of great challenges to our security, and I have valued his sense of purpose and patriotism," the president said. "He and I both share a deep admiration for the men and women of our intelligence community, who are performing extraordinary and indispensable service to our nation."

Blair, a retired Navy admiral, is the third director of national intelligence, a position created in response to the failure to prevent the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

His departure highlights the continuing disarray and competition among the disparate elements of the intelligence community - the very same issues the 9/11 Commission identified and that the national intelligence director was supposed to make a thing of the past.

Two other government officials said several candidates already had been interviewed for the DNI job, which is to oversee the nation's 16 intelligence agencies.

Names mentioned as possible candidates include current top White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan and James R. Clapper, the defense undersecretary for intelligence.

All the officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Blair's term in office was marred by turf battles with CIA Director Leon Panetta and Blair's own controversial public comments after the failed Christmas Day jetliner bombing attempt.

The two congressional officials said Blair had been on a losing streak since he squared off with Panetta last May over Blair's effort to choose a personal representative at U.S. embassies to be his eyes and ears abroad, instead of relying on CIA station chiefs, as had been the practice.

Blair issued a directive declaring his intention to select his own representatives overseas. Panetta followed up shortly thereafter with a note telling agency employees that station chiefs were still in charge - a move that some construed as insubordinate and a blow to Blair's authority.

The White House did nothing to back Blair over Panetta, which sent a message to the rest of the intelligence community that Blair could be ignored, according to one senior congressional staffer. Worse, the skirmish ended up costing Blair the support of Brennan, who resented being forced to mediate, according to another staffer familiar with the issue.

In the failed Christmas Day attack, the Senate Intelligence Committee found that the National Counterterrorism Center was in a position to connect intelligence that could have prevented it. As director of national intelligence, Blair oversaw the center.

One senior Senate staffer said it was apparent Blair had been kept on the periphery of the FBI's investigation into the Nigerian suspect in the attempted plane bombing, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

Blair's later testimony before Congress did not endear him to the White House, the officials said, when he acknowledged that an elite interrogation team known as the High-Value Interrogation Group had not been deployed to question Abdulmutallab. Blair may have further damaged himself by admitting that he had not been consulted on whether the HIG unit should have been used.

The HIG team was deployed after the Times Square bombing attempt this month, administration officials said this week.

Blair also told Congress that Abdulmutallab continued to provide helpful information to investigators at a time when authorities had hoped to keep the bomber's cooperation secret. With that information divulged, FBI Director Robert Mueller confirmed at the same hearing that Abdulmutallab was cooperating.

Blair was the first Obama administration official to describe the deadly shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, last fall as an act of homegrown extremism. The administration had previously been reluctant to call the suspect, an Army psychiatrist, a homegrown terrorist or extremist.

By law, the principal deputy director of national intelligence, David Gompert, becomes the acting director until the Senate confirms the president's nominee, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., said.

Rep. Pete Hoekstra, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, called Blair a consummate public servant.

"I had high hopes for his willingness to work with Congress on a bipartisan basis to ensure that America's intelligence professional had the tools, resources and authorities they need to help protect our homeland," Hoekstra said Thursday.

Some Republican lawmakers have criticized the Obama administration for not keeping them in the loop on key intelligence matters, often singling out Brennan as being too secretive. [Dozier/AP/20May2010] 

Section IV - BOOKS, OBITUARIES AND COMING EVENTS

Books/Reading

'Peddling Peril' by David Albright, reviewed by Bob Drogin. Nuclear weapons, which largely faded from front pages after the Cold War, are back in the news. President Obama endorsed a new national security strategy, and earlier this year he signed an ambitious arms control treaty with Russia, further easing fears of global Armageddon. But Obama also led an unprecedented summit of world leaders to warn of an increasingly urgent threat - nuclear terrorism.

Much of this perilous state of affairs can be traced to the villainous deeds of Abdul Qadeer Khan. A.Q. Khan, as he is known, is the self-described father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb and the self-confessed mastermind of a criminal network that seemingly sold nuclear weapons technology like it was aluminum siding. The proof: Nearly every nation that has tried to build or obtain a nuclear device in the last 30 years has relied on Khan's black market enterprise.

Outside the CIA and its sister services overseas, probably no one has investigated Khan's smuggling network as thoroughly as David Albright. His "Peddling Peril" is the most authoritative account we are likely to see of how a Pakistani metallurgist with monstrous ambition used front companies, forged documents and legal loopholes to create a nuclear Wal-Mart, or what Albright calls "Bomb Inc." Dr. Strangelove couldn't have said it better.

For years, government officials downplayed or ignored Khan's illicit trade as industrial spying, or violations of export control laws, rather than as nuclear espionage on behalf of a foreign power. Security breaches were repeatedly concealed lest they jeopardize other diplomatic priorities or corporate profit margins. It is a terrifying tale, not least because the failure to prosecute or imprison most of Khan's associates means the world's most dangerous business may still be thriving.

Other books have sketched Khan's story, but Albright mines previously unavailable documents, and he interviews key players for new details. He chronicles how Khan stole classified blueprints from a European consortium to jumpstart Pakistan's uranium enrichment program in the mid-1970s and then did what no Western scientist considered remotely possible - he built an atomic bomb in Pakistan by secretly buying and assembling component parts from abroad. 

In the 1980s, Khan again broke new ground: He began selling complete nuclear factories and the know-how to construct bombs, something only governments had done before. He assembled a team of unscrupulous German, South African and Swiss businessmen to help peddle these resources to dictatorial regimes in Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya.

Khan's drawings and documentation for Libya's centrifuge plant were so detailed they contained instructions on where to install toilet paper holders in the bathrooms. He also supplied Iran with critical components for a then-secret uranium enrichment program that still bedevils the international community. "Without Khan's assistance," Albright writes, "Iran's gas centrifuge program would pose little threat to the region or the United States today."

Khan has claimed patriotism and Muslim solidarity as his motive, but he and his cohorts raked in hundreds of millions of dollars. Vital supplies, purchased from the United States and Europe, were routed through a maze of businesses and third-party cutouts in Malaysia, Dubai, Turkey and elsewhere to avoid suspicion. "They could not outmaneuver us, as we remained a step ahead always," Khan boasted on Pakistani TV last year.

Although the CIA and British intelligence investigated Khan from at least 1978, it took them nearly three decades to take him down, an intelligence failure that haunts us today. The evidence suggests willful blindness in successive U.S. administrations more concerned about using Pakistan as a Cold War proxy against the Soviet Union than on stopping this nuclear Johnny Appleseed.

It's still unclear how much Pakistani leaders authorized Khan's freebooting (he frequently used Pakistani Air Force planes to ferry his supplies) and, more important, whether his customers included Al Qaeda or its murderous offshoots. The Pakistani government has refused to let foreign intelligence or U.N. experts interview Khan since he was placed under house arrest in 2004.

Albright is a unique figure in Washington, a nuclear proliferation expert who flourishes in the interstices between intelligence and journalism. He founded and heads the Institute for Science and International Security, a one-man think tank for all practical purposes. He regularly makes news by relying on commercial satellite photos, personal ties to U.S. policy makers and U.N. nuclear inspectors (Albright served with U.N. teams in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War) and a deep grasp of nuclear science. Like many journalists, I called him regularly when I reported on nuclear proliferation.

In September 2007, for example, Israeli jets bombed a nondescript building in the Syrian desert. Neither government, nor the George W. Bush administration, initially acknowledged the raid's purpose. But Albright's institute used commercial satellite imagery to determine that the target appeared to house a nuclear reactor built with technology from North Korea. For six months, Albright's analysis was the only independent assessment. Finally, in April 2008, the CIA publicly concurred.

Albright is a better investigator than writer, and his dry prose sometimes reads like a grand jury indictment involving export licenses and shipping manifests. But this is also a valuable book: The reader's outrage mounts as clues emerge, the danger spreads and government officials look the other way. It's clear what drives Albright: America must vastly improve its ability to prevent nuclear smuggling and, ultimately, nuclear terrorism. After reading "Peddling Peril," it drives my fears too. [Drogin/LATimes/11May2010] 

Obituaries

Wil Charette, Sr.  Wilfred J.A. Charette (Squeak) born 14 November 1936, passed away 9 May 2010 at his home in Tampa, FL. Wil is survived by his beloved wife Amy Charette of Tampa, FL. He was a devoted and loving father of Wilfred J.A. Charette, Jr, of Gainesville, VA; Joseph Anthony Charette of Nashville, TN; beloved brother of Carol Moran of Cumberland, R.I., and loving uncle of Steven, Jill, Jane and Ellen Moran all of Rhode Island.

Wil Charette, a native of Rhode Island served 11 years of military service followed by service with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1964 until his retirement on 29 November 1996. His first CIA assignment was as a paramilitary Staff Officer at CIA Headquarters and its domestic training facilities. He then served in Laos and Thailand as a Paramilitary Case Officer, Chief of Operations, and Chief of a Laotian irregular paramilitary unit for 8 years. Mr. Charette was then assigned to Ethiopia and Ghana from 1974-1979. In late 1979 Mr. Charette was posted to Swaziland, as Chief of Station (COS) until 1982 when he was assigned to Kampala, Uganda, as COS. Following a two-year tour in Uganda, Mr. Charette attended the US Naval War College in Newport, RI, where he received a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. In 1985, he was appointed Chief, CIA Counter Terrorist Center, Foreign Liaison Training and Terrorist Incident Response Team (IRT). From 1992-1994, Mr. Charette served as the Agency's Deputy Chief, Office of Field Deployment. His last U.S. Government assignment was that of DCI Representative at U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida. Mr. Charette, in post retirement, continued to serve the intelligence community as a senior advisor to SOCCENT at MacDill AFB. Mr. Charette served on the board of directors and co-founded the Special Operation Memorial Foundation, MacDill AFB.

Mr. Charette had extensive military experience, having served domestically and overseas with the 508th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT), the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st Calvary Division, and Special Forces. Mr. Charette is a Charter Member of the US Army Parachute Team (Golden Knights). He was the first Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the Special Forces Training Group High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) Committee, which included Fulton Recovery Systems (SKYHOOK) Operations. In 1961, he was selected to train the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment's military free fall cadre at Hereford, England. Mr. Charette was a member of the Joint Army/USAF HALO Test Team in the early 1960's that established much of the HALO training and operations doctrine still in use today. He also participated in the record breaking 43,500 foot jump to establish a world record "FAI Class G-II-C, group of nine with delayed fall". He received the Distinguished Flying Cross for his participation in the HALO Test Program and his subsequent use of HALO insertion techniques. He is the author of the United States Parachute Association (USPA) Publication, "Jumping in the Troposphere", and is the recipient of the USPA Golden Wings representing 1,000 free fall parachute jumps. Mr. Charette's last military assignment was with the 5th Special Forces Group.

During his stellar and distinguished career, Mr. Charette received the following awards and commendations:

(CIA) Donovan Award for Excellence
Career Intelligence Medal for Exceptional Achievement
Two Director Of Central Intelligence awards for exceptional service under conditions of hazard and hardship
Promoted into the Senior Intelligence Service (SIS-1989)
(DOD) Distinguished Flying Cross
Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service

Wil (Squeak) Charette will be remembered for his commitment to service, to his country and to his family. He will always be remembered as a patriot and the epitome of what it means to be a true American hero. In the words of his brothers and sisters in the clandestine service "he was a legendary warrior... A legend in own time. The things he survived, his mentoring, his leadership, and his unwavering patriotism is and will forever be a flame that goes on burning, we will never forget him. He was our commander... our General." [EastLakeBlister/18May2010] 

Joe Edwin Armstrong. Joe Edwin Armstrong was an electrical engineer, college professor and former Navy pilot who loved storytelling, folk dancing and organic farming.

"Renaissance Man" was an apt term for Armstrong, a man of esoteric interests who died of a heart attack May 13 at his home near Healdsburg. He was 82.

He chose a road less traveled, whether working in a highly classified job for the U.S. National Security Agency at the height of the Cold War, earning a master's degree in ancient history or building a handcrafted passive solar home.

He was making plans to return to Greece this summer and collaborate on an article for an archeological journal on one of his passions, the study of ancient water clock technology.

For his 80th birthday, Armstrong wrote: "I have lived an exciting, charmed life and have no intention of changing that lifestyle until forced to, by forces beyond my control."

"He was a very strong person and managed to do what he wanted to do," said his wife Karen Urke-Wegener, who said her husband didn't just dabble, but studied things.

Raised in Arkansas, the son of a Methodist preacher and the eighth of nine children, Armstrong at 17 enlisted in the U.S. Navy pilot school, flying Corsairs.

He became a pilot by the age of 21 and had two tours of duty, surviving a fiery crash while trying to land his plane on an aircraft carrier.

"The ship had a swell come up and was in rough waters," said his youngest daughter, Shelly Albertson of Santa Rosa, who said the plane burst into flames when her father tried to land. "He burned off his eyebrows and eyelashes. He was not scarred from it," she said. In 1950, Armstrong married Addis Allene Wright and went on to attend the University of Texas in Austin on the GI Bill, earning a Ph.D. in electrical engineering.

He and his wife had three children before moving to California, where Armstrong took a job managing labs in San Jose for Sylvania.

He continued working in electrical engineering and helped to found ESL, Inc. before going to work in Europe for the National Security Agency.

He worked for two years, based in Frankfurt, Germany, traveling extensively around Europe for work and with his family.

"He never told us about what he was really doing, until much later," said his daughter. The family story, she said, is that he was working on the technology for what later became the Stealth bomber.

His third wife, Karen, whom he married in 1987, said Armstrong told her he would debrief prisoners and troubleshoot communication systems. "He said it was interesting, but a very tense job. He only stayed at it two years."

Armstrong returned to Northern California and by the 1970s was a professor of engineering at San Jose State. He divorced and married a second time.

He worked at Stanford Research Institute and then moved to Sonoma County to get closer to nature, buying 12 acres of hillside property near Healdsburg.

By 1981 he was a part-time faculty member at Sonoma State University. For more than 20 years, he taught Energy Management and Design.

Armstrong published "Tales of a Fledgling Homestead," a book describing his back-to-nature experience, and also pursued literary writing and poetry.

A guitar player, he wrote songs about his Arkansas boyhood and played in a string band. Organic farming and making his own wine were among his interests, as were Scottish and Scandinavian folk dancing. He also had a "salon" in his home where he would invite guests to hear stories or meet painters, sculptors or jewelry artisans. "He was a very interesting guy, passionate and engaging. He loved to share," Albertson said.

In addition to his wife and youngest daughter, survivors include his son Keith Armstrong of Sunnyvale; daughter Donna Armstrong of Albany, N.Y.; sisters Christine Shope and Betty Blake, both of Little Rock, Ark.; and two grandchildren. [Mason/PressDemocrat/21May2010]

Brigadier General Harry Aderholt. Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Harry C. "Heinie" Aderholt passed away May 20, 2010, at his home, surrounded by loving family, loyal friends and his devoted caregiver.

Brig. Gen. Harry C. "Heine" Aderholt, USAF Ret. died on 20 May 2010 at the age of 90 in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. He was the founder of the USAF Air Commandos. He had a long history of involvement and command in USAF Special Operations including many joint operations in Korea, Laos, Viet Nam and other areas. Details of his military career were published in "Air Commando One: Heine Aderholt and America's Secret Air Wars" by Warren A. Trest.

Gen. Aderholt's 30-plus year military career is legendary. His status as a leader, his many accomplishments, awards and citations will be recorded in the annals of military history.

His innumerable friends will remember him as a man of integrity with a loving heart who inspired and touched so many lives.

He was born on Jan. 6, 1920, in Birmingham, Ala., to Forest Aderholt and Katie Banholzer and was preceded in death by his loving wife of 56 years, Jessie; brothers, Roy Aderholt and Robert Aderholt; and sister, Cornelia Akin.

He is survived by his wife, Anne; daughter, Janet Lynn Elliott and husband Chaplin Col. (Ret.) Richard G. Elliott Jr. of Panama City, Fla.; son, George Aderholt and wife Pat of Navarre, Fla.; one sister, Katherine McDaniel of Trussville, Ala.; two brothers, Warren Aderholt and his wife Bunny of Marietta, Ga., and Louis Aderholt of Huntsville, Ala.; grandchildren, Kevin Richard Elliott and wife Kathy Anderson Elliott, Stacie Lynn Elliott, Kellie Marie Elliott and Mark Randall Elliott; great-granddaughter, Annie Lynn Elliott; and several nieces and nephews.

Heinie was one of seven children raised by his widowed mother (his father died, as a result of an accident, when Heinie was just a boy of nine), and he learned very early in life many lessons that would shape his future. Undoubtedly, his mother's influence from her strength, courage, love and strict discipline, provided him with the solid foundation that helped him to grow and develop into the remarkable man he became.

Heinie's love of people was obvious and his sincerity and straight forward, up-front approach encouraged the development of many life-long friendships. None more enduring than the bond of love, loyalty and mutual respect that he shared with Maj. Gen. Richard Secord.

We wish to thank his faithful friend, Joseph Caruth, who enabled him to continue his early morning ritual of working out at Aderholt Fitness Center.

Until his final days he remained close to his brothers and sister and their families. As recently as late January, he made a trip to Birmingham, on to Huntsville, then to Atlanta, assuring all he would be back soon.

In lieu of flowers, the family requests donations in memory of Gen. Aderholt be made to the McCoskrie Threshold Foundation to support projects in Thailand and Laos.

A memorial service will be held at Hurlburt Air Park on July 2 at 9 a.m. USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. Norton Schwartz will be the main speaker. A reception will follow. [NWFDailyNews/22May2010] 

Charles E. Lee Security Specialist - Charles E. Lee, 71, a retired police intelligence specialist who did intelligence and security work for the State Department, died May 10 at a hospital in Jacksonville, N.C. He had lung cancer.
Mr. Lee spent 20 years with the Suffolk County police department in New York before retiring in 1982 from its intelligence bureau at the rank of detective sergeant.
He worked in Pasadena, Calif., for Dynametric, a security systems company, before settling in the Washington area in 1988 to do security work for President-elect George H.W. Bush.
In the 1990s, he worked on design and security of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for the State Department. He did security work for a private company until Mr. Lee rejoined the State Department from 1999 to 2003 handling diplomatic and physical security concerns.
He moved to Jacksonville from Falls Church in 2005.
Charles Edward Lee was born in Patchogue, N.Y., and served in the Navy from 1956 to 1959. Survivors include his wife of 47 years, Carolann Friedberg Lee of Jacksonville; two children, Teresa George of Falls Church and Christopher Lee of Buffalo; a sister; a brother; and two granddaughters.

Coming Events

EVENTS IN COMING TWO MONTHS....

MANY Spy Museum Events in August with full details are listed on the AFIO Website at www.afio.com. The titles for some of these are as follows:

• Thursday, 5 August 2010, noon - Washington, DC - "Silent Sentry: The Untold Story of the National Security Agency" - at the International Spy Museum
• Wednesday, 11 August 2010, 6:30 pm - Washington, DC - "Uneasy Alliance: The CIA and ISI in Pakistan" - at the International Spy Museum

25 May 2010 - Arlington, VA - The Defense Intelligence Forum event to hear Allen Keiswetter on "Political Islam" HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND RESCHEDULED The location of the event -- the Alpine Restaurant -- was sold suddenly last week and is now closed for an indefinite time for renovation. Allen Keiswetter's talk on Political Islam has been rescheduled for 22 June at the Rockbottom Brewery in the Ballston Commons Mall. See new entry under 22 June, below.

25-26 May 2010 - Hartford, CT - SCIP [Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals] workshop on "Fundamentals of Competitive Intelligence"
Two full-day workshops (CI 101� and CI 202™) provide the beginner and intermediate competitive intelligence (CI) professional a comprehensive development program to sharpen his or her skills in CI research and analysis techniques.
The introductory course will offer a comprehensive introduction to professionals new to CI. Presenters will develop a working definition of the field and discuss its ethics. Attendees will learn about available primary and secondary resources, and the techniques necessary to access them. Attendees will learn to analyze and manage data effectively once it has been collected.
The intermediate workshop is a follow-up to the introductory course. The topics presented are considered crucial to the continuing success of an internal CI program, whether it's being started from scratch or developing into a greater presence within the organization.
About the Presenter
Mike Sandman is senior vice president of Fuld & Company Inc., a pioneering competitive intelligence consulting firm in Cambridge, Mass. Prior to joining Fuld, he was an operations manager in the composites industry. Sandman has an extensive background in international business, is on the faculty of the Academy of Competitive Intelligence (ACI) and leads war games for Fuld's clients.
Pricing
Member Rates $995 Discount Price $895.50
Non-Member Rates $1295 Discount Price $1165.50
Register Now at http://www.scip.org/training/
Questions? Contact Sandra Skipper at +1.703.739.0696 x110, sskipper@scip.org or Robyn Reals at +1.703.739.0696 x107, rreals@scip.org.

25 - 27 May 2010 - Ottawa, CAN - The IAFIE hosts 6th conference on Intelligence Education. The International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) hosts 6th Annual Conference at the Ottawa Marriott Hotel. Theme: Intelligence Education: A Global Phenomenon. For more information or to register.

27 May 2010, 11:30 a.m. - San Diego, CA - AFIO San Diego Chapter hosts Charles Wurster, USCG (Ret). Charles D. Wurster - President/CEO, The San Diego Port Authority, Retired U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Charles D. Wurster was appointed as the Port's President/CEO by the Board on January 5, 2009. Wurster is a three-star Admiral who served 37 years in the Coast Guard. Before serving as Coast Guard's Commander of the Pacific Area from 2006-2008, he served as Commander of the Fourteenth District in Honolulu. He also served as the Chief of Acquisition in Washington, DC; Chief of Staff for the Pacific Area in Alameda, CA; Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard base in Kodiak, Alaska; and Commanding Officer of the Facilities Design and Construction Center in Seattle, Washington. Wurster holds a Master's degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Illinois and graduated with honors from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut
Location: The Trellises Garden Grill, Town and Country Resort and Convention Center, 500 Hotel Circle North, San Diego, CA 92108
$20.00 per person including gratuity. RSVP for you and your guest required by Friday, May 21, 2010.
Calling Marjon at 619-297-9959 or by sending an Email to Darryl at darryl@pexis.com

Wednesday, 2 June 2010, 6:00 p.m. -- Las Vegas, NV - the AFIO Las Vegas Chapter meets to hear Fred Barber on "The Roman Empire & The New Rome"
Fred Eugene Barber's presentation takes the audience through 2700 years of history in about an hour, so hang on to your chairs. He starts with the founding of Rome, through its conquest of the Mediterranean world, its holding of power, its conversion to Christianity and its collapse into countries most often under new owners. As the vacuum is filled by former Roman colonies as Roman lands are leaving the empire, Mr. Barber gives a brief explanation of how and who filled the vacuum spots, concentrating a bit on the Byzantium and the world of the Arabs and Turks, and how this has affected us here in the New World. Spain, a former Roman province, becomes part of this story because the Arabic peoples controlled and lived in Spain for over 500 years.
Barber is not a professional speaker, but has a passion for history, especially as to how it has affected his America of today. He is a firm believer in the old adage: History repeats itself....and as Rome fell, so might....
Event location will be at The Officers' Club at Nellis Air Force Base. All guests must use the MAIN GATE located at the intersection on Craig Road and Las Vegas Blvd. Address: 5871 Fitzgerald Blvd., Nellis AFB, NV 89191 Phone: 702-644-2582. (Guest names must be submitted to BentleyM@nv.doe.gov or at afiolasvegas@gmail.com by 4:00 p.m., Monday, May 24th. Join us at 5 p.m. in the "Check Six" bar area for liaison and beverages.
If you plan to bring a guest(s), please RSVP with names by 4:00 p.m., Monday, May 24th. Entrance to the Base self and guests cannot be guaranteed if I don't have their names (unless they already have military ID to enter the base).
Dinner: You are welcome to arrive early and join us in the "Check Six" bar area, inside the Officer's Club. The Check Six has an excellent, informal dinner venue along with a selection of snacks. Water will be provided during the meeting, but you may also purchase beverages and food at the bar and bring them to the meeting. Once again, please feel free to bring your spouse and/or guest(s) to dinner as well as our meeting, but remember to submit your guest(s) names to me be the stated deadline above.
Questions? Email afiolasvegas@gmail.com or call 702-295-1024. We look forward to seeing you!

Friday, 4 June 2010, 8:30 am – 4 pm - Raleigh, NC - The North Carolina FBI Citizen's Academy Alumni Association presents Training: Human Trafficking and Modern-Day Slavery - Tools for an Effective Response
Location: St. Matthew African Methodist Church, 1629 Bennett Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27604 Cost: $35 per person
Please RSVP as soon as possible via either email or mail. You may either pay at the door or mail your check.
Checks payable to : NC FBICAAA
E-MAIL registrations, send to : tammy.caaa@gmail.com
MAIL registrations: ATTN: Tammy Montanez, NCDOT 1507 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, NC 27699-1507
Questions? Call Tammy at 919-368-5914
Walk-ins are welcome with registration and payment at the door

7 -11 June 2010 - San Diego, CA - Bicoastal Counter Terrorism Summit by Halo Corporation. Monday Warrior Mindset $200; Tuesday: Active Shooter Campus, Corporate and House of Worship Safety $200; Wednesday: Maritime Security and Port/Border Awareness $200; Thursday: Americas Deadliest Threat $200; Friday: Islamic Literalist Ideology $200. California Responders these training courses are eligible for the use of Homeland Security. Grant Program SHSP, UASI, LETPP. Homeland Security Grant funds may cover the cost of Registration, Travel, Lodging and Per Diem
If you would prefer to pay by check, please make payable to: The HALO Corporation, 501 West Broadway, Suite A‐331, San Diego, CA 92101
www.thehalocorp.com 619-881-9125

16-17 June 2010 - Independence, Missouri - CIA/Harry S. Truman Library/Woodrow Wilson Center Co-Host Conference "The Korean War, the Armistice, and the Search for Peace on the Korean Peninsula." Event falls on 60th Anniversary of The Korean War. Registration on AFIO website will open in mid-April. Announcement of CIA document release including special booklet/CD handouts to attendees, includes roundtable discussion – Invasion and Intervention: What the U.s. Intelligence Community Knew and Who They Told - chaired by Clayton Laurie, with 3 other historians; Reception at Truman Library. CD-ROMs containing the newly released documents will be distributed at the press conference and the conference.
From the Central Intelligence Agency: Approximately one thousand declassified documents from four series in the agency's records relating to the Korean \Var have been digitized and described by the agency's Historical Documents Division. The four series are (1) Korean Daily Reports; (2) National Intelligence Estimates; (3) Special Intelligence Estimates; and (4) Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports. About half of the documents have never been released before; the other half have been released in part, but are now being either fully released or with newly released information included.
Registration handled by the Truman Library. To view agenda: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/koreanwar2010.html
To Register for event: [Word Document] http://www.trumanlibrary.org/korea/KoreanWarRegistration2010.doc
or [PDF form] http://www.trumanlibrary.org/korea/KoreanWarRegistration2010.pdf

Thursday, 17 June 2010 - Washington, DC - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Round Table hosted by LexisNexis Doors open at noon. Event runs 1:00 – 3:00 P.M.
Location is National Press Club, Washington, D.C. No Charge. Seating may be limited. RSVP at www.lexisnexis.com/osint
The focus of this initial event will be "OSINT 2020: The Future of Open Source Intelligence."
The program will include keynote remarks by Mr. Dan Butler, Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), followed by a "perspectives" discussion with leading experts among our group of distinguished attendees. The discussion will be based on the future of OSINT as a recognized discipline in strategic and tactical national security decision-making.
OSINT 2020 Panelists:
Mr. Alexander Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, ODNI
Mr. Doug Magoffin, Chief, Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office
Mr. Kevin O'Connell, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University and President/CEO of
Innovative Analytics and Training
Dr. Mark Gabriele (invited) Booz Allen Hamilton
The OSINT Round Table was created to make a public space for discussion about the government's needs for Open Source Intelligence in order to facilitate relationships between government officials and private sector leaders. We seek to foster an increasingly responsive open source intelligence infrastructure that meets the needs of national security decision makers.
No Charge. Seating may be limited. RSVP at www.lexisnexis.com/osint

Tuesday 15 June 2010, 5 p.m. - Newport News, VA - AFIO Norman Forde Hampton Roads Chapter Meeting features LTC Joe Leporati on Disaster Relief in Haiti
US Naval Lieutenant Commander Joe Leporati will speak about his experience with disaster relief as part of the US military's "Operation Unified Response" in Haiti
LCDR Leporati is a US Naval aviator and strategic planner whose early Naval experience included Helicopter Aircraft Commander and Functional Check Pilot positions in helicopter missions in the Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Gulf and Africa. He left the Navy in 1999; after the 11 Sep 2001 attacks, he joined the Navy Reserve and was voluntarily recalled to active duty. LCDR Leporati served as Safety Officer onboard USS KEARSARGE, deploying twice in support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. He was awarded the Chief of Naval Operations Safety Award for his efforts.
In 2004 - 2005, LCDR served US Fleet Forces N3 Global Force Management as Assistant Aviation Operations Officer. In that role, he participated in USN's humanitarian assistance in Haiti, as well as relief efforts to Hurricane Katrina victims. He authored the Airborne Use of Force Concept of Operations, placing US Coast Guard gunners on Navy helicopters to prosecute "Go Fast" drug running vessels in the US Southern Command. In Mar 2006, LCDR Leporati reported to the Multi National Forces Iraq Joint Personnel Recovery Center, where he fused intelligence, conducted diplomatic efforts and coordinated operations to recover missing US Service members, US citizens and others in Iraq. After Iraq, he served as Joint Forces Staff College instructor on the Joint Command, Control and Information Operations School faculty.
LCDR Leporati transfered to the Information Warfare Officer community in 2008 and was appointed Director of the Fleet Information Operations Center Texas. As FIOC Director, he led 200+ sailors conducting direct support, analysis and production, and cyber operations in support of Joint Interagency Task Force South, 4th Fleet and US Southern Command. LCDR Leporati was temporarily supporting Carrier Strike Group-1 aboard the USS Carl Vinson in January 2010 when it was re-routed to Haiti for earthquake disaster relief. In Mar 2010, LCDR Leporati reported to the NIOC Norfolk Planning Directorate and is assigned to the Information Operations Planning Team for US Southern Command.
His military decorations include the Bronze Star, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with two gold stars, and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one gold star. He is a Joint Qualified Officer. LCDR Leporati holds both a Master of Business Administration Degree and a Master of Arts Degree in Diplomacy.
Location: Christopher Newport University Library, Newport News (Room # tbd)
Free and open to the public.
Please rsvp: Melissa Saunders mwsaunders@cox.net

19 June 2010 - Kennebunk, ME - The AFIO Maine Chapter features lawyer Suzanne Spaulding speaking on "Solving Current National Security Issues." Suzanne Spaulding, who is currently Principal, Bingham Consulting Group, Bingham McCutchen LLP, is an authority on national security . She served as director of two congressionally mandated commissions, the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Amb. Paul Bremer, III, and the Commission to Assess the Organization of  the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction chaired by former CIA Director, John Deutch.  She has been quoted regularly in media outlets around the country.  She was minority staff director for the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  Previous legislative experience includes legislative director and senior counsel for Sen. Arlen Specter.  She also worked for Rep. Jane Harman.  She was assistant counsel at CIA and  is immediate past chair, American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security.  Ms. Spaulding is currently a member of AFIO's National Board. The meeting will be held at the Kennebunk Free Library, 112 Main St., Kennebunk at 2:00 p.m. The public is invited. For information call 967-4298.

Monday, 21 June 2010, 6 p.m. - New York, NY - The AFIO NY Chapter meets to hear Jack Devine discuss "The True Story of Charlie Wilson's War"

Speaker: Jack Devine, 32 year veteran of the CIA. Was Acting Director of the Agency's operations outside the US with authority over thousands of employees in very sensitive missions among many other worldwide assignments. Recipient of the CIA Meritorious Officer Award, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal and several other meritorious awards.
Topic: (1) Afghanistan: Where we are, (2) Charlie Wilson's War: The inside story of what actually happened
Where: University Club 9th Floor, Registration 5:30 PM Start 6:00 PM
$40./person; only $20./person, students & military. No reservations required.
Questions to Jerry Goodwin, Chapter President, 347-334-1503 or email him at afiometro@yahoo.com

22 June 2010 (Rescheduled from 25 May) - Arlington, VA - The Defense Intelligence Forum meets to hear Keiswetter on Political Islam.

The DIF meets at the Rock Bottom Restaurant and Brewery, Ballston Common Mall, Arlington, VA. The speaker will be Allen L. Keiswetter, who will speak on Political Islam. Mr. Keiswetter, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer, is a Scholar at the Middle East Institute and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Maryland. He has also taught courses on Islam and the Middle East at the National Defense Intelligence College and the National War College. In the Department of State, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the Near East Bureau, and Director of the Office of Intelligence Liaison in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His postings abroad include Riyadh, Sanaa, Khartoum, Baghdad, Tunis, Beirut, Brussels and Vietnam. The Defense Intelligence Forum covers topics of current interest. It is open to members of all Intelligence Community associations and their guests.
Pay at the door with a check for $29 per person payable to DIAA, Inc. Social hour starts at 1130, lunch at 1200. Make reservations for you and your guests by 15 June by email to diforum@verizon.net. Give names, telephone numbers, email addresses, and choices of Pasta, Grilled Salmon, Grilled Sirloin, or Lemon Chicken. Pay with a check. THE FORUM DOESN'T TAKE CASH!

25-26 June 2010 - Great Lakes, IL - The Midwest Chapter of AFIO will host its annual conference at the Great Lakes Naval Station. The conference will include a full days worth of speakers on Friday the 25th. Saturday the 26th will include a day trip to Waukesha, WI to tour the Cold War Museum and former Nike Missile Site, and then lunch at the Safe House, a spy themed museum in Milwaukee, WI. Saturday's return trip will include dinner and a speaker. On Sunday 27 June there will be a trip to the Cantigny First Division Museum (Wheaton, IL) for a museum tour and bring your own meal picnic.
Registration is $10 per person. Hotel reservations can be made by calling the Navy Lodge at 1-847-689-1485 for 24-27 June. Room rate is $65 per night total (no tax). Hotel reservations should be made no later than 7 June 2010. Please remember to mention that you are with the Midwest AFIO Chapter. For more information and to confirm your attendance, please contact Angelo Di Liberti ASAP at 847-931-4184. Also state whether you plan to attend the trip to Cantigny as we will need to contact the Museum curator with a final head count.

HOLD THE DATE - 17 - 20 August 2010 - Cleveland, OH - AFIO National Symposium on the Great Lakes - "Intelligence and National Security on the Great Lakes"

Co-Hosted with the AFIO Northern Ohio Chapter at the Crowne Plaza Hotel, Cleveland, OH. Includes presentations by U.S. Coast Guard on Great Lakes security; Canadian counterparts to explain double-border issues; National Air/Space Intelligence Center; Air Force Technical Applications Center; Ohio Aerospace Institute, Tours of NASA Lewis-Brookpark and Plumbrook Stations. Cruise on Lake Erie .
Spies-in-Black-Ties Dinner and Cruise on Lake Erie. Online Reservations to be taken here, shortly.

6 - 7 October 2011 - Laurel, MD - The NSA's Center for Cryptologic History hosts their Biennial Cryptologic History Symposium with theme: Cryptology in War and Peace: Crisis Points in History.

Historians from the Center, the Intelligence Community, the defense establishment, and the military services, as well as distinguished scholars from American and foreign academic institutions, veterans of the profession, and the interested public all will gather for two days of reflection and debate on topics from the cryptologic past. The theme for the upcoming conference will be: “Cryptology in War and Peace: Crisis Points in History.” This topical approach is especially relevant as the year 2011 is an important anniversary marking the start of many seminal events in our nation’s military history. The events that can be commemorated are many.
Such historical episodes include the 1861 outbreak of the fratricidal Civil War between North and South. Nineteen forty-one saw a surprise attack wrench America into the Second World War. The year 1951 began with the fall of Seoul to Chinese Communist forces with United Nations troops retreating in the Korean War. In 1961, the United States began a commitment of advisory troops in Southeast Asia that would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War; that year also marked the height of the Cold War as epitomized by the physical division of Berlin. Twenty years later, a nascent democratic movement was suppressed by a declaration of martial law in Poland; bipolar confrontation would markedly resurge for much of the 1980s. In 1991, the United States intervened in the Persian Gulf to reverse Saddam Hussein’s aggression, all while the Soviet Union suffered through the throes of its final collapse. And in 2001, the nation came under siege by radical terrorism.
Participants will delve into the roles of signals intelligence and information assurance, and not just as these capabilities supported military operations. More cogently, observers will examine how these factors affected and shaped military tactics, operations, strategy, planning, and command and control throughout history. The role of cryptology in preventing conflict and supporting peaceful pursuits will also be examined. The panels will include presentations in a range of technological, operational, organizational, counterintelligence, policy, and international themes.
Past symposia have featured scholarship that set out new ways to consider out cryptologic heritage, and this one will be no exception. The mix of practitioners, scholars, and the public precipitates a lively debate that promotes an enhanced appreciation for the context of past events. Researchers on traditional and technological cryptologic topics, those whose work in any aspect touches upon the historical aspects of cryptology as defined in its broadest sense, as well as foreign scholars working in this field, are especially encouraged to participate.
The Symposium will be held at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory’s Kossiakoff Center, in Laurel, Maryland, a location central to the Baltimore and Washington, D.C., areas. As has been the case with previous symposia, the conference will provide unparalleled opportunities for interaction with leading historians and distinguished experts. So please make plans to join us for either one or both days of this intellectually stimulating conference.
Interested persons are invited to submit proposals for a potential presentation or even for a full panel. While the topics can relate to this year’s theme, all serious work on any aspect of cryptologic history will be considered. Proposals should include an abstract for each paper and/or a statement of session purpose for each panel, as well as biographical sketches for each presenter. To submit proposals or form more information on this conference, contact Dr. Kent Sieg, the Center’s Symposium Executive Director, at 301-688-2336 or via email at kgsieg@nsa.gov.

For Additional Events two+ months or greater....view our online Calendar of Events

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